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ABSTRACT 
 
Augustine, the fourth-century Christian philosopher, is perhaps best-known for his 
spiritual autobiography Confessions. Two aspects of the problem of evil are arguably 
critical for comprehending his life in Books 1 through 9 of the work. His search for the 
nature and origin of evil in the various philosophies that he encounters (the intellectual 
aspect) and his struggles with his own weaknesses (the experiential aspect) are windows 
for understanding the actual dynamics of his sojourn. 
I defend the idea above by providing a fuller examination of the key role that both 
aspects play in his spiritual journey. Examining relevant events from Augustine’s life 
chronologically, I analyze his philosophical wanderings from his encounter with Cicero’s 
work Hortensius through his eventual disillusionment with the Manichaean religion, and 
finally, his move in the direction of Christian teachings with the help of Neo-Platonism. 
Along the way his philosophical questions (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with 
his own depravity (the experiential aspect) have an effect on each other until his ultimate 
move toward Christianity resolves both problems of evil. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO AUGUSTINE’S 
CONFESSIONS AND THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
 
Augustine’s Confessions, widely hailed as one of the most influential books in 
Western literature, especially in Western religious literature, continues to generate 
considerable interest among scholars, especially in academic circles in Europe and North 
America. Written from approximately 397 to 401, this unique work is well-known as 
Augustine’s account of his personal journey to the Christian faith. With Augustine as 
undoubtedly one of the most influential Christian philosophers and theologians in history, 
the interest in his Confessions is even more intense because of the personal background 
that the work provides about him.  
 However, despite the predominance of religious elements in the Confessions, the 
number and variety of other scholarly studies from other disciplines on this particular 
work are rather astonishing. Even a partial summation of some of the key articles and 
investigations from 1888 through 1995 by Richard Severson displays a startling range of 
academic inquiries from a wide variety of fields, ranging from autobiographical studies to 
classical and literary scholarship and from psychological criticism to assorted theological 
investigations, of course, including studies in spirituality, doctrinal debates, “God talk,” 
profiles of sin, and his use of Scripture throughout the work.
1
  Various philosophical 
issues besides the problem of evil also pervade the work such as the nature of time, the 
                                                          
 
1
  Richard Severson, The Confessions of Saint Augustine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1888-1995 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), v-vii. 
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phenomenon of memory, studies in ethics, and the nature of philosophy itself. Echoing 
Severson’s opening assessment, G.E. Gorman, in the Foreword to Severson’s work, notes 
how Confessions is “studied by literary critics as the paradigmatic Western 
autobiography, by psychologists as an ancient case study, by philosophers as a tract on 
time, and by theologians for many reasons.”2 Rarely has such a work in Western 
literature undergone so much serious attention in academia for so many diverse reasons. 
                              
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The aim of this particular study is to provide a focused exposition of the role of the 
problem of evil in Augustine’s Confessions. This analysis will be confined to Books 1 
through 9 since those books in the work contain the narrative of his journey to the 
Christian faith and the results of his conversion. Delineating two aspects of the problem 
of evil, an intellectual aspect and an experiential aspect, is arguably critical for 
comprehending his journey. The intellectual aspect concerns his search for the nature and 
origin of evil, and the experiential aspect focuses on his struggles with his own 
temptations and weaknesses. 
Both aspects are windows for better understanding the dynamics of his sojourn, and 
throughout the study I intend to defend that idea by providing a fuller examination of the 
key role that both play in the narrative. Examining relevant events from Augustine’s life 
chronologically, I analyze important episodes from his childhood, his philosophical 
wanderings stemming from his first encounter with Cicero’s work Hortensius, a careful  
                                                          
2
  G. E. Gorman, foreword to The Confessions of Saint Augustine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1888-
1995, by Richard Severson (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), xi. 
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examination of his eventual disillusionment with Manichean beliefs, and finally, his 
move in the direction of Christian teachings, with the help of Neo-Platonism as an 
intermediary of sorts. Regarding “resolution” of the first problem of evil (the intellectual 
dilemma), it is helpful to understand that the resolution of that problem in Confessions is 
more one of explanation than justification. Augustine’s answer enables him to reach an 
understanding, to his satisfaction, of the nature and origin of evil. However, this 
explanation is not necessarily to be understood as a complete justification of God’s 
allowance of evil, especially in the more technical sense of theodicy as justifications 
developed by thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz, John Hick, and others. This distinction 
is helpful in better understanding Augustine’s quest.  
The intellectual problem of evil itself needs very little introduction. Formulated in the 
context of monotheism, the dilemma that is posed consists of explaining how evil can 
simultaneously exist with a deity that is all-powerful and all-knowing and supremely 
good since such a being would not want evil to exist and by definition would also possess 
the needed qualities to ensure that evil not become a reality in the first place. In other 
words, it is logically inconsistent, some have argued, to have evil present in the same 
world as a being with the attributes above. As a result, some thinkers have resorted to 
denying that one of the premises above is true, making this description of the problem of 
evil one of the most vexing issues in the history of Western philosophy because of its 
potential ramifications. Augustine’s related focus on the origin of evil also appears in his 
Confessions, but the formulation of the main dilemma above will be sufficient at this 
point for introducing the study.  
4 
 
An exposition of Augustine’s understanding of evil at various times is a critical 
component for reaching a high level of understanding of the role of the problem of evil in 
his life. Moreover, understanding his interaction with the problem more fully can be 
useful in better understanding his philosophy on this issue in other works of his such as 
On Free Choice of the Will as well as his anti-Manichean works. In addition, such an 
analysis can also shed more light on Augustine’s other views in philosophy such as his 
positions on free will, the concept of the will itself, and the moral nature of God.  
The purpose of this current chapter is to deal with certain preliminary issues before 
commencing with the investigation in subsequent chapters. In particular, I seek to provide 
some background to Confessions such as Augustine’s key reasons for writing the work 
and also the related issues of the structure and unity of the text and the historicity of the 
narrative. In view of several key verdicts on the historicity question, considerations of the 
effect of that issue on the study are included here as well. This section is followed by a 
survey of various interpretive approaches that have been proposed for understanding the 
work. The consideration of each interpretative approach also includes observations on 
how the study can be beneficial when it is applied to that particular understanding of the 
text. Finally, the last section in this chapter contains an overview of key periods in the 
narrative and issues that will be analyzed in the various chapters of the study.  
                                  
 
Literary and Historical Considerations of Confessions 
 
 
Reflections on both literary and historical factors concerning the work are crucial. In 
Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, arguably the most respected biography on Augustine 
from the twentieth century, Peter Brown outlines both the literary and historical 
5 
 
background from that period in an effort to understand what led up to the writing of the 
Confessions. Brown notes that “religious autobiography” with common features of 
“wandering, temptations, sad thoughts of mortality, and the search for truth” was a genre 
that pagan philosophers had originally established and one that Christians had continued 
in the fourth century.
3
 Thus, Augustine already had a ready audience for this type of 
work. Brown also observes how he would have felt the need to explain himself to his 
contemporaries.
4
 His anti-Manichean works still did not fully settle in everyone’s mind 
his break with his past association with that particular group. And although he had been 
baptized even by Ambrose himself, his works thus far had shown a strong acquaintance 
with pagan philosophers such as the Platonists. In addition, his conversion had been 
relatively “unspectacular,” especially when compared to various conversion narratives of 
his contemporaries since he had simply retired from his chair in rhetoric at Milan after 
serving to the end of that particular term on the basis of bad health.  
Moreover, as Augustine entered middle age including coming to grips with his new 
role of priest and later bishop, this new adjustment led to intense self-examination as a 
man “made deeply afraid by the weight of my sins.”5 Thus, Brown argues that 
Confessions is not a “book of reminiscences” but rather an “anxious turning to the past,” 
which is “unmistakable” in the text itself: “Allow me, I beseech You [God], grant me to 
wind round and round in my present memory the spirals of my errors [circuire praesenti 
memoria praeteritos circuitus erroris mei].”6   
                                                          
3
  Peter Lamont Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000), 152. 
4
  Ibid., 156. 
5
  Ibid., 157, Brown’s translation from Conf., 10.43.70. 
6
  Ibid., Brown’s translation from Conf., 4.1.1. Latin insertions are mine unless otherwise noted, and I use 
James J. O’Donnell’s Latin text for Confessions unless otherwise noted: James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: 
Confessions, vol 1., Introduction and Text (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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In connection with the title of the work itself, James J. O’Donnell notes the biblical 
roots in the use of the word confession in Psalm 9:2, 31:18, 34:18
7
 for example.
8
 
However, the connotations of thanksgiving and praise that are innate to biblical usage 
cannot be found in classical usage. Confiteri (to confess) is a verb involving speaking, 
and confessio (confession) is speech that God makes possible, and hence it should be 
seen as authorized by Him.
9
 God is usually the addressee, but not always (e.g. 10.37.62). 
As the subject varies, the effect could be that of praise (a confession of praise), self-
blame (a confession of sins), or “determined avowal” (a confession of faith) with the last 
type as the least common in Augustine’s Confessions. 
In Augustine: A New Biography, the provocative work by O’Donnell that was 
published in 2005, he takes a somewhat different stance on the circumstances 
surrounding the writing of the Confessions. Since he also authored the masterful 3-
volume edition of the Confessions (text and commentary) in 1992, O’Donnell’s 
biography on Augustine has gained substantial attention. O’Donnell essentially maintains 
that Augustine wrote Confessions primarily in order to resolve any current questions or 
rumors about his past and thus, enable his influence, unimpeded, to help the church that 
he served to be triumphant and successful, especially against the Manichees and 
Donatists, a move which also favored Augustine’s own ambitions in the long run as 
                                                          
7
  O’Donnell’s list of verses here uses the verse numbering found in the Vulgate edition of the Bible and 
translations based on the Vulgate. In translations such as the RSV (Revised Standard Version), the first 
verse that he references would be found in Psalm 9:1 and the last in 35:18. Regarding the second passage, 
31:18, O’Donnell is arguably referring to 31:5b (32:5b in the RSV) because (1) Psalm 31 in the Vulgate 
only contains eleven verses, and (2) O’Donnell’s Latin wording of the second example of the use of confess 
is essentially the Latin equivalent of 31:5b. (O’Donnell gives the Latin phrases of the usage of confess in 
each verse, but without classifying the type of confession. The first and last references are reasonable 
examples of confessions of praise, with the second reference serving as a confession of sin.) 
8
  James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 2, Commentary on Books 1-7 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 3. 
9
  Ibid., 4. 
7 
 
well.
10
 O’Donnell notes the connection between this goal of resisting rival groups and the 
overall structure of the book:  
We do not understand Augustine at this crucial point in his life unless we see that the central 
preoccupations of the Confessions are the Manichees, whom he seeks to dismiss before the work is 
one-third complete—and the Donatists, whom he never mentions. Between them he sets his own 
performance, an artful confession, exculpatory in the way public confession exculpates and justifies at 
the same time.
11
 
 
O’Donnell submits that it was crucial in Augustine’s view to use his past, with a 
mighty work of God in it, in order to justify his present, which served to strengthen his 
influence and work for the African Caecilianist church and against the Donatist church.
12
 
Reaching that goal required minimizing his previous Manicheism, portraying it as a 
“youthful indiscretion,” and coupled with exactly the kind of “sexual profligacy” that a 
Manichean teacher would have strongly objected to. For the same reason it was also 
crucial to minimize his previous associations with Christianity such as any enrollment as 
a catechumen while an infant, adolescent considerations of the faith, and ongoing 
associations with Christian institutions in his early period, etc., so that his true 
faithfulness as a Christian only began when he underwent baptism in Milan in 387. This 
is not to say that O’Donnell views Augustine’s account as totally contrived. Rather, he 
sees the narrative portion as reflecting Augustine’s distinct spin on specific events in his 
past in such a way so as to favor his own current ecclesiastical and political position in 
connection with the struggles of the church that he served. 
In support of his interpretation O’Donnell also notes specific discrepancies in the text. 
For example, he argues that Augustine’s assertion of spending nine years with the 
Manichees is problematic since even a basic calculation of his time with them from the 
                                                          
10
  James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: A New Biography (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 41. 
11
  Ibid., 53. 
12
  Ibid., 53. 
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time he turned nineteen until his thirtieth birthday, approximately the time that he 
decisively broke with the Manichees in Rome to move to Milan, actually adds up to 
eleven years.
13
 Furthermore, instead of the unpersuasive efforts of Faustus, a key 
Manichee leader, serving as the factor that confirmed Augustine’s skeptical outlook on 
that religion, O’Donnell observes that only when Augustine left Rome and moved to a 
city in which no Manichee community existed, did he make a final break with that 
group.
14
 However, O’Donnell acknowledges as well that Augustine’s fear in composing 
Confessions stemmed not only from fear of a defeat in “local church politics” but also a 
significant fear of failure in regard to his service to God, his lord and master.
15
 Thus, as 
O’Donnell notes, “the act of telling his story sustained him and helped him shape the way 
he   could lead his people and achieve his goals.”  
Concerning the historicity of the narrative, Garry Wills notes the conflict between the 
portrayal of various events in Confessions and Augustine’s other writings such as the 
downplaying of the influence of Neo-Platonist teachers such as Mallius Theodore or the 
exaggeration of the importance of other figures such as Ambrose.
16
 Nevertheless, he 
submits that instead of Augustine striving to meet modern standards of historiography, 
Augustine’s meditative tone in the work focuses on the “action of grace” in his life, 
God’s lessons that he did not recognize or prove receptive to at the time, which is the 
“true story” in Augustine’s view, especially in light of the participation of his life’s 
pattern in the larger picture of divine work in creation and human history.
17
  
                                                          
13
  Ibid., 44-45. 
14
  Ibid., 45. 
15
  Ibid., 7. 
16
  Garry Wills, St. Augustine’s Childhood: Confessiones, Book One (New York: Viking Penguin, 2001), 
11. 
17
  Ibid., 11-12. 
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Fully addressing the issue of the historicity of the narrative section is outside the 
scope of this study (although I do include alternative understandings of Book 8 further 
below). However, I will note that it is arguably still too early for firm conclusions to be 
drawn by scholars on O’Donnell’s views concerning Augustine’s motivations, and even 
given O’Donnell’s thesis, Wills’s input as to Augustine’s view of the “true story” would 
suggest that even a modified version of the account, one that emphasizes certain events 
and deemphasizes others without a strict adherence to historiography, might reveal more 
about the true Augustine than might be thought otherwise. Examining the intellectual and 
experiential aspects of evil with Wills’s interpretation illuminates at the very least the 
intricate dynamic of those elements at the level of divine action that Augustine believes is 
active in his life, in particular in the larger context of divine work throughout human 
history. For example, the temptations that Augustine struggles with in his own life as the 
experiential problem and the work of God’s grace in addressing that problem could be 
seen as somehow representative of the larger role of grace in addressing the experiential 
problem of evil as a whole in the history of humanity.  
Brown’s points on Augustine’s potential need to come to grips with elements of his 
past are also well taken. Overall, I will conduct this study on the premise that the 
narrative sections are historical and thus portrayed as autobiographical, essentially 
Brown’s position on the historicity question. If this premise is accurate, then the benefits 
of the study have already been outlined above and even more advantages will be seen 
below in the treatment of the various interpretative approaches to Confessions. If 
O’Donnell’s position on Augustine’s motivations for writing his Confessions is correct, 
then the study is still beneficial for two reasons: first, as was stated above, Confessions as 
10 
 
a modified account of Augustine’s struggles does not inevitably negate the lessons that 
can be gleaned about Augustine the man. Of course, it would mean that one must be more 
selective and discerning in what conclusions to draw when applying this analysis toward 
that particular end, but an altered version of Augustine’s past does not render such an 
investigation useless in that regard, albeit more difficult to utilize it in understanding 
Augustine as a person.  
Secondly, even under the scenario that O’Donnell’s thesis is correct, one could still 
arguably have reason to trust what can be learned from Augustine’s philosophical 
understanding of evil, especially in connection with his other works since putting one’s 
“best foot forward” in an account of the past does not necessarily negate the 
philosophical aspects of the work. However, what should one make of a worst-case 
scenario in which Augustine’s arguments and contemplation on evil in Confessions and 
his other works are totally spurious, simply an ongoing and effective method for 
Augustine to place himself in good standing with church authorities and Christian 
intellectuals in that period by using the problem of evil to argue for the superiority of 
Christianity over rival alternatives on this crucial issue? Although such a scenario strikes 
me as extremely doubtful, even here lessons could still be drawn from his use of the 
experiential and intellectual aspects as he makes the fullest utilization of arguments and 
reasoning that resonate with readers of his time, not to mention the effectiveness of such 
arguments in attacking rival groups’ understanding of evil and refuting their own attacks 
in this regard. So the only interpretation of Confessions that might yield very little, if any, 
lessons from the ensuing study here would be a purely allegorical understanding of the 
work, an interpretation that is seriously problematic in my view.  
11 
 
On the issue of historicity, two other considerations that are helpful to consider 
involve the all-important conversion scene in Book 8. First, Leo Ferrari takes the position 
that at least some significant aspects of that crucial scene are fictional. For example, he 
discounts the factuality of Augustine’s encounter with Romans 13:13-14 in effecting his 
conversion because of the existence of only one citation of that passage by Augustine in 
the fifteen-year period from conversion (386) to the completion of Confessions (401)—a 
conspicuous absence for a passage that Augustine presumably would have cherished as 
being central to his coming to Christianity.
18
 Noting similarities between the accounts of 
Paul’s conversion and Augustine’s own, Ferrari comments on the lack of numerous 
allusions to Paul’s conversion in Augustine’s writings during his early post-conversion 
period.
19
 When this observation is contrasted with the seventeen allusions to Paul’s 
conversion during Augustine’s period of work on Confessions (396-401 in Ferrari’s 
view), Ferrari suggests that Augustine used Paul’s story as a paradigm on how to present 
his own account.
20
 In addition, in Sermon 89 Augustine includes the story of Nathanael 
under the fig tree, a narrative that is symbolic of Augustine’s situation under the fig tree 
in Book 8, along with the voice that calls to Paul in his conversion: “Saul, Saul, why do 
you persecute me?”21 The similarity between the elements in the sermon and Augustine’s 
own life-changing encounter under the fig tree with the mysterious voice that tells him to 
“take and read” is clear enough in Ferrari’s view. 
 
 
                                                          
18
  Leo Ferrari, “Beyond Augustine’s Conversion Scene,” Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian, ed. 
Joanne McWilliam (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 98. 
19
  Ibid., 100.  
20
  Ibid., 100-101. 
21
  Ibid., 101. 
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But how would Augustine ever justify taking such liberties? In contrast to the silent  
reading that one often finds today, Ferrari submits that works such as Confessions were 
written to be read aloud to a gathered audience, thus with the text serving as a script for 
the purpose of a dramatic performance.
22
 In such a format “the presentation, to be 
dramatically effective, must subordinate factuality to the canons of dramatic 
presentation,” leading to a “certain romanticizing of reality…” Overall, in the 
presentation the audience is invited, in a sense, to be involved in grief over the 
indubitable truth of Augustine’s sinfulness of the past and his rebellion against God.23 
Moreover, on the issue of truth in Book 10 (10.3.3-4) Augustine remarks that his 
confession is not just for the curious, inert about changing their own lives, but for those 
whose ears are “opened to him by charity.” In his essay On Lying, written two years 
before his writing of Confessions, Augustine makes a similar point and also submits how 
allegory and figurative language are legitimate ways of expressing truth, especially 
spiritual truth. The parallel between Paul’s conversion and his own not only increased the 
dramatic impact but served to confirm the spiritual tradition that his conversion belonged 
to.
24
 In a culture that heavily valued the past instead of looking to the future, his audience 
“savoured authenticity” in his presentation instead of suspecting plagiarism as the 
modern mind would.    
Despite Ferrari’s rejection of the factuality of key elements of the conversion scene, 
the present study can still be helpful. One immediate benefit of the study for accounts like 
Ferrari’s involves Ferrari’s observation of the format of presenting Confessions to an 
audience. With presumably a mixture of both the curious and committed followers of 
                                                          
22
  Ibid., 102. Ferrari cites 10.3.3 and 4 and 10.4.6 from Confessions in support of this understanding. 
23
  Ibid., 103. 
24
  Ibid., 104. 
13 
 
Christ among the listeners, Augustine’s treatment and explanation of the experiential 
problem of evil throughout the entire work would need to be relevant and compelling for 
the first group and theologically faithful and encouraging for the second. Thus, one can 
learn from his treatment of the solution to experiential evil in Book 8 how Augustine 
seeks to show the first category of listeners that the Christian solution to his struggles is 
truly effectual. This effort includes his careful choice of the relevant Romans passage to 
illustrate the Christian claim of the authoritative nature of written revelation.  
For the second category of listeners, one relevant question concerns how Augustine’s 
treatment of Christian victory in Book 8 serves to strengthen believers’ understanding of 
their own conversion against evil and to encourage them to persevere against other 
personal vices in their ongoing journey of faith. A consideration of the central role that 
Augustine chooses to give the Romans passage in the scene can shed light on his 
emphasis on the use of God’s written revelation in the context of dealing with 
experiential evil as well as the key role of grace in the process. Moreover, through the use 
of imagery from the story of Nathanael, Augustine suggests a parallel here between 
Nathanael’s story and Augustine’s own initial reticence to consider Christ and his 
teachings as a serious option, thus reinforcing the importance of grace and perhaps 
instilling Catholic listeners with the additional hope that their non-believing friends could 
also be converted. The parallels with Paul’s own conversion in that scene can heighten 
these points of emphasis even more in view of Paul’s marked animosity toward 
Christianity before his own conversion in the Book of Acts.  
A second but related point of contention for Book 8 involves the question, put forth 
by some commentators, of whether Augustine was really converted to Neo-Platonism 
14 
 
instead of to Christianity in the autumn of 386. John McGuckin concurs largely with the 
more moderate proposal that Augustine the bishop superimposed much of his feelings, 
both philosophical and religious, from 400 on “his younger self” of 386, a case first 
raised by A. Harnack in a lecture in 1888.
25
 McGuckin submits that the conscious use of 
literary stylizations throughout the text of Confessions supports this thesis as well. 
Although McGuckin readily acknowledges how Augustine’s understanding and practice 
of Christianity were to undergo a formative evolution in the years after his conversion, he 
submits that Augustine’s general Christian direction, albeit one with heavy Neo-Platonic 
influences at the beginning, had been established when Augustine strongly accepted the 
“biblical and incarnational Platonism” that Ambrose had preached in Milan. Thus, while 
the versions of his conversion in his early writings were expressed more in philosophical 
terms, after years of imbibing elements of Pauline theology Augustine focuses more on 
“biblical” themes in his conversion account in Confessions: “pride, grace, and the person 
of Christ.”26 McGuckin also comments on the connection between the fig tree imagery 
and Nathanael as well as parallels between Augustine’s conversion and Paul’s, part of 
Augustine’s effort to illustrate “the action of grace on the proud will of man.”27 However, 
the similarities between Augustine’s description of his anguished struggle of the will and 
the spiritual emotion of the Psalmist in Psalms 51 and 38 are especially noteworthy. 
McGuckin does not claim that the conversion scene is “entirely an artificial edification 
                                                          
25
  John Anthony McGuckin, “The Enigma of Augustine’s Conversion: September 386 AD,” Clergy 
Review, 71, no. 2 (1986): 320. For Harnack’s key work on this topic, see Adolf von Harnack, Monasticism 
and The Confessions of S. Augustine, trans. E. E. Kellet, F. H. Marseille (New York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 
1910). 
26
  McGuckin, “The Enigma of Augustine’s Conversion: September 386 AD,” 321. 
27
  McGuckin, “The Enigma of Augustine’s Conversion: September 386 AD,” 322. 
15 
 
for the reader,” but he does hold that scriptural testimonies were used in shaping the basic 
narrative structure and even in supplying some details of the scene.
28
  
Some of the benefits of the study for Ferrari’s interpretation are also relevant for 
McGuckin’s approach in view of their common findings such as parallels between 
Augustine’s account and Nathanael’s and Paul’s own stories. However, McGuckin’s 
observations of the use of the Psalms, especially Psalm 38 with Augustine’s inner 
struggle of the will, can open the door to further insights on how Augustine uses the 
experiential conflict to encourage believers in their own struggles and how he utilizes 
Scripture to accomplish that aim. In addition, Augustine’s use of penitential passages 
(Psalms 51:7, 6:3, 79:5, 8)
29
 for an exploration of his innermost being in Book 8
30
 can 
also shed light on his instruction to Christians on the contrite heart they should seek to 
cultivate in their experiential struggles.  
 
 
Relevance of the Study for Various Interpretative Approaches 
 
 
One of the key investigations regarding Confessions involves the problem of the 
structural unity of the text itself. Since the relevance and purpose of examining the 
problem of evil in the work is connected, of course, to some kind of interpretative 
structure for understanding the book, it is helpful to survey some of the structural 
frameworks surrounding various studies in Confessions in order to understand the 
relevance of the study for specific interpretations that have been proposed. Doing so also 
serves to expose the reader to the unusual complexity of the Confessions as well as to the 
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richness and depth of various understandings of the text. Chosen in part on the basis of 
their differences in comparison to each other, these views present a basic sample of a 
number of plausible ways that scholars have proposed for understanding the work. 
It is also worth observing at this point the difficulty that scholars experience in 
providing a single, workable understanding of the text. In his masterful commentary on 
the Confessions, O’Donnell notes in his Introduction how it is “impossible…to take the 
Confessions in a vacuum, and…impossible to give any single interpretation that will 
satisfy.”31 Robert McMahon, whose own interpretative approach is also included in this 
chapter, asserts that “no single view need be, or can be, right in any absolute sense.”32 He 
uses Dante’s Commedia as an example of how two different understandings could, in a 
sense, be equally valid: 
Dante’s Commedia, for example, can be understood as representing a journey with three guides or 
as one recorded over three cantiche. These two descriptions divide the poem in very different ways and 
involve different visions of its literary form. Yet both are clearly correct within their own terms. The 
formal coherence of the Confessions may similarly be described in different ways, all of them 
“correct,” each with its limitations. The best descriptions, it seems to me, comprehend the work more 
completely than others. They reveal the Confessions as an even more beautiful, more coherent and 
compelling work than it has hitherto seemed. 
 
Although it is perhaps inevitable that debates on the one “correct” interpretation will  
continue, McMahon is helpful in pointing out how more than one understanding can 
reveal additional insights about the work as a whole.  
In all of the following approaches, the benefit of the ensuing study on evil may also 
shed more light on the roles of Books 10-13 too in connection with the work as a whole.  
Of course, the brief discussion of the key points of each approach below scarcely does 
them justice. My own view of the Confessions is not strictly tied to any one suggested 
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interpretation. I strongly acknowledge the overall prayerful nature of the work, which is 
one reason that I do not view the narrative portion as autobiography in the stricter, 
twentieth-century understanding of that genre. 
 
O’Donnell’s and Crosson’s Approaches 
O’Donnell’s interpretation and also Frederick J. Crosson’s interpretative 
understanding serve as two complementary approaches of the value of my particular 
topic. O’Donnell essentially views Augustine’s work as an “intellectual autobiography” 
with two ecstatic experiences in Book 7 and the Ostia vision in Book 9 serving as the 
culmination of Augustine’s ascent from a state of ignorance to a specific new level of 
illumination.
33
 O’Donnell then argues that this ascent of the mind leads to the latter part 
of the work, consisting mostly of theological content, with Augustine’s attempt to explore 
more deeply the nature and activity of God in various ways: God the creator by 
juxtaposing the phenomenon of time with that of eternity in Book 11, Augustine’s own 
relation to understanding the divine revelation of God the Son in Book 12, and God the 
Spirit’s work in history as creation history is juxtaposed with church history in Book 
13.
34
  
Regarding the narrative portions of the text, O’Donnell argues for a triad pattern             
corresponding to the Trinity.
35
 More specifically, he identifies a correspondence of the  
key positive features of the Trinity: God the Father is, God the Son knows, and God the 
Spirit loves. This being, knowing, and loving is reflected in humanity, made in the image 
of God, but the distortion of the three aspects in sinful man becomes an evident pattern in 
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Augustine’s downward descent in his Confessions.36 Drawn from the three categories of 
sin in 1 John 2:16 in the New Testament, the actual order of descent intentionally 
corresponds to the three temptations in these same general areas against Christ by the 
devil in Matthew’s Gospel.37 In his 1992 commentary, O’Donnell argues that 
Augustine’s references to his three sins in Book 1 (1.10.16) are reflective of the three 
types of sin that he uses to examine his conscience much later in the work in Book 10:
38
 
“Assuredly You [God] command that I contain myself from the lust of the flesh, the lust 
of the eyes, and the pride of life” (10.30.41).39 The first category is exhibited in 
Augustine’s sins of the flesh--sensual pleasures, especially sexual desire, which dominate 
Book 2.
40
 The sin of curiosity, the desire to learn about forbidden areas, especially in 
magic and religion, corresponds to “the lust of the eyes”41 and takes place in Book 3 with 
Augustine’s escapades in Carthage, resulting in his encounter with the Manichees.42 
Book 4 reflects the sin of worldly ambition in connection with “the pride of life,” the 
third temptation from John’s epistle, as Augustine pursues a lucrative career.43 Therefore, 
the corruption of the triad follows the particular order of knowing, loving, and being, 
with Augustine “betraying each divine person in turn, the father last.” The spiritual ascent 
takes place by reversing his path, with events in Milan dealing respectively with his 
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ambition and curiosity and eventually his sexual lust in the conversion of Book 8.
44
 Thus, 
according to O’Donnell, his understanding of the Confessions takes into account 
Augustine’s fascination with triad patterns in this period as well as his deliberate efforts 
to shape his story in a way that is reflective of the very theology he holds to. 
Crosson’s understanding is similar to O’Donnell’s in some respects. Books 2, 3, and 4 
are the marks of stages of overall spiritual descent, signifying an estrangement from God, 
with Books 6, 7, and 8 serving as marks of his gradual ascent back to God.
45
 Crosson 
agrees as well with the triad pattern in the Confessions with the three categories of sin 
dominating his descent, and how his ascent back to God addresses each of the three. 
However, although the work serves as an “autobiography” at one level, at another level in 
the work as a whole Crosson emphasizes how the philosophical problem of divine 
transcendence in relation to the world (i.e. how can a God that is totally transcendent 
relate to that world in space and time?)
46
 constitutes the higher purpose of the entire 
work. Consisting of two parts, the problem of omnipresence dominates Books 1-7, with 
the problem of divine speaking/acting in time including the Incarnation, serving as the 
focus of Books 7-13.
47
 
Although the issue of omnipresence initially emerged in 1.2.2, finally in Book 10 
Augustine focuses directly on memory ultimately to show that God is not already present 
there as a result of recollection (10.26.37).
48
 Instead, he can only have known about God 
through, in Crosson’s words, a “direct noetic encounter, however obscure...” The second 
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problem initially emerged in Augustine’s thinking with his observation that the works of 
the Platonists offered key truths regarding the nature of the divine, but what they lacked 
in their writings was that “no man hears [God] calling to us.”49 Then, in Book 11 
Augustine observes how “…in the Gospel, [your Word] speaks through the flesh, and this 
word sounded outwardly in the ears of men [insonuit foris auribus hominum],”50 and he 
continues with subsequent meditations on that Word, specifically Genesis here, in 
seeking to understand more fully God speaking in time. Consequently, regarding the 
second problem, which stemmed originally from his experiences of God communicating 
to him through Paul’s New Testament writings in Book 7 and through a child in the 
conversion scene of Book 8, Augustine grapples more extensively with the “relation of 
God to the temporal world” in the meditations of the last few books of his Confessions.51 
In connection with these two interpretations, my focus on the role of the problem of 
evil is relevant to both approaches. With O’Donnell’s approach an understanding of 
Augustine’s struggles with evil can shed additional light on the intellectual aspects of the 
journey in the autobiography since I will examine throughout this study how both aspects 
of the problem fuel much of his intellectual journey, thus providing background for the 
culmination of the ecstatic experiences. An analysis of the problem also dovetails with 
other issues in O’Donnell’s approach: To what extent does the experiential evil that flows 
from the three categories of sin aid in addressing the intellectual problem of evil? Do all 
three play an important role in that regard even though the issue of lust is arguably the 
largest factor in the experiential component of evil for him? In connection with the 
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previous question, in a broader sense does an experience of one’s flaws in one category 
make a significant difference in one’s approach to the intellectual problem in comparison 
to someone with struggles in another category? And if lust is the most predominant 
temptation in the experiential aspect of his struggle with evil, what light does that shed on 
Augustine’s view of the Trinity and humanity in the image of God?  
With Crosson’s approach the clearest benefit of the examination of evil in this study 
stems from the specific role that the problem plays in addressing the major theme of 
divine transcendence in the Confessions: what role does the problem play in resolving 
those metaphysical questions that Augustine explores throughout the work, and in 
particular, are there ways in which the experiential component of evil can shed light on 
those initial questions that the traditional formulation of the intellectual component does 
not directly address? Even if the intellectual component of the problem is arguably the 
driving force behind Augustine’s evolving conception of God’s nature and 
characteristics, what aspects of the intellectual problem were themselves “driven” by the 
experiential aspects of the problem? Would Augustine have reached the particular 
answers that he did without the presence of the experiential problem at various times in  
his life? And in a broader sense, to what extent are the intellectual aspects of the 
problems that philosophers grapple with influenced by their own personal experiences of 
those problems? 
 
Kotze’s Approach 
Annemare Kotze’s interpretation involves an understanding of the text based on 
features that she argues make up a protreptic/paraenetic literary approach in Late 
22 
 
Antiquity.
52
 She outlines how protreptic/paraenetic literature in Late Antiquity contains 
usually a conversion story of sorts, which served first a protreptic purpose, specifically 
seeking to convert the reader to the specific worldview of the author, and eventually 
followed by more writing with either protreptic or polemic elements and usually with a 
didactic purpose.
53
 The protreptic section itself also served a paraenetic aim—seeking to 
encourage the commitment of those already converted to continue to hold tightly to the 
chosen path. In support of her position, she points to this same approach in three works of 
Late Antiquity that Pierre Courcelle in his work Les Confessions de Saint Augustin dans 
la tradition litteraire: Antecedents et Posterite pointed to as possible models for the 
structure that Augustine employed in Confessions: specifically On the Trinity by Hilary 
of Poitiers, To Donatus from Cyprian of Carthage, and Dialogue with Trypho by Justin 
Martyr. Arguing that Courcelle only made the parallels in connection with the 
autobiographical portions of the texts in question, she submits that the paraenetic sections 
indicate a strong parallel as well.  
Concerning On the Trinity she notes how Hilary’s careful refutation of Arian 
teachings is preceded by the personal story of Hilary’s own conversion54 with the 
climactic section taking place with Hilary’s attainment of faith and baptism in Book 1.14. 
Regarding Cyprian’s To Donatus Kotze submits that sermons of Augustine’s indicate his 
familiarity with Cyprian’s conversion story from chapters 3 and 4 of the work, and after 
the body of Cyprian’s letter focuses on vices to be avoided, the book closes with a 
“didactic tone” in chapters 14 through 16 to encourage the reader to shun the evils 
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previously discussed.
55
 Kotze suggests as well that the garden scene in Book 8 for 
Augustine’s conversion may point to Augustine’s desire that his conversion be seen as 
fitting the traditional conversion scenarios of such earlier works. In Justin Martyr’s 
Dialogue with Trypho, the earliest of the three works, Kotze argues for a similar overall 
pattern: after an autobiographical section, relatively brief in this case, the author includes 
a polemical discussion regarding the merits of the Jewish and Christian positions on 
various issues. Although there is no conversion story in this text, the work closes with a 
direct appeal for Trypho and his colleagues to convert to Christianity.
56
  
Even though the conversion narrative in Confessions (Books 1-9) is larger than the 
ones in these earlier works, Kotze observes that the basic parallels are still valid: in 
Augustine’s work, despite the protreptic section with his own conversion story and 
baptism making up nine of the thirteen books of the work, those first nine books, in terms 
of length, constitute only roughly half of the entire text in comparison to the exegetical 
books, 10-13.
57
 However, Kotze includes the idea that the exegetical books reinforce the 
protreptic aims as well, but they also serve as a polemic against Manichean views about 
the nature of God, similar to the polemical purpose of Hilary’s final section in his own 
work against Arian views.
58
 She also notes that if the protreptic/paraenetic view is 
correct, then modern readers of Confessions with their more contemporary 
understandings of autobiography approach the text with erroneous presuppositions 
precisely because they are unaware of the protreptic purpose behind the text itself, 
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whereas Augustine’s combination of conversion narrative and exegetical books would 
have been largely expected by the reader of that period.
59
 
The study on evil can benefit Kotze’s approach in several ways: How much does the 
experiential aspect of the problem play a role in serving the protreptic aim in comparison 
to the role of the intellectual component, especially in view of the strong emphasis on 
correct moral behavior and appropriate virtues in some of the previous works that Kotze 
discusses in order to build her case? Does Augustine emphasize the experiential aspect of 
the problem more than the intellectual component in this regard? If the conversion in 
Book 8 is arguably the climax of the conversion narrative in the protreptic section of the 
work, in what ways does the resolution of the experiential problem of evil in that section 
also serve a paraenetic purpose, especially when Book 9 is taken into consideration as 
well? Moreover, the question of whether there is a larger emphasis on the experiential, 
one that would encourage believers to persevere in the appropriate moral virtues 
(including the avoidance of the sin Augustine wrestles with), is also relevant to consider. 
Or on the other hand, does the intellectual element constitute a stronger paraenetic thread 
throughout the work, especially in view of Augustine’s reflections on his improved 
understanding of God’s good nature throughout the work and the spiritual peace and 
intellectual satisfaction that he seemingly gains as a result? Addressing such questions 
could conceivably shed new light on Augustine’s use of the literary approach that Kotze 
subscribes to his Confessions. 
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Suchocki’s and McMahon’s Approaches 
Marjorie Suchocki’s symbolic understanding of Confessions concurs in a general 
sense with those scholars that see the work as representing more than one individual’s 
journey, which to them is key to understanding the overall structure. She argues that the 
two trees from the Garden of Eden in the biblical account are central for comprehending 
the structure.
60
 The tree of knowledge of good and evil is represented by the pear tree in 
Book 2 with the tree of life represented by the fig tree in Book 8. In the incident of the 
theft at the pear tree, Augustine comes to an “experiential knowledge of good and evil,” 
and at the fig tree Augustine is empowered to obey God’s command to “Take up and 
read.” Each symbolic tree scene is followed by five books that deal with the aftermath of 
the respective symbolism of that tree. The first five, Books 3-7, focus on the three results 
of the Fall that the pear tree symbolized: “lust, death, and an ignorance of God through 
the inability to cling to God” with the last idea serving as an overarching theme 
throughout the first section. The second group of five, Books 9-13, respond to these evils 
with the ignorance of God, for example, eventually resulting in a satisfied knowledge of 
God. Thus, the final three books, often seen as a “postscript” to the rest of the work, are 
definitely integral to the actual structure. 
In support of her thesis Suchocki compares Augustine’s interpretation of Genesis 2 
and 3, as found in Books 13 and 14 of his City of God, with the structure of Confessions. 
In particular, the sin with the forbidden fruit by Adam and Eve is repeated by Augustine 
in the pear tree incident.
61
 Moreover, with the inhabitants of the earthly city turning their 
misdirected love to things of the world, she argues that Augustine sees “sexual desire” in 
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the earthly city as the most obvious example of such inordinate love, a clear case in 
which the body refuses to obey the spirit. Likewise, in the next five books of Confessions 
Augustine’s own personal struggles with lust continually frustrate his efforts to attain 
knowledge of God. Book 3 in particular, with Augustine’s escapades in Carthage, 
engages this theme
62
 with the loss of a dear friend in Book 4 introducing the problem of 
death.
63
 Books 3 and 4 profoundly illustrate the ongoing theme of an “inability” to know 
God—with Book 3 detailing the encounter with the Manichees and in 4 a useless pursuit 
in Aristotle’s Categories.64 Books 5, 6, 7 use his growing reconsideration of church 
teachings ultimately to locate the lack of knowledge of God within the larger problem of 
the fallen will being unable to cling to God in the first place. 
His famous analysis of the will in part of Book 8 culminates in the conversion 
moment at the fig tree, and subsequent books correct the results of the original fall.
65
 
Book 9 tests his new perspective on death as four deaths occur including the death of his 
mother Monnica, whereas Book 10 deals with the issue of lust: Augustine’s commentary 
in that book on experiences of the senses and inordinate love are marked by the recurring  
idea “Give what You command and command what You will” (10.29.40, 30.41, 31.45, 
37.60).
66
 Although a satisfied knowledge of God is an overarching issue in the last five 
books, the last three in particular explore knowledge of God’s nature and character in 
even more profound ways: Book 11 is not simply a treatise on the nature of time but 
ultimately on God’s nature in relation to eternity,67 whereas Book 12 addresses his 
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original questions raised in Book 5 concerning God’s nature and creation including issues 
of metaphysical evil
68
 with Book 13 then focusing on the “salvation history” of that 
creation.
69
 
The study on the intellectual and experiential aspects of the problem of evil can be 
beneficial for several features of Suchocki’s interpretation. What bearing do the 
experiential aspects of the pear episode have on the inability of the will to cling to God? 
Is the experiential component more of a driving force overall in helping Augustine with 
the intellectual problem or does it serve more forcefully as a hindrance, consistent with 
Suchocki’s claim that his personal struggles with sin are an obstacle to his ability to know 
God? At the level of humanity is the larger theme here the idea that experiential evil is 
always the key obstacle in the earthly city’s inability to know God instead of other 
factors? The question of whether the pattern for Augustine, a gradual resolution of certain 
experiential evil even before the conversion of Book 8, is indicative of a larger pattern for 
all that ultimately become believers is also worth considering under Suchocki’s 
interpretative framework. 
On the unity of the book Robert McMahon takes a markedly different approach. 
McMahon notes how Book 13, examining creation allegorically, divides the creative acts 
into nine acts, and he submits that each divine act corresponds to each respective book in 
the first part of Confessions.
70
 Thus, McMahon surmises that “God’s creating the young 
Augustine as a Christian in books 1-9 recapitulates God’s creation of the Church in the 
allegory on universal Creation, in book 13.” However, McMahon goes further and asserts 
that Books 10-12 contain recurring patterns that are also analogous to the allegory in 
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Book 13, and he submits that the governing principle is the “return to origins” eventually 
resulting in a “return to the Origin,” the principle that governs the Neo-Platonist Upward 
Way.
71
 In uniting these parallels together, McMahon argues that the overall structure of 
the book follows this “return to the Origin,” a pattern very similar to the structure in The 
Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius and Dante’s Commedia.72 Noting various 
scholars that interpret these kinds of works in this way, McMahon also points to 
scholarship that even suggests such an early pattern in Plato’s Phaedrus and Republic as 
well. In the case of Confessions the narrative structure contains a three-part recurring 
pattern of “return to the Origin”: Augustine at a personal level in Books 1-9, the flow of 
ideas in Books 10-12 (Time is anterior to Memory in the same way that God’s 
sempiternal heaven is anterior to Time), and the allegory of redemption itself on a 
universal scale in Book 13. 
In McMahon’s approach the study here can be beneficial for two crucial questions. 
Does the resolution of the intellectual problem of evil play a larger role (in the “return to  
Origin” pattern that McMahon describes) as one might expect with the Neo-Platonic 
emphasis on the role of the mind in meeting the goal of merging with the “One”? Does 
the experiential problem play a significant role at all in the “return to Origin” in 
Confessions, and if so, is there a corresponding pattern in the general role of experiential 
evil in Plotinian thought when viewed through the experiential category?  
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Wills’s and Riley’s Approaches 
According to Garry Wills, various criticisms of the structure, unity, and historicity of 
Confessions are blunted by the observation that the genre of Augustine’s work does not 
fit the mold of a standard autobiography
73
 and that the prayerful nature of the book is a 
compelling factor in correctly understanding it.
74
 On the issue of historicity Wills’s more 
specific thoughts on that debate were already noted earlier in this chapter. Regarding the 
immediate structure of the book, he notes the patristic Christian framework that is 
employed throughout the work: six stages of human life, which in the original scheme 
match six events of creation, all of which also correspond to six ages in the history of 
humanity. Concerning the stages of human life, which Augustine explicitly refers to in 
his own growth and development throughout certain narrative sections (2.1 and 7.1), his 
Confessions only goes through Stage 4 (Juventus, age 30-45) since Augustine is still in 
that period himself when writing the work.
75
 However, by anticipating the “seventh day,” 
the “Sabbath,” when God rested after the original creation, the corresponding age in 
human history envisions the human soul in the final state contemplating the Trinity, and  
thus, Augustine uses the final three books of Confessions to reflect on the specific days of 
Creation and what they express regarding the nature of the Trinity. Wills notes favorably 
as well O’Donnell’s tracing of the triads throughout the work and their connection to the 
Trinity.
76
 
Regarding the study on evil in connection with Wills’s emphasis, the respective roles 
of both intellectual and experiential evil in each stage of human life are certainly worth 
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further exploration. Does Augustine suggest that the role of each might be typical, at least 
in a general way, in everyone’s stages of life or only in his own life? Are there any 
lessons to be gleaned when comparing the roles of both aspects in Augustine’s life to the 
potential roles of each in the corresponding six stages of human history that Wills 
discussed, a parallel that might prove to be similar to overt elements in Suchocki’s 
interpretation of the work? Examining these issues from such an angle may unlock 
further layers of development in Augustine’s work that have not yet been fully probed. 
Patrick Riley’s understanding of Augustine’s work in his study, Character and 
Conversion in Autobiography, focuses heavily on the issue of self-knowledge and self-
identity of the author. Despite the title Confessions, Riley rules out the idea that it is an 
autobiography in the strictest sense because of the unusual structure of the book.
77
 
However, he agrees that the autobiographical features in the work with the abrupt change 
in the format and type of discussion after Book 9 are part of the very keys to 
understanding the work and the theme of self-knowledge that Augustine struggles with. 
Books 1-8 focus on an epistemological quest by the preconversional self that strives to 
address the retrospective question of “who was I”?, a question that could never be 
answered since the self was separated from God in that period to begin with. 
In Book 10 the realization sinks in that the newly converted self also lacks the ability 
to be fully comprehended even by its own consciousness.
78
 In that book itself Augustine 
makes clear that his focus is now “not what I was, but what I am.”79  The original quest 
for “epistemological certitude” becomes now a desire for “ontological certainty” about 
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  Patrick Riley, Character and Conversion in Autobiography: Augustine, Montaigne, Descartes, 
Rousseau, and Sartre (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 24-25. 
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  Ibid., 50.  
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  Riley’s translation from Conf. 10.3.4.   
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the intricacies of the self along with the realization that only God can provide that 
knowledge.
80
 The limitations of memory that Augustine discovers in Book 10 showcase 
how he is unable to fully grasp or reach any satisfying level of self-knowledge. Books 11-
13 then affirm the idea that God’s radical difference from humans means that He can 
hardly be grasped by the human mind, but nevertheless, the value of the self must be 
based on this divine source. The “metaphysical difficulties” presented through those 
books reiterate why self-representation is no longer a possibility apart from God. Issues 
of language and also of temporality are the vehicles for reinforcing this idea in Book 11
81
 
with the analysis of God’s creative acts in Books 12 and 13 serving to recapitulate the 
radical difference between God and humans and consequently, the utter impossibility of 
human self representation.
82
 Riley’s summary of this section inextricably ties the genre 
and structure of the book to the overarching struggle for self-knowledge: 
Confessions must be read as an autobiography that elides its own autobiographical content in order 
to demonstrate the absolute futility of any autobiographical venture. The conversional moment is the 
fulcrum on which this elision turns: not precisely its motor, but the sign revealing that the 
preconversional self was never really quite a self, and that the postconversional self is nothing more 
than the absolute desire to undergo yet another transformation, this time to become an indivisible part 
of the eternity of the divine plenitude.
83
 
 
If Riley’s interpretative position holds sufficient merit, then the profundity for 
Augustine’s understanding of self-identity cannot be overstated. 
The present study’s relation to Riley’s thesis could involve two questions in 
particular. First, what role do both aspects of the problem of evil play in hindering or 
helping Augustine’s preconversional self from reaching the apex of conversion? The 
question of what relation there is between both components in causing Augustine’s new 
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desire for “ontological certainty” as well as how his retrospective look at both affects his 
understanding of “self,” both preconversional and postconversional, would also merit 
further inquiry. More general questions such as the role of both problems in one’s 
grappling with the issues of self-identity and self-knowledge to begin with also come to 
mind.  
                                                
 
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
In the second chapter I examine the experiential aspect of the problem of evil as the 
starting point, with the idea that this component arguably launches or at the very least 
heightens Augustine’s eventual preoccupation with the intellectual problem of evil. I 
submit as well that for him the experiential aspect is an accurate barometer of the overall 
state of his spiritual health. As a result, I commence with an examination of relevant  
episodes in the first part of Augustine’s life, ranging from initial observations about his 
childhood in Book 1, to his growing problem of lust as an adolescent (2.2.2) to the 
incident of the stolen pears (2.4.9). I also explore here various understandings of the pear 
tree incident, and my analysis of these events also includes the connection between the 
experiential problem of evil and his move away from the God of his mother’s Catholic 
faith along with a critique of his perspective on evil in this chapter. 
In the third chapter I take into account Augustine’s excited reading of Cicero’s 
Hortensius, which launches him on a quest to find true wisdom (3.4.7), and how it 
ultimately sets the stage for the intellectual aspect of the problem of evil. I also explore 
the shaping of the intellectual aspect of the problem of evil for Augustine in his 
Manichean period, examining the specific Manichean view of evil as well as this sect’s 
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overall system of thought. In addition, I analyze how the experiential aspect widens with 
the death of Augustine’s friend (4.4.7). In connection with Augustine’s relationship with 
his concubine during this period, I will include the effect that the intellectual aspect had 
on the experiential aspect such as the problem of Augustine’s avoidance of self-
responsibility (5.10) and related issues. My critique of Augustine’s understanding of 
these events closes this chapter. 
In Chapter 4 I argue how Augustine’s brief excursus into Neo-Platonism two years 
later (7.9.13) was still crucial for him to reach some kind of resolution on the intellectual 
problem of evil. In order to do justice to the complexity of Neo-Platonic thought and its 
influence on Augustine’s view of ontological evil, I include a survey of the various 
interpretations even from contemporary interpreters of the Neo-Platonic view of this 
aspect of evil: after briefly examining relevant sections in 1.8 of Plotinus’s Enneads 
concerning evil, I incorporate relevant exposition for a fuller understanding of the 
Plotinian view. After applying the results of the analysis to Augustine’s view and taking 
into account other scholars’ input, I use passages from Confessions and other works of 
Augustine’s to examine his position on metaphysical evil and moral evil. I also take into 
account the importance of the two “ascent” experiences of Book 7.  
In connection with Augustine’s growing understanding of free will as a cause of evil 
with regard to the intellectual resolution, Augustine’s fresh reading of the Apostle Paul 
(7.21.27) on experiential evil in Romans 7 in the New Testament sheds new light on the 
second aspect of his struggles and helps to pave the way for the climactic conversion in 
Book 8. I take into account as well the connection between Augustine’s tremendous 
struggle of the will and his experiential problem of evil (8.7.17) and then analyze several 
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aspects of the famous conversion scene in Milan in order to explore how the moral 
conversion in this scene, in contrast to his earlier intellectual conversion, then more fully 
resolves his experiential problem. I close this chapter with several observations on the 
results of his conversion along with a consideration of his contributions from this section 
of the dissertation.  
The focus of the fifth chapter involves a final discussion of these overall patterns of 
evil in Augustine’s life and additional lessons that his famous quest holds for all of us.  In 
addition, I discuss specific lessons that Augustine’s two problems offer to 
philosophically-minded readers today, both in the academic study of philosophy of 
religion and also for the layperson that struggles with these issues in the varied seasons of 
life. In particular, I interact with comparisons of theistic and christological theodicies as 
well as other categorizations of the problem of evil and what bearing these have on 
Augustine’s struggle with the problem in his Confessions. I also include in the fifth 
chapter a consideration of the strategic nature and relevance of Augustine’s view of evil 
for today’s culture.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  EARLY CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 
 
 
There is no textual evidence that Augustine fully understood the events of 
experiential evil in Books 1 and 2 at the time that he experienced them. His exploration 
of what happened in that period is entirely retrospective. Nevertheless, this period of 
events holds value as important background to the later events in Confessions and also 
helps us to understand the experiential aspect of evil in his life more deeply.  
 
EARLY CHILDHOOD 
 
Concerning the evil that Augustine experienced in his early years, much of it stems 
from the specific acts of others, especially in the area of education. However, Augustine 
also includes instances of his own sinfulness during this early period. The discussion 
commences here with observations about his infancy and the early part of his education 
followed by a separate section dealing with the more complex experiences with his 
parents.    
 
 
Infancy and Early Education  
 
 
Although examples of evil abound in Augustine’s description of his early education, 
he even draws observations from the period of his infancy. He is quick to point out 
examples from this period by observing as an adult the general similarities among infants. 
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From this he concludes that after trying to communicate his wishes as best he could, 
whenever he did not receive what he wanted, he reacted with rage, taking his “revenge in 
screams” (1.6.8). M. Miles explains that Augustine terms this anxious grasping in human 
life as concupiscientia (concupiscence), a grasping for “sex, power, and possessions,” 
which becomes more evident later in his life.
84
 His additional observations in the next 
chapter prompt his statement that children’s innocence lies only in how helpless their 
bodies are, not in “any quality in their minds.” He concludes chapter 7 by remarking how 
he was even “conceived in iniquity”85 and by pondering the question of when therefore, 
was he ever innocent.
86
 Yet Augustine observes further instances of evil in his childhood 
as well in a key passage about that period:  
O God, my God, what emptiness and mockeries [miserias…et ludificationes] did I now 
experience: for it was impressed upon me as right and proper in a boy to obey those who taught me, 
that I might get on in the world and excel in the handling of words to gain honor among men and 
deceitful riches. I, poor wretch, could not see the use of the things I was sent to school to learn; but if I 
proved idle in learning, I was soundly beaten. For this procedure seemed wise to our ancestors: and 
many, passing the same way in days past, had built a sorrowful road by which we too must go, with 
multiplication of grief and toil upon the sons of Adam…As a boy I fell into the way of calling upon  
You, my Help and my Refuge; and in those prayers I broke the strings of my tongue [rumpebam nodos  
linguae meae] —praying to You, small as I was but with no small energy, that I might not be beaten at 
school. And when You did not hear me (not as giving me over to folly), my elders and even my 
parents, who certainly wished me no harm,  treated my stripes as a huge joke [ridebantur], which they 
were very far from being to me. (1.9.14) 
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It is not difficult to see how the idea of gaining “honor” and “deceitful riches” might 
already plant seeds in Augustine for his later ambitions, but his observation of this 
general evil among the “sons of Adam” also points to Augustine’s lament of this aspect 
of the human condition. However, more specifically, his habit of praying to avoid 
beatings, the absence of any answer to those prayers, and his elders’ and parents’ laughter 
at his beatings all suggest a rather miserable set of circumstances for him in this period.  
Despite the evil that Augustine experienced through the harsh discipline at the hands 
of adults, he is also not hesitant to outline his own weaknesses as a young boy, 
weaknesses that provide an early glimpse of some of his later struggles as an adult. For 
example, in refusing to apply himself to his studies as fully as he should have, he stated 
that he disobeyed because of a “sheer love of play.” He loved, for instance, the “vanity of 
victory [superbas victorias],” and he submitted that he harbored “in my eyes [per 
oculos]” a strong “curiosity [curiositate]” for the plays at the theater and for the shows 
and games that he encountered with his elders (1.10.16).
87
 In addition, in his efforts to 
excel even at boyhood games, if at a disadvantage, he would try to win by cheating, 
stemming “from the vain desire for first place” (1.19.30).  
Concerning his early studies Augustine comments not only on his own sins as a boy 
but also on the folly involved in the classical aspects of his education. Referring to those 
classical studies as a “torrent from hell [flumen tartareum],” he castigates the educational 
system that made him as a boy learn of the god Jove and his case of adultery in Homer’s 
writings (1.16.26). Nevertheless, while noting that he and his classmates were “flogged” 
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  J. O’Donnell understands this passage as reflecting the triad of temptations from 1 John 2:16. The 
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if they did not also drink from this “wine of error,” the vile content in the literature, he 
admits that he was a willing learner in such studies and “sinfully delighted in them…” In 
his remarks on the performances that he and his classmates gave in presenting a speech 
by the goddess Juno, Augustine retrospectively labels the entire business as “smoke and 
wind” (1.17.27).  
In such reminiscences from childhood, Augustine posits how the seeds of vanity, one 
of the key vices that he struggled with in the future, were especially sown through the 
contests that took place for the learning of prose and literature:  
Yet it was no wonder that I fell away into vanity [Quid autem mirum, quod in vanitates ita 
ferebar] and went so far from Thee, My God, seeing that men were held up as models for my imitation 
who were covered with shame if, in relating some acts of theirs in no way evil, they fell into some 
barbarism or grammatical solecism [si cum barbarismo aut soloecismo enuntiarent]: yet were praised, 
and delighted to be praised, when they told of their lusts [libidines suas], provided they did so in 
correct words correctly arranged. (1.18.28)  
 
Augustine’s slide into “vanity,” the harmful examples of the particular men that he was 
exposed to, and the focus on gratifying one’s lusts instead of the shame that one should 
feel in that regard are rather evident in the passage. Augustine is rather direct in his clear 
statement about the negative effects of this exposure on him at that time.  
In short, Augustine experiences evil in the world, not only through his school and the 
authority figures that maintained it, but also through his own lack of innocence. Such 
examples range from his basic behavior as an infant to his love of games and shows, 
including a love to be number one in competition with other boys instead of applying 
himself to his studies. Even when he did focus on his lessons, the questionable content of 
the classical stories and their tendency to encourage his vain wishes strengthened the 
generally negative view that he held of his early childhood.  
Without failing to notice the good things, Augustine’s summary near the end of Book 
1 expresses his thoughts on his experiential evil in that early period: “…in Him [God] I 
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shall exult for all the good qualities that even as a boy I had. But in this lay my sin: that I 
sought pleasure, nobility, and truth [voluptates, sublimitates, veritates] not in God but in 
the beings He had created, myself and others. Thus I fell into sorrow and confusion and 
error […in dolores, confusiones, errores]” (1.20.31). One sees a small glimpse here of 
the triad of temptations from 1 John 2:16 that J. O’Donnell included in his interpretation 
of the entire work. As a boy Augustine initially sought happiness in three areas:  in 
pleasure, in nobility (“lofty things”), and in truth. However, by seeking them in God’s 
creatures instead of in God Himself, Augustine encounters essentially the opposite of 
what he was seeking. By succumbing to the lust of the flesh, he experiences sorrow 
instead of pleasure.
88
 By yielding to the pride of life—overweening aspirations to be “on 
top,” he has confusion instead of the lofty heights that he had hoped to reach.89 Finally, 
by following the lust of the eyes he finds himself in error instead of finding truth.   
 
 
Parents 
 
 
Although Augustine’s parents wanted the best for him, their belief concerning what 
was best complicated Augustine’s growing struggle with sin in his view. For instance, 
grounded early in his mother Monnica’s90 Catholic faith, he requested baptism upon 
wrestling with a serious illness. Yet his unexpected recovery encouraged his mother to 
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postpone the baptism on the belief that the guilt from sinful acts after baptism could be a 
greater danger than such guilt before the cleansing of baptism. Augustine is candid as he 
remarks that “it was obvious that many mighty waves of temptation threatened to break 
upon me as I grew out of boyhood” (1.11.18), a point that his mother was well aware of 
in her decision on the deferral of baptism. He criticizes her decision (retrospectively) as 
well as the common attitude in his culture toward the behavior of unbaptized youth. 
However, despite Augustine’s criticisms of the attitude toward that behavior, since it is 
clear in that section that the deferral of baptism was a common practice at that time, it is 
more difficult for Augustine to view Monnica’s choice on the deferral here as 
blameworthy. 
Augustine is even more critical of both parents for their failure to address effectively 
his growing sexual problems. He states how lust, in his sixteenth year, “took complete 
control of me” (2.2.4), but instead of rescuing him from this dilemma through supporting 
a marriage for him, both parents were strongly focused on his training in rhetoric. In the 
subsequent chapter he ascribes his father’s indifference concerning his struggles to his 
sole focus on Augustine’s future career, and he elaborates on his mother’s decision that 
an early marriage for him would affect his studies negatively (2.3.8). However, 
Augustine notes as well his mother’s hope that his training would in some way be a help 
in placing him on the right path to God.  
Book 2 still provides additional clues on Augustine’s perception of his parents. For 
instance, although J. O’Meara generally agrees that Augustine praised his mother more 
than he did his father, he reminds us of Augustine’s pride at Patricius’ sacrificial efforts 
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to have him educated at Carthage.
91
 O’Meara is correct about Augustine’s praise, but this 
understanding of Augustine’s view of that commitment is not complete. While 
concurring that Augustine held some admiration for Patricius’ sacrifices for him, Peter 
Brown rightly couples this with Augustine’s later observation that Patricius saw in him 
only “hollow things [inania]” (2.3.8).92 Moreover, I find it noteworthy that immediately 
after the statement about his father’s sacrifices, Augustine is critical of how “this same 
father” had a total lack of concern for the issue of Augustine’s chastity. Indeed, there was 
no one, apparently not even his father, to root out the “briars of unclean lusts” that 
“towered over” Augustine’s head (2.3.6). On the contrary, one day in the public baths his 
father noticed his advancement toward manhood, was thus pleased about the possibility 
of grandchildren, and even went to tell his mother Monnica of this development. Even 
after hearing this, she did not act upon the information by considering marriage for 
Augustine (for the reasons discussed above), and her admonition to Augustine to avoid 
sexual relations with a woman (2.3.7) was not effective for reasons considered in the next 
section.  
In providing a fuller understanding of his parents, it should be also pointed out that 
Augustine, in Book 9, comments on his father’s volatile temper and marital infidelity 
(9.9.19), his mother’s forbearance of her husband’s behavior, and her eventual success in 
bringing Patricius to the Christian faith (9.13.27). Augustine’s touching words about her 
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42 
 
near the end of Book 9 show his affirmation of her spirituality and high regard for her 
despite his criticisms of her in Book 2.
93
  
Nonetheless, a larger observation here is the lack of criticism of Patricius on  
Augustine’s part: although Augustine does mention his father’s unfaithfulness to the 
reader in Book 9, if his father were as responsible for Augustine’s sexual activity as much 
as some commentators have suggested or if Augustine had felt as much disdain for his 
father as others have proposed, it is more difficult to explain why the recounting of 
Patricius’ behavior was not included in Book 2 (in which Augustine describes the early 
development of his sexual wanderings). Augustine’s postponement until Book 9 of 
mentioning his father’s hot temper, which without Monnica’s forbearance could have 
easily led to her being beaten on certain occasions, is noteworthy as well. Perhaps 
Augustine’s goal in Book 2 was to underscore the role of both parents in unwittingly 
setting the stage in his life for two of his struggles: his vain ambitions (aided by his 
parents’ support of his future career in rhetoric) and his sexual struggles. If such a goal of 
emphasizing their role were met more easily by deferring a broader discussion of his 
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parents to a later book, then this could help to explain his decision to place that such 
topics in Book 9, aside from the fact of Monnica’s death in that same book. 
  
ADOLESCENCE 
 
        
Much of the evil discussed in this section takes place in Book 2. The observations on 
his sexual struggles in the first few chapters followed by Augustine’s lengthy analysis of 
the pear theft episode dominate most of the book, and therefore, the following two 
sections in the discussion are divided in that way. Although the period of adolescence 
includes all of the teenage years, the discussion in this section extends through 
Augustine’s sixteenth year with the subsequent events in Book 3 discussed together in the 
chapter on the Manichean period in Augustine’s life. 
                                                       
 
Sexual Struggles 
 
 
Augustine’s sexual struggles have been the subject of much scrutiny. The most 
immediate issue concerns the nature of the language that Augustine uses in his 
descriptions. For example, although Maria Boulding summarizes Augustine’s depictions 
as “lurid,” she submits that the language he uses is largely metaphorical, even noting 
Augustine’s own admission of his earlier tendency to exaggerate the truth to his 
companions (2.3.7) as a reinforcement of her point.
94
 On the one hand, it is true that 
Augustine’s depictions of out-of-control lust certainly contain their share of rhetorical 
flourishes. In particular, the vivid language in 2.1 and 2.2 comes to mind as notable 
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examples of this. However, in spite of that, one should not interpret them entirely 
metaphorically, especially in view of their plausible connection to what are literal events 
in future chapters such as Augustine’s eventual taking of a concubine in Book 4. The 
more balanced suggestion that the struggles were literal to a certain degree but “mere 
peccadilloes” by today’s standards, coupled with Augustine’s emphasis of them to 
illustrate our disordered, post-Fall fragmentation supplies a more helpful understanding 
on the use of his sexual struggles in various parts of Confessions.
95
  
Regarding a different relation, is there any substantial link between Augustine’s 
struggles and the disapproving parental character of Monnica? A key text in this regard is 
when Augustine himself states: “I still remember her anxiety and how earnestly she urged 
upon me not to sin with women, above all not with any man’s wife […ut monuerit cum 
sollicitudine ingenti, ne fornicarer maximeque ne adulterarem cuiusquam uxorem]. All 
this sounded to me womanish and I should have blushed to obey [qui mihi monitus 
muliebres videbantur, quibus obtemperare erubescerem]” (2.3.7). The admonition itself 
consists of two parts. Monnica first advises him “not to sin with women.” The Latin here, 
ne fornicarer, conveys the meaning of avoiding fornication, sexual relations with an 
unmarried woman. Augustine continues to express each verb in first person as Monnica 
then expands her admonition so that ne adulterarem--he would also avoid committing 
adultery with any woman. 
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 R. O’Connell posits that Monnica’s instructions tended to encourage his sexual 
activity: her admonition to avoid fornication and “most important of all [maximeque],” to 
avoid adultery (2.3.7) has enough of the suggestion of the “cynical nostrum ‘if you can’t 
be good, be careful.’”96 O’Connell believes that at the very least her wording did not put 
the “needed spine” into the resolve of a 16-year-old to maintain a chaste lifestyle. 
O’Connell’s point here is well-taken. The 2-part admonition arguably sent the message 
that succumbing to the first kind of temptation was not as serious as a failure in the 
second category, which should especially be avoided. Thus, Monnica’s admonitions to 
Augustine in Book 2 were definitely not ideal to say the least, in dissuading Augustine 
from sexual activity and probably even encouraged his subsequent negative behavior.  
At the beginning of Book 2 Augustine is rather direct concerning how his sexual 
struggles served as an accurate barometer of his spiritual journey. In 2.1.1 he directly 
outlines the connection between the experiential problem of evil as exemplified by his 
sexual wanderings and his movement away from the only concept of God that he 
understands, the God of the Catholic faith of his mother. One point of this connection 
appears in his description of his heightened thoughts of lust in his adolescence (probably 
his sixteenth year):  
I propose now to set down my past wickedness and the carnal corruptions of my soul…I collect 
my self [sic] out of that broken state in which my very being was torn asunder because I was turned 
away from Thee, the One, and wasted myself upon the many. Arrived now at adolescence I burned for 
all the satisfactions of hell, and I sank to the animal in a succession of dark lusts [silvescere ausus sum 
variis et umbrosis amoribus]: my beauty consumed away, and I stank in thine eyes, yet was pleasing in 
my own and anxious to please the eyes of men. (2.1.1) 
 
Although Augustine’s full interpretation of this period here is done retrospectively, of 
course, the abiding faith of his mother from his early age on makes it reasonable to 
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conclude that Augustine’s exposure to the Christian God, albeit with African nuances, 
was a strong one, and his efforts to pray against the floggings at school constitute one 
example of this. However, he reinforces the connection between his personal evil and 
spiritual distance from God more explicitly in 2.2.2 by adding, “…I departed further from 
You, and You left me to myself: and I was tossed about and wasted and poured out and 
boiling over in my fornications [ebulliebam per fornicationes meas].” 
 
 
The Pear Theft 
 
 
Augustine’s self-analysis of the episode of the pear theft dominates the rest of Book 
2. The basic facts surrounding the theft are relatively simple. Augustine was home in 
Thagaste for a year until his father could have enough money to send him to Carthage to 
continue his studies. One night after playing games rather late with some companions, 
Augustine and his group went to a pear tree in the property of another owner and carried 
off a large load of pears (2.4.9). He admitted the pears were not especially attractive to 
the eye; in fact, he and his friends barely had a taste of the pears before casting the fruit to 
the hogs. Therefore, the theft was not committed out of hunger but for darker reasons, 
reasons that Augustine probes and analyzes in the subsequent chapters of Book 2.  
Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle views the pear theft as entirely metaphorical for actual 
sexual activities that he and his group were involved in toward women. Noting that 
Monnica had warned him against fornication earlier in Book 2 as well as Augustine’s 
specific comments in 2.9.17, Boyle proposes that “the theft of pears allegorized the theft 
of persons” with the fruit and the animal to which he had pushed it serving as “potent 
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symbols.”97 Drawing from various historical sources that point to the meaning of pear 
imagery from that period,
98
 Boyle argues that Augustine’s throwing of pears to pigs was 
metaphorical for sexual intercourse and that “pig” was a colloquial term for female 
genitals.
99
  
Boyle’s metaphorical understanding of the theft as sexual activity breaks down after a 
closer look at the details and context. One notes, for example, the difficulty of explaining 
the contrast between the metaphorical, yet very clear language of Augustine’s sexual 
activities early in Book 2 (2.1.1 and 2.2.2) and the rather straightforward, literal-sounding 
narrative of the events in the orchard in 2.4.9. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile, for 
instance, certain elements of the supposed metaphor such as the pear as a symbol of 
sexual maturity or even of male genitals with the text such as Augustine’s glee at the 
successful playing of a trick on the “owners” of the pear tree in 2.9.17. Furthermore, as 
O’Donnell points out, Augustine did not need what was stolen; the case is much simpler 
than any case of fornication might have been.
100
 In an actual incident of sexual 
transgression he could not have said clearly or convincingly that the appeal was “not the  
thing itself but the wrongness itself.” 
Regarding a literal understanding of the theft, by using the Platonic dictum “Virtue is 
knowledge” as the point of comparison, we can place most of the major interpretations  
 
                                                          
97
  Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, Divine Domesticity: Augustine of Thagaste to Teresa of Avila (New York: 
E.J. Brill, 1997), 11.  
98
  Ibid., 11-13. 
99
  Ibid., 15. 
100
  O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 2, 126.  
48 
 
into one of two categories.
101
 The dictum itself involves the view that a correct 
knowledge of right and wrong will result in virtuous choices by that individual. Stated 
another way, one could summarize it as the belief that no one does something wrong 
willingly--bad choices are made simply out of ignorance. However, a narrower form of 
the dictum involves the position that every choice is for the sake of something that the 
agent believes to be good. Thus, an evil choice, voluntarily made, is done when people 
mistakenly believe that they perceive some type of good in it. Of course, one could hold 
to the latter understanding of the dictum without necessarily endorsing the former.   
Therefore, one category of interpretation in this chapter views Augustine’s analysis of 
his motive for the theft as being consistent with the Platonic dictum, but always with the 
more limited understanding of that belief. According to this view Augustine did choose to 
commit the theft because of some perceived good in the situation: either he mistakenly 
believed that he perceived some type of good in an aspect of the theft itself or in the 
companionship that accompanied the theft, or in some combination of both. The second 
category, the anti-Platonic classification, involves the idea that Augustine’s motive serves 
as a counter-example to the Platonic model, even to the broader understanding of it. 
Therefore, accounts in this second category utterly reject both forms of the Platonic 
dictum or at the very least move beyond them to explain this particular act.  
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Platonic Interpretations of the Theft 
Scott MacDonald’s account is the most interesting of the “Platonic” interpretations 
and also serves as a helpful starting point for becoming acquainted with Augustine’s 
overall analysis of the theft in more detail. MacDonald agrees with a number of 
commentators that Augustine undoubtedly uses the theft account to illustrate his moral 
depravity even further and that he describes the “divine prohibition” of not stealing as 
one that is written on every heart (2.4.9).
102
 He then notes Augustine’s observation of 
how strange the motive is in this case, the motive of intentionally doing something that 
one knows is wrong.
103
 Unlike the other acts of wrongdoing in Book 2, the act of theft is 
committed with complete knowledge that it constitutes sin, and the act is committed 
“precisely because it is a sin.” MacDonald also notes two statements of motive in 2.4.9: 
Augustine’s statement “Nor had I any desire to enjoy the things that I stole, but only the 
stealing of them and the sin” is reinforced by his later statement that “Our only pleasure 
in doing it was that it was forbidden.”104 In the same section MacDonald also views a 
similar pattern of statements as assertions on motive, and this passage is worth noting in 
its entirety as Augustine launches his full self-analysis here in one part of 2.4.9: 
Such was my heart, O God, such was my heart: yet in the depth of the abyss You had pity on it. 
Let that heart now tell You what it sought when I was thus evil for no object, having no cause for 
wrongdoing save my wrongness. The malice of the act was base and I loved it—that is to say I loved 
my own undoing, I loved the evil in me—not the thing for which I did the evil, simply the evil [amavi 
defectum meum, non illud ad quod deficiebam, sed defectum meum ipsum amavi]: my soul was 
depraved, and hurled itself down from security in You into utter destruction, seeing no profit from 
wickedness but only to be wicked.
105
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According to MacDonald Augustine’s worry that he committed something forbidden, a 
theft, only to be wicked drives his search in subsequent sections for examining the motive 
more carefully. MacDonald also points out how Augustine’s strong focus on the foulness 
of the heart as exemplified in this deliberate act helps to show that Augustine’s 
prodigality in his adolescence is now complete, drawing from the story of the Prodigal 
Son in the New Testament.
106
  
In addition, MacDonald concurs with the notion that Augustine’s account here is 
deliberately intended to reflect the primal sins of Adam and Eve, a “gang of two” in 
connection with Augustine’s companions, and also Lucifer’s own fall and salvation 
history.
107
 The pear tree symbolizes the Fall with the fig tree in Milan as a symbol of 
redemption in Book 8. In his subsequent analysis MacDonald draws from Augustine’s 
Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount (1.34) to identify Augustine’s category of 
“subjective constraint” concerning motivation.108 This category specifies that if an agent 
freely performs an action, then something in or about that activity is delightful to the 
agent and moves her to that activity. Using part of Augustine’s discussion in 2.5.10, he 
also identifies an “objective constraint” on motivation, a natural connection between how 
humans are constituted and what objects they delight in.
109
 Augustine observes subjective 
constraints when analyzing a sample case of murder, but the concept of the objective 
constraint precludes an offense of murder for no reason at all.
110
 As a result, even 
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Catiline, who reportedly committed his crimes in Rome for no reason, had reasons for his 
heinous acts, reasons that were based on an objectively “recognizable delight.”111  
With these categories Augustine explores his motivations and rejects that the theft 
itself, like murder, would hold anything objectively delightful. Although pears 
themselves are “appropriate objects of delight,”112 he also clearly rejects those as the 
source of his motivation. MacDonald then moves temporarily to section 16 (2.8.16) with 
Augustine’s general conclusion about the wrongdoings in his adolescence.113 In 
particular, he focuses on a relevant passage in that section involving Augustine’s 
consideration of the role of his companions in his motivation for the theft: 
Now—as I think back on the state of my mind then—I am altogether certain that I would not have 
done it alone. Perhaps then what I really loved was the companionship of those with whom I did it…If 
I had liked the pears that I stole and wanted to enjoy eating them, I might have committed the offence 
alone, if that had been sufficient, to get me the pleasure I wanted; I should not have needed to inflame 
the itch of my desires by rubbing against accomplices [nec confricatione consciorum animorum 
accenderem pruritum cupiditatis meae]. But since the pleasure I got was not in the pears, it must have 
been in the crime itself [in ipso facinore], and put there by the companionship of others sinning with 
me [quam faciebat consortium simul peccantium].  
  
 
MacDonald submits that we already know how it seemed to Augustine that he loved the 
stealing itself and nothing more, but his realization that he loved the friendship itself and 
would not have committed the theft apart from that factor accomplishes two items: first, 
this final observation connects the theft narrative to the overall pattern of Book 2.
114
 In 
2.1.1 Augustine indicated his desire to be satisfied with the lowest forms of goods, and 
his observation that he only took delight in “loving and being loved [amare et amari]” 
                                                          
111
  MacDonald does not elaborate further on Augustine’s example of Catiline here. However, in 2.5.11 
Augustine explains that although Catiline was reputedly cruel for no reason at all, in reality his stated 
purpose for his crimes was so that his skill and willpower would not grow weaker and that through the 
training of co-conspirators he ultimately would be able through more crimes to take over Rome. Successful 
control of the city would end his fear of retribution from the law and his money problems, and apparently 
this final goal is the objectively “recognizable delight” that MacDonald speaks of. 
112
  MacDonald, “Petit Larceny, The Beginning of All Sin,”402. 
113
  MacDonald, “Petit Larceny, The Beginning of All Sin,” 403. 
114
  MacDonald, “Petit Larceny, The Beginning of All Sin,” 404. 
52 
 
occurs in 2.2.2. Therefore, the pear episode too emerges as another “disordered attempt at 
love and being loved.” Secondly, MacDonald believes Augustine’s earlier understanding 
of motivation also emerges intact here. The “objectively undelightful theft” did not move 
him or could not alone be the source since the delight in another objectively delightful, 
intelligible good, the fellowship with his companions (loving and being loved), was the 
crucial impetus here in the theft. In contrast to the theft, this good of the camaraderie is 
one that humans naturally delight in.  
MacDonald then moves back to section 14 (2.6.14) in order to resolve how 
Augustine’s proposed solution in that section fits with the later sections of Augustine’s 
analysis. Augustine initially rejects a number of objectively delightful human goods as 
sources of his motivation: corporeal goods such as the pears’ beauty, their taste, were not 
the source and nor were the beauty of spiritual or intelligible things such as the beauty of 
the virtues or the capacities of the soul or the intelligible order in Nature’s patterns.115 
However, the deceptive vices that Augustine examines not only exemplify how a person 
pursues lower goods inordinately, but also show that person’s desire to be like God with 
respect to that good. For example, an avaricious person has an inordinate desire for 
possessions, but this pursuit also shows in a “defective and shadowy” way the person’s 
attempt to be like God with respect to possessions, that is, possess all things. In a key 
passage in 2.6.14, Augustine connects the section on vices (2.6.12-13) to his own act 
against God: 
Thus the soul is guilty of fornication when she turns from You and seeks from any other source 
what she will nowhere find pure and without taint unless she returns to You. Thus even those who go 
from you and stand up against You are still perversely imitating You. But by the mere fact of their 
imitation, they declare that You are the creator of all that is, and that there is nowhere for them to go 
where You are not.  
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So once again, what did I enjoy in that theft of mine? Of what excellence of my Lord was I 
making perverse and vicious imitation [et in quo dominum meum vel vitiose atque perverse imitatus 
sum]? Perhaps it was the thrill of acting against Your law—at least in appearance, since I had no power 
to do so in fact, the delight a prisoner might have in making some small gesture of liberty—getting a 
deceptive sense of omnipotence [tenebrosa omnipotentiae similitudine] from doing something 
forbidden without immediate punishment. I was that slave, who fled from his Lord and pursued his 
Lord’s shadow. O rottenness, O monstrousness of life and abyss of death! Could you find pleasure 
only in what was forbidden, and only because it was forbidden [potuitne libere quod non licebat, non 
ob aliud nisi quia non licebat]?  
 
According to MacDonald Augustine links the deceptive vices to the theft by painting 
the theft also as a perverse imitation of God, in this case through a faint imitation of 
God’s omnipotence, flouting the standards of God by trying to assert a kind of liberty or 
type of power that he (Augustine) really does not possess.
116
 This kind of possession—
found only in God’s omnipotence—constitutes the objectively recognizable good that 
Augustine subjectively took a delight in, and so it fits well with Augustine’s theory of 
motivation.   
MacDonald is aware that his account might seem to clash with Augustine’s text 
because even after section 14 Augustine explores his motivations further instead of 
calling his search for a motive complete.
117
  In reply, he submits that Augustine’s 
insistence that he committed the theft simply because it is forbidden does not deny his 
previous assertions in section 14 since the two descriptions work together in describing 
one motive. More specifically, the forbidden nature of the act enables one to understand 
how the act then satisfies the other description of an “expression of radical freedom and 
power.” Secondly, McDonald notes as well how it is correct to say that “nothing” else 
was motivating Augustine toward the theft since what “moved” Augustine, the possibility 
of omnipotence, was illusory, a total delusion.
118
 Augustine’s desire to showcase the full 
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depth of his depravity at this point in his student life provides a reasonable explanation 
for his emphasis on the motive of simply doing what is forbidden, but the role of 
camaraderie in drawing him to act is still needed to make the account complete, thus 
leading to the further discussion even past section 14. Consequently, Augustine focuses 
on an act in which there appears to be no rational motive, but he ultimately finds two: one 
motivation of the theft was pursuing a type of unbounded power and freedom through the 
theft, but since this motivation was not sufficient to move him to the act, the role of 
companionship, “to love and be loved,” was a second motivation that helped to bring 
about Augustine’s decision of thievery.119 These two goods that he focused on, whether 
based on error or illusion, still fall under the Platonic understanding of motivation.  
I agree with some of the background in MacDonald’s account, specifically that the 
relating of the episode serves to display Augustine’s deep level of depravity at that time, 
that the episode is a general parallel with the basic account of Adam and Eve’s sin, and 
that MacDonald’s delineation of the subjective/objective constraints are helpful up to a 
point for understanding Augustine’s “weeding out” of possible motives for his actions in 
MacDonald’s account. However, I concur with Robert McMahon’s understanding of 
Augustine’s self-analysis as a prayerful searching process, not a more finalized, 
systematic treatise.
120
 The style and tone of the self-analysis from chapter 4 through 
chapter 9 strongly come across as a probing, exploring confessional process, not a tidy 
account of which possible motives to accept or reject. This crucial distinction is, of  
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course, totally at odds with MacDonald’s approach as well as a number of other 
interpretations under the Platonic category, and as a result, it seriously affects their 
conclusions. 
In addition, accepting for a moment the approach that the theft analysis is meant to be 
a finished, coherent product, other problems arise. For instance, focusing on power itself 
as the perceived good in 2.6.14 is somewhat problematic. Montague Brown submits that 
Augustine is simply considering here the possibility that the theft contained at least some 
kind of element of good (in comparison to choosing a lesser good over a greater one) if 
his aim was to imitate God in the area of power instead of imitating created things.
121
 
However, Brown adds that it would be “absurd” to say that one imitates God and thus 
does something good by rebelling against God in such a clear fashion. Therefore, he 
believes that Augustine apparently rejected that option and then moved to consider a very 
different possibility at the end of that section (that he simply did the theft because it was 
unlawful).
122
 Thus, in the very same section Augustine himself rules out the idea that he 
was seeking good by imitating God as he exclaims, “Could a thing give pleasure which 
could not be done lawfully, and which was done for no other reason but because it was 
unlawful [potuitne libere quod non licebat, non ob aliud nisi quia non licebat]?”123 As a 
result, I find it rather challenging to accept the interpretation that one narrowly and yet 
reasonably perceives a “good” in this aspect of the theft without an unjustifiable 
exclusion of the larger aspects of the act—the rather restricted “good” here (a new level 
of power that Augustine doesn’t already possess) does not go far in supporting the motive 
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as a rational one in the larger context of a theft, even after considering the added 
motivation of the companionship. Regardless of how cognizant Augustine the youth was 
of the larger religious implications of his act, specifically rebellion against God, 
Augustine arguably knew that the basic act of stealing itself was wrong and in a clear 
enough way that makes a Platonic understanding here (the narrower form of the dictum) 
rather difficult to sustain. Moreover, concerning the friendship motive in these accounts, 
efforts by some such as MacDonald, to strongly link Augustine’s phrase “love and be 
loved” in 2.2.2 to companionship in 2.8.16 as a perceived good in the theft require yet 
further argumentation to be effective. For instance, as K. Paffenroth observes, the 
immediate context in 2.7.15 and 2.8.16 including the “itch” metaphor points to the 
camaraderie as a facilitator of the action at most, not the actual goal of the action.
124
 
Explaining this metaphor is more difficult under Platonic accounts that argue for the 
fellowship of the companions as a full-fledged motive. 
A brief consideration of several other Platonic accounts shows some similarities with 
MacDonald’s account but in some cases key differences too. Lyell Asher’s interpretation 
also includes Augustine’s grasping for omnipotence.125 Asher observes as well that the 
companions serve as the needed “itch” to “trigger his impulses” and commit the theft, 
especially in view of Augustine’s comment earlier in Book 2 of his companions’ 
tendency to commit bad exploits and boast about them with Augustine even boasting of 
things that he never committed, so eager was he for their approval (2.3.7).
126
 So a key 
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motive in the theft was also precisely the pleasure Augustine obtained from exhibiting his 
act to an “admiring audience,” an audience provided to each thief by all the others.  
R.R. Reno’s account is similar to MacDonald’s as well. Holding tightly to the view 
that all people’s actions must have some kind of good, real or imagined, as their object,127 
Augustine, according to Reno, understood himself to be seeking to possess a divine 
attribute, omnipotence, and therefore, his pleasure in “doing what is not allowed rested in 
the psychological freedom one feels when one has successfully flaunted [sic] authority or 
rebelled against conventions.”128 Reno includes the companionship as a motive as well, a 
strong moving force itself, in a case “in which finite good (in this case friendship) is mis-
prized [sic].”129  
Although Brooke Hopkins agrees that the pursuit of omnipotence is one motive that 
Augustine suggests in his search,
130
 she believes that Augustine ultimately settles on the 
comradeship with his group as the only motive.
131
 After proposing the general need for 
camaraderie as a motivating force, Hopkins also adds the need for approval as well but 
then modifies that element to mean simply a motive of “fear of losing their esteem.” In 
connection with the passage on shame at the end of Augustine’s analysis (2.9.17), 
Hopkins elaborates on this as a fear of being exposed, a need to “keep up appearances to 
the end,” totally regardless of any damage that results. O’Donnell’s position holds that 
Augustine found the lower good in the companionship as the sole motive, and so he 
maintains his consistency with his (Augustine’s) own view that evil as “no-thing” has no 
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power of attraction.
132
 Consequently, O’Donnell’s final conclusion on the motive is 
similar to Hopkins’s. O’Donnell’s account is not strongly dependent on any parallel with 
the Genesis story, but he does note Augustine’s related wording to that narrative (2.6.14) 
as part of his larger analysis:
133
 “I was that slave [Adam], who fled from his Lord and 
pursued his Lord’s shadow.” In his discussion of evil in Augustine the Theologian, 
Eugene TeSelle firmly holds that no matter how “malicious it [the act] may appear to be,” 
the narrative reinforces the idea that willing, for Augustine, is “always for the sake of 
some value, though that value may be insignificant or inappropriate.”134 Nevertheless, 
TeSelle stops short in that discussion from identifying the exact good or value that 
attracts Augustine in the theft episode.  
The accounts above suffer from the same key problems that were found in 
MacDonald’s interpretation. Furthermore, despite Asher’s observation of Augustine’s 
tendency to boast in 2.3.7, the more immediate contextual evidence of Augustine’s 
calling the theft a “nothing” (2.8.16) and the secondary role of the friendship in 2.9.17 
should carry more weight in the investigation here. Hopkins’s modification of the 
companionship motive and therefore, her own overall interpretation, encounters the same 
difficulties. Finally, if companionship really played such a key role in the theft as 
O’Donnell and others submit, the invisible role of the friendship before the theft and also 
in much of Augustine’s initial analysis, observations that Paffenroth has brought to the 
forefront,
135
 would be unaccountably strange under such accounts. That Augustine raises 
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the possibility of companionship as a rational motive for the first time so late in his 
analysis is more difficult to explain under those interpretations.  
Robert McMahon’s “confessional” approach takes a somewhat different approach in 
tackling the difficulties of the theft episode. McMahon notes the tendency of many 
commentators to observe a contradiction in the entire analysis with one motive put 
forward by Augustine at the end of chapter 6, an irrational motive, purely a “perverse act 
of his prideful will,” and with a positive, rational motive stemming from friendship, love 
of others, later in chapter 9.
136
 Scholars then often side with one motive or the other for 
resolving this inconsistency based on the assumption that Augustine intends to present a 
“coherent doctrine” as part of a final product. However, McMahon submits that the 
process of confession of Augustine the speaker in contrast to Augustine the author 
indicates how the differing views in each chapter are two separate moments in his 
continuing self-analysis, and as a result, the second motive should be taken more 
seriously as Augustine’s conclusion on the matter.137 In support of his approach 
McMahon notes the pattern of questioning in 2.8.16, that is, questioning the irrational 
motive from chapter 6 and the new pattern of discovery in section 17 (2.9.17), in which 
he examines the new motive--to be loved by his companions--four times in five 
sentences, allowing the new idea to register with him with surprise and gratefulness in the 
pattern’s center at what has been revealed to him by God: “Behold, the living record of 
my soul lies before You, my God [Ecce est coram te, deus meus, viva recordatio animae 
meae].”138 As a result, McMahon notes the failure of many commentators to distinguish 
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between Augustine the speaker and Augustine the author and the false difficulties that 
this lack of distinction creates.  
McMahon avoids many of the problems of the previous accounts, and I agree strongly 
with his “confessional” understanding of the flow of Augustine’s analysis. However, 
concerning the motivation itself McMahon’s interpretation fails to consider other options 
such as an irrational motive (stealing for the sake of stealing) with the camaraderie as a 
mere catalyst to commit the deed, not a full-fledged motive itself. As a result, he 
mistakenly sees the comradeship as a full motive and thus rules out any irrational motive 
as a possibility despite evidence to the contrary in 2.9.17.   
 
Anti-Platonic Interpretations of the Theft 
The anti-Platonic understandings of the theft have some key features in common but 
also some important differences. Gareth Matthews’s interpretation reaches a far different 
conclusion in comparison to the Platonic accounts above. On the one hand, Matthews 
agrees with MacDonald that the examination of Catiline’s deeds does not help Augustine 
resolve his inquiry, and that in addressing his own theft, Augustine plainly states that 
“there was nothing beautiful about you [my act of theft]” (2.6.12).139 Yet, although 
Matthews also concurs that the list of vices illustrates humanity’s perverse imitations of 
God, he concludes that Augustine’s motivation in the theft is a case of “Rebel Without a 
Cause,” simply an irrational, futile act of rebellion against God’s moral standards, not a 
deed motivated by anything delightful in either the act itself nor the result of it, and thus, 
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not a case of motivation in the Platonic category.
140
 Regarding section 16 (2.8.16) 
Matthews agrees that because of the presence of the gang, Augustine committed an act 
that he would not have done alone.
141
 Yet Matthews asserts that the theft was not done 
for “the approval or admiration of the gang.” The initial “Rebel” motive stands; his love 
was still for “the act itself, but performed in concert with the gang.” In spite of this, 
Matthews views the passage about the “knot” that Augustine seeks to “untangle” at the 
end of the analysis of the theft (2.10.18) as signifying Augustine’s unresolved perplexity 
as to whether his account of motives is really fully satisfactory, especially in view of the 
difficulties associated with understanding a motivation with a desire to do wrong without 
cause.
142
  
Matthews mistakenly views the theft analysis as a coherent whole and in the end 
settles on an irrational motive as Augustine’s overall conclusion, with the rebellious act 
done without any clear goal in mind. However, while disagreeing with Matthews’s 
interpretative approach and final answer, I do concur with his very helpful input on the 
role of the companions in the theft. Section 17 does support his view of the gang as 
merely a catalyst for the deed, not an act done for the gang’s approval. In this way 
Matthews avoids a common tendency to view the companionship as a full motive despite 
the problems with that understanding that we noted earlier.   
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In his own full account Paffenroth firmly holds that Augustine’s aim in the theft story 
is to show that the Platonic understanding of human nature is wrong.
143
 He notes the 
negative influence of Augustine’s companions early in the narrative—they “inculcate 
‘pestilential custom[s] [de pestilentiae more… produxeramus]’” (2.4.9) in each other, but 
he maintains that this is hardly even important since Augustine never says who was 
behind the idea of the theft.
144
 Moreover, they do not seem to be the initial impetus 
behind the encouragement that he feels to steal. In Augustine’s opening analysis in the 
next paragraph in section 9 (2.4.9), the companions totally disappear. Paffenroth then 
focuses on the key passage in that section in which Augustine describes his heart 
including his remark that “I loved the evil in me--not the thing for which I did the evil, 
simply the evil …” Paffenroth submits that this definitely points to evil being chosen by 
Augustine for its own sake, part of Augustine’s efforts to find an exception to the 
Platonic understanding of “evil” choices.145 Furthermore, Augustine cannot be satisfied 
with a Platonic view of the theft since such a view would allow that we only need 
guidance and education to avoid mistaking evil for good or mistaking lesser goods for 
greater goods—a conclusion that is antithetical to Augustine’s belief in the necessity of 
Christ’s sacrifice or God’s grace for the individual.146  
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Paffenroth also observes Augustine’s use of the “itch” imagery as well (2.8.16) to 
support his point that the camaraderie was not the focus of Augustine’s pleasure or 
love.
147
 Instead of being a cause of a disease, an itch is merely a symptom, and in a 
similar fashion the friends are not the cause of any sin but simply another symptom.
148
 As 
a result, in the same way that scratching makes something itch even worse, sinful 
companionship, the “rubbing together of guilty minds [confricatione consciorum 
animorum],” can only lead to additional sinful acts.149 Paffenroth is aware of the paradox 
in his account—if evil is an ontological “nothing” in Augustine’s view, how can it have 
such power to attract?
150
 The solution of friendship as the lower good is unacceptable to 
Augustine since it leads to a Platonic understanding of the theft, and also he is insistent 
that regarding the theft, he did love “nothing” (2.8.16). Since the companionship plays 
only a secondary role in the theft at most, Paffenroth finally concludes that the evil 
camaraderie is basically another element of this paradox of evil, not the resolution to it as 
Augustine’s oxymoronic exclamation “O friendship too unfriendly!” (2.9.17) seems to 
indicate.
151
 In other words, Augustine’s final observation on friendship here is best seen 
as a parallel element to the theft story instead of being part of it. Loving the emptiness of 
a useless theft is analogous to loving the emptiness of a useless relationship with no 
reduction or explanation beyond saying that they are both strong manifestations of evil. 
Therefore, Paffenroth holds that while the Platonic understanding might explain almost 
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all sin in Augustine’s view, Augustine offers an exception here, one that goes beyond the 
Platonic model for understanding it.
152
   
Paffenroth also mistakenly views the analysis as a systematic whole. In his account he 
stipulates that the motive is one of evil for evil’s sake, an interesting answer that differs 
conceptually from Matthews’s final answer. However, he reaches this conclusion by 
placing too much weight on the passage on evil near the beginning (2.4.9) to the 
exclusion of considering other relevant statements on motive throughout the analysis. In 
spite of that, Paffenroth’s examination of the role of the companions supports their 
position as a catalyst reasonably well if one sees the theft analysis as a coherent whole. 
Nevertheless, McMahon’s confessional approach to the text, and therefore the more 
disjointed nature of Augustine’s analysis, actually supports even more fully Paffenroth’s 
interpretation of Augustine’s final comment on friendship as a parallel to the theft 
comment, not a regular part of the analysis. 
Geoffrey Scarre’s interpretation differs considerably from Matthews’s and 
Paffenroth’s. Although he understands the original passage on evil (2.4.9) as Augustine’s 
statement that he is doing evil for evil’s sake, Scarre holds that Augustine’s own self-
analysis here does not match his writings in City of God on the effects of the Fall.
153
 The 
aftermath that Augustine describes in 14.15 of that work focuses on a number of lusts and 
appetites including ones for affluence, power, glory, revenge against enemies, sexual 
pleasure, etc. However, he notes that Augustine never says anything about wrongdoing 
for its own sake as the object of love, probably because he did not perceive it as one of 
the natural lusts resulting from the Fall.  
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As a result, Scarre submits that instead of loving wrongdoing for its own sake, 
Augustine committed the theft because he was loving sin for its own sake.
154
 In other 
words, Augustine believed that humans after the Fall are naturally inclined to resist God’s 
commands simply because they are His commands. Wrongdoing can be attractive to us as 
a way to show our independence, and Scarre submits here that the essence of sin is 
rejecting the authority of God for our own. Thus, Scarre perceives a definite difference 
between doing something wrong simply for the sake of wrongdoing and doing something 
wrong for a different, attractive reason while still fully knowing that the action is wrong, 
and his explanation of Augustine’s motive falls under the latter category. Consequently, 
although Scarre does not hold to a Platonic explanation for the theft, at the same time he 
does not believe that Augustine committed the vice simply for the sake of vice in contrast 
to Paffenroth’s account. Nevertheless, Scarre concludes with his view that Augustine’s 
account is too “theologically-charged” to be fully convincing. In reality, he suspects that 
Augustine’s desire to be thought of as “one of the gang” and the natural competitive spirit 
among the boys truly explain the theft, especially since a teenager at that age is more 
likely to be trying to grab attention, not attempting to spite God.   
Scarre’s initial conclusion from the text is similar to Paffenroth’s, and I will comment 
more on their answer in relation to my own account shortly. However, Scarre’s 
stipulation of “sin for sin’s sake” as the actual motive, based on a passage from City of 
God, is questionable. First, the gap in time between the writing of Confessions and the 
writing of City of God 14.15, which Scarre references, was approximately twenty 
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years.
155
 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to allow for the definite possibility that 
Augustine’s thought in this area (what the specific results of the Fall were) matured over 
time, with City of God reflecting his final conclusions on that issue. In addition, in the 
context of 14.15 Augustine’s outline of different results is not necessarily meant to be 
exhaustive, hence the wisdom in avoiding arguments from silence on that topic.  
 
An Anti-Platonic “Confessional” Interpretation 
Having reviewed key problems with the various accounts above, I outline here my 
own account of the motive. Despite my general agreement with McMahon’s 
“confessional process” reading of Augustine’s analysis, instead of concurring with 
McMahon on companionship as the motive I take a very different direction in my review: 
first, in 2.4.9 I observe Augustine’s statement that he had no desire to enjoy what he stole 
but to enjoy “only the stealing of them and the sin [sed ipso furto et peccato],” wording 
with peccato (“sin”). Such a focus initially brings to mind Scarre’s suggestion of “sin for 
sin’s sake” as a motive. The proposal of this motivation is possibly reinforced a few lines 
later by Augustine’s statement that they did not steal the pears to eat but instead their 
“only pleasure in doing it was that it was forbidden [dum tamen fieret a nobis quod eo 
liberet quo non liceret].” In spite of this, pleasure from doing something that “was not 
permitted [non liceret]” does not automatically indicate the “sin” motive here since such  
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wording could simply refer to a moral boundary instituted by a human authority, not 
necessarily by a divine one.
156
  
Later in the same section Augustine makes another statement concerning motive as he  
directly states that “I loved the evil in me—not the thing for which I did the evil, simply 
the evil…[amavi defectum meum, non illud ad quod deficiebam, sed defectum meum 
ipsum amavi].” A more literal rendering of the wording about his “failing” [defectum] 
could make the English phrasing somewhat awkward, but Sheed’s choice of wording 
captures the basic essence of the statement—the evil itself in him was the focus of 
Augustine’s love in contrast to the “thing” for which he did the evil. Such a motive is 
conceptually more consistent with an “evil for evil’s sake” motivation than with a focus 
on sinful rebellion against God. Augustine closes this section, reinforcing once again the 
idea of the “evil” motive by stating that he was “seeking no profit from wickedness but 
only to be wicked [non dedecore aliquid, sed dedecus appetens].”  
The distinction above is important since it is analytically difficult to reconcile those 
two kinds of motive. Upon closer analysis, “evil for evil’s sake” involves being attracted 
to a wrong action precisely because of its wrongness, not for any other reason. Drawing 
an idea from David Hume’s essay “Of the Standards of Taste,” Scarre stresses the point 
that regarding virtue, we praise it, of course, and give it our approval, whereas we 
disapprove of vice.
157
 He adds that an individual can certainly be attracted to things that 
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he disapproves of, noting that there is no linguistical or logical problem with the 
following: “X is wrong, and I don’t approve of X, nevertheless, I like/want X.” Yet it 
does not make sense to say, “X is wrong, so I don’t approve of X, yet its wrongness is 
precisely what attracts me to it.” My own example of the first statement would be the 
case of a smoker that believes that smoking is wrong, but he likes or wants to smoke 
anyway because of some perceived good associated with the act: smoking makes him feel 
relaxed, impresses his friends, serves as a form of escapism, etc. The second statement 
would involve a case in which a person smokes precisely because it is wrong, not because 
of a perceived good associated with it. That such a statement is ultimately incoherent will 
be further examined later in the chapter. Yet Augustine’s statements that use the “evil” 
motive are best classified as reflecting this second statement.  
However, “sin for sin’s sake” is an example of the first statement above.158 In such a 
case the agent is attracted by a perceived “good” in the act such as the thrill of showing 
one’s imagined independence, or thumbing one’s nose at authority, variations here of 
consciously flouting God’s standards. This situation stems from how the term “sin” itself, 
particularly in the context of Augustine’s writings, presupposes a higher religious 
authority, God, that has laid down boundaries in the moral realm that should not be 
crossed. In contrast to that scenario, the “evil” category of motive, need not involve a 
higher authority at all.
159
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At this point some might argue that Augustine does not necessarily mean to raise two 
very different motives here that are incompatible with each other. Instead, he plausibly 
uses them simply as variations of each other. On the one hand, without any more specific 
qualifications made by Augustine to distinguish between them as sharply separate 
motives, it is not totally clear-cut that he intended these two to be very distinct 
motivations. Yet in the end it is best to take each statement at face value as constituting a 
certain category of motive instead of serving as variations of the same motive. This view 
is particularly the case since McMahon’s “confessional” interpretative approach itself, if 
correct, would suggest that this understanding of those statements is the most natural 
reading of the text. After all, such an approach supports the view that Augustine really is 
probing various possibilities in an effort to understand his true motivation in the theft 
episode better. If McMahon’s confessional approach is correct, then Augustine’s switch 
between the two conceptually different motives poses less of a problem for McMahon’s 
final interpretation in comparison to most Platonic accounts, which usually view the theft 
analysis as one coherent essay.  
Although some will note that the “sin” motive above only appears in his brief 
summary of the theft (2.4.9) before his self-analysis actually begins, the “omnipotence” 
passage at the end of section 14 uses the same kind of language. More specifically, in 
2.6.14 Augustine describes his illusory feeling of omnipotence “from doing something 
forbidden without immediate punishment [faciendo impune quod non liceret],” thus 
crossing a line again involving an authority figure, a more developed situation beyond 
simply committing evil for the sake of evil. Interestingly, Augustine then reverts back to 
wording in section 15 (2.7.15) that supports the “evil” motive as he thanks God for 
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forgiveness for his evil in that period of his life, thanking Him also for the evil that he 
never did but might have done: “And the evil I have not done, that also I know is by Thy 
grace [Gratiae tuae deputo et quaecumque non feci mala]: for what might I not have 
done, seeing that I loved evil solely because it was evil [quid enim non facere potui, qui 
etiam gratuitum facinus amavi]?” With “evil,” mala, in the immediate context here, it is 
certainly reasonable to understand gratuitum facinus to refer to a “criminal act,” 
performed for no reason at all. Therefore, when the passage is considered as a whole, it is 
best to classify this brief reference to motive as another example of the “evil” motive. 
This conclusion is also reinforced by Augustine’s continued use of mala (evil) in the 
subsequent sentence.  
In his contemplation at the beginning of section 16 (2.8.16), even though the word 
“evil” [mala] is nowhere in the passage, Augustine continues with a motive that is 
conceptually consistent with the idea of “evil for evil’s sake.”  
“What fruit therefore had I (in my vileness) in those things of which I am now ashamed? 
Especially in that piece of thieving, in which I loved nothing except the thievery [in quo ipsum furtum 
amavi, nihil aliud]—though that in itself was no thing [cum et ipsum esset nihil] and I only the more 
wretched for it.”
160
 
 
Regarding the whole episode, Augustine states his love for “nothing except the thievery,” 
and one sees a brief reference here as well to his eventual view of evil as literally 
nothing—just a privation. However, he next considers the possibility of the 
companionship as part of the motive. While calling that “friendship” also a “nothing,” 
apparently a corrupted form of friendship at best, he contemplates the prospect of his 
being attracted by it:  
                                                          
160
  Sheed’s emphasis in both English sentences. The first two italicized portions are Sheed’s to denote 
Augustine’s use of Scripture, in this case Romans 6:21 from the New Testament.  
 
71 
 
Now—as I think back on the state of my mind then—I am altogether certain that I would not have 
done it alone. Perhaps then what I really loved was the companionship of those with whom I did it. If 
so, can I still say that I loved nothing over and above the thievery [non ergo nihil aliud quam furtum 
amavi]? Surely I can; that companionship was nothing over and above, because it was nothing [immo 
vero nihil aliud, quia et illud nihil est]. 
 
Nonetheless, he eventually moves back to pursuing how the deed itself and also the 
companionship fit together in the correct understanding of his motivation at that time: 
If I had liked the pears that I stole and wanted to enjoy eating them, I might have committed the 
offence alone, if that had been sufficient, to get me the pleasure I wanted; I should not have needed to 
inflame the itch of my desires by rubbing against accomplices [nec confricatione consciorum 
animorum accenderem pruritum cupiditatis meae]. But since the pleasure I got was not in the pears, it 
must have been in the crime itself [in ipso facinore], and put there by the companionship of others 
sinning with me [quam faciebat consortium simul peccantium].  
 
The question might arise as to whether Augustine moves back to “sin” language near the 
beginning of the passage above, at least indirectly by stating, “If I had liked the pears that 
I stole and wanted to enjoy eating them, I might have committed the offence alone 
[solus…committere illam iniquitatem].” Despite Sheed’s choice of the phrase “committed 
the offence,” which might initially suggest an offended party, the Latin here is not 
conclusive: iniquitatem (from iniquitas, “injustice” or “unevenness”) would point to 
committing an “injustice” against another party, but it does not necessarily serve as a 
synonym or indicator of “sin” in this context. 
As Augustine rules out the option that his pleasure was from the pears themselves, he 
concludes that it must have been in the “crime itself” [in ipso facinore]. With a focus here 
similar to his earlier statement about the facinus (“criminal deed”), it is best to see this as 
a return to the “evil” motive discussed earlier. Yet he couples that observation with an 
acknowledgement that the companionship was the needed catalyst to set in motion his 
actions leading to the theft. Augustine also includes “sin” language near the end of the 
passage, his use of peccantium in describing the actions of the group. All the same, the 
reference is rather brief—not a more direct statement of motive like the earlier statements 
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already considered. As a result, there is no serious reason to view that brief reference as 
negating the “evil” motive that is supported by other lines in the same passage.  
The wording of his final statement on the motive in section 17 (2.9.17) is an effort to 
sum up the entire matter: “Here, then, O God, is the memory still vivid in my mind. I 
would not have committed that theft alone: my pleasure in it [the theft] was not what I 
stole, but that I stole [me non libebat id quod furabar sed quia furabar]: yet I would not 
have enjoyed doing it, I would not have done it, alone.” Although the statement on 
motive here is more general in nature than some of the previous, more direct statements, 
it is reasonable to classify it in the “evil for evil’s sake” category. Of course, in the 
passage above Augustine also strongly confirms the role of the camaraderie in sparking 
the decision to commit the theft but without negating the key role of the act itself as the 
main attraction. 
 Consequently, I find myself in agreement with Scarre that based on the text, 
Augustine’s motive centers around evil for evil’s sake. However, I differ, for reasons 
already discussed, with Scarre’s contention that Augustine’s view here should be 
understood as a case of sin for sin’s sake because of City of God. Scarre’s ultimate 
position that the real-life motive outside the text was Augustine’s vying for attention in 
his group is plausible, but I remain committed to taking the text at face value on 
Augustine’s belief about the motive despite any temptation to draw a different 
conclusion.   
Yet Scarre is correct in his assertion that a motive such as evil for evil’s sake is 
ultimately incoherent. We saw earlier his belief that an individual can certainly be 
attracted to things that he disapproves of with the following form: “X is wrong, and I 
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don’t approve of X. Nevertheless, I like/want X.” It does not make sense to say, “X is 
wrong, so I don’t approve of X. Yet its wrongness is precisely what attracts me to it.” 
Scarre is skeptical of the possibility of such persons because although the virtue-loving 
person experiences pleasure in acting well, explaining the vice-loving agent whose 
feelings and moral evaluations are going separate ways here is seriously problematic: the 
sincerely wrong-loving agent is expected to experience pleasure “in acting against his 
sense of right,” a scenario that Scarre finds “incomprehensible.”161 As a result, he rightly 
submits that it is incoherent to say, “X is wrong, but I personally approve of X,” labeling 
it a “mystery” as to how an agent could genuinely experience pleasure in something 
precisely because he could not approve of it.  
Was Augustine aware of the incoherence of the motive? If our analysis above on the 
coherence issue is correct, he apparently did not know about or agree with such a 
conclusion; otherwise, he presumably would have ruled out that option during his search 
in Book 2 for the true motive. Yet if he evidently believed that his description of the 
experience that he was having as a boy is accurate and true, perhaps coming to grips with 
the inconsistency of the motive is part of the “knottedness” that Augustine seeks to 
“unravel” near the end of Book 2. As for what the true motive might have been instead of 
the experience of “evil for evil’s sake,” one can never be sure.  
My own account of the motive above brings to light a few remaining observations 
concerning the other accounts. Regarding the Platonic accounts, the conceptual 
differences between the motives described earlier in my account raise more questions 
about the “coherent” understanding of the theft analysis, questions in addition to 
McMahon’s own challenges to that interpretation. Although MacDonald does discuss 
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certain passages containing both types of motives in his list of Augustine’s relevant 
statements on motivation, he never addresses the conceptual distinctions between them in 
making his case but assumes they are essentially variations of each other.
162
 The other 
Platonic accounts, including McMahon’s, fail to give the “evil for evil’s sake” motive 
adequate consideration despite the various direct statements in Augustine’s search that 
point to this option.  
Concerning the anti-Platonic accounts, Matthews dismisses the “evil for evil’s sake” 
motive as a possibility early in his account since wickedness, no lesser good with beauty 
of its own, could not have been what attracted Augustine.
163
 Viewing Augustine’s theft 
analysis as a systematic exploration is a key factor in Matthews’s error here since he 
believes that everything Augustine says throughout the analysis must somehow be 
logically consistent. Although Paffenroth also interprets the analysis as a methodical 
account, he is correct in his final conclusion of evil for evil’s sake with the 
companionship in a catalyst role. Reaching their conclusions through the belief that the 
theft analysis is a coherent whole poses an additional challenge to their fellow 
“coherentists” that interpret the motive as fitting the (narrower) Platonic understanding of 
motivation. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIL IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 
  
 Noting the meaning and the connections between Augustine’s experiences of evil in 
Books 1 and 2 and the implication of these connections for Augustine personally is an 
important step to take at this stage. Book 1 showcases Augustine’s early experience with 
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evil, ranging from his infancy to his early boyhood, with those early experiences laying 
the groundwork for his later encounters with the experiential problem of evil. In 
particular, his temptation in the area of the “pride of life,” to pursue vain ambition, 
receives impetus in two areas: the games and shows that he attended as a boy and the 
high expectations from the schoolmasters that he strive to excel in lessons and 
competitions involving classical studies and public speaking. 
In Book 2 his parents unwittingly reinforce his move toward vanity as they also 
expect his success in those studies. At the same time, they fail (in his view) to address 
adequately a different, growing temptation in his life, that of his sexual struggles, thus 
leading to his spiritual rebellion as illustrated through the pear theft episode that 
dominates the rest of Book 2. Augustine’s final observation at the very end of Book 2 
that “I went away from Thee, my God,…I became to myself a barren land [regio 
egestatis]” (2.10.18), summarizes the full depths of his revolt during this period. 
Boulding translates the phrase as “land of famine” and makes a connection with it to the 
story of the Prodigal Son--Augustine’s own prodigality is now complete.164 Likewise, 
O’Donnell also had observed “echoes” of the Prodigal story in the theft analysis in 
Augustine’s language of throwing the pears to the pigs,165 arguably a link that reinforces 
the serious degree of spiritual prodigality of Augustine in his sixteenth year. As 
MacDonald terms it, Augustine’s purpose in relating the theft story is to show by the end 
of Book 2 that the “prodigal has reached his nadir.”166 O’Donnell and MacDonald, both 
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the 21st Century, Part 1—Books, vol. 1 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997), 74.  See footnote 54 on 
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  O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 2, 130. O’Donnell compares the language about the pigs to 
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holding to a Platonic understanding of the theft, are correct that under the Platonic 
interpretation it is clear that Augustine’s spiritual rebellion had reached a new level.  
Yet under the motive that has been proposed here, “evil for evil’s sake,” a motive that 
goes beyond the Platonic explanation, how much more an understanding of this as the 
motive illustrates the depth of his rebellion as he deliberately committed a wrongful act 
without any perceived good connected to it. Although using the simple example of the 
theft of a pear tree may seem rather perplexing, the motive and how it showcases the 
depravity of his heart is clearly one of the reasons for Augustine’s focus here. It is 
notable how the act under Augustine’s analysis is even less rational in a sense than the 
irrational, futile act of rebellion that Matthews terms the theft as. In Matthews’s account 
such a rebellious act, a case of a “Rebel Without a Cause,” conceivably takes place when 
one’s level of frustration or anger has reached a new high, conditions have reached a 
breaking point of sorts, and the agent is compelled to “lash out,” revolt in some way, but 
without any clear goal in mind. In contrast, Augustine’s “evil” motive is even less 
rational—so irrational that a breakdown of the logical form of it is incoherent. Although 
we suggested earlier that he was not aware of the immediate logical problem with such a 
motive, perhaps in a sense he held an awareness of the sheer irrationality of it, an act so 
irrational that it is even less explicable than the spontaneous, nihilistic act of rebellion in 
Matthews’s interpretation.  
In Augustine’s reflections on sinful rebellion in general, which is prompted by the 
incident of the pear theft, he muses on how “the soul is guilty of fornication when she 
turns from You and seeks from any other source what she will nowhere find pure and 
without taint unless she returns to you” (2.6.14). The fornication passage here suggests 
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how the theft as well as probably the sexual relations with various women that he 
described earlier in Book 2 conceivably symbolize the spiritual rebellion against God that 
was ultimately taking place in his heart.
167
 Viewed through this lens, concerning the 
earlier fornication passage in which he was “boiling over in my fornications” (2.2.2), he 
is plausibly using “fornications” in both ways in that particular statement, both spiritual 
and physical fornication. In addition, it is noteworthy how Augustine uses the metaphor 
of a seductress in describing his eventual spiritual/intellectual “seduction” by the 
Manichees (3.6.11), a metaphor drawn from Solomon’s parable of a temptress that 
represents Folly, the antithesis of Wisdom, in the Old Testament Book of Proverbs (9:13-
17). 
  But more specifically, how did family relations serve as a factor in Augustine’s 
downward spiral into spiritual rebellion in Book 2? We noted earlier that one motive that 
Augustine considered in his analysis was the possibility of stealing the pears simply 
because such an act was “forbidden.” In that consideration we suggested that the issue of 
parental authority was in the forefront, especially in view of Augustine’s reaction to 
Monnica’s advice on sexual relations as “womanish” so that he “should have blushed to 
obey,” not as an admonition from God.  
Although Augustine eventually rejected that motive in our account, why would he be 
that disturbed later about that authority to begin with, aside from the natural rebellious 
tendencies that can often surface in the teen years? Augustine’s frustrations with his 
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metaphor here in Boulding, 71, n. 43. I would add that the biblical use of prostitution as a metaphor for 
spiritual unfaithfulness throughout the Old Testament (Ex. 34:15-16; Jdg. 8:27-33; Ezek. 16:26, 28; 23:5-8) 
is presumably in Augustine’s mind here even though most of those references are more specifically a 
metaphor using prostitution in connection with adultery, i.e. Israel’s, in some cases, Judah’s unfaithfulness 
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parents in the first part of Book 2 are especially key. For example, even though William 
Mallard agrees with some commentators that the pear tree also recalls the original tree of 
knowledge of both good and evil in the Genesis story, he adds that the theft episode 
equally centers on the “hollow rage” of this adolescent, caught between “the family’s 
expectations and casual disregard [from the events in 2.3] (neither of which accords with 
how he really is)…”168 As a result, it is no coincidence that the incident with the pear tree 
as well as his new wayward direction in Carthage (3.1.1) both take place shortly after his 
frustrations with his parents (2.2.2-2.3.8). Mallard asserts that Augustine’s aggravation 
with his mother’s passivity in not having him baptized or married culminated in actions 
on his part that showed an outright rejection of her faith and a turn toward the other 
direction.
169
 He notes how Augustine’s language in the “Babylon” passage in 2.3.8 points 
toward great frustration on his part at her inaction.
170
  
Although certain aspects of this summary of Monnica’s situation such as the Babylon 
symbolism
171
 are pieced together retrospectively by Augustine the adult, Mallard is 
focusing on Augustine the youth’s presumable disappointment and perhaps anger as well 
at his mother’s failure to act upon his father’s report of his physical development. In spite 
of Mallard’s submissions here, where exactly to draw the line between what Augustine 
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  William Mallard, Language and Love: Introducing Augustine’s Religious Thought Through the 
Confessions Story (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1994), 30. The account of the 
postponement of his baptism is in 1.11.17-18.   
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  Ibid., 28. 
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  As we saw earlier, in 2.3.6 Augustine relates how at the public baths his father rejoiced upon seeing 
him and realizing how he had reached puberty, and thus, Patricius could look forward to expecting 
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171  As a common symbol of human sinfulness and divine judgment in the New Testament, Babylon is 
used by Augustine to state that “she [Monnica] still lingered in its outskirts. She had urged me to chastity, 
but she did not follow up what my father had told her of me…” (2.3.8). 
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the youth felt concerning Monnica’s actions and what is really retrospective on 
Augustine’s part is difficult to fully ascertain from the text. Nonetheless, it is reasonable 
to conclude from the text that the early frustrating situation between Augustine and his 
parents was a definite factor, if not the only factor, in his behavior in the second part of 
Book 2. Although the “forbidden” motive is not the motivation that Augustine finally 
settles on as explaining his behavior with the theft, his deeper, darker descent into an 
irrational motivation for the pear theft is arguably connected to the unfavorable situation 
that he found himself in at home.  
 Therefore, instances of experiential evil in Augustine’s early childhood and 
adolescence, evil caused by himself as well as others, are not difficult to find in the first 
two books of Confessions. His parents, though well-meaning, plausibly made 
questionable decisions that either encouraged or at least did not adequately discourage his 
negative behavior in this early period despite his mother Monnica’s efforts to ground him 
in a basic foundation of knowledge about God at the same time (1.11.17). Consequently, 
the parents’ mistakes or in some cases the young Augustine’s perception of them as 
mistakes at that time presumably served as a key factor, if not the only factor, behind 
Augustine’s temporary rejection of God and his journey in a wayward direction. 
Although the influence of these early instances of evil on his later preoccupation with the 
problem of evil itself remains to be seen, the correlation between the experiential evil of 
this period and his growing spiritual distance from God is already rather clear. Augustine 
describes his rebellion in stark terms in this part of the work, and his overall description  
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of this period of life provides important background to the reader before Augustine 
commences with new experiential and intellectual struggles with evil in subsequent 
books.  
 
 
CRITIQUE OF AUGUSTINE’S CONTRIBUTIONS REGARDING EVIL 
 
 
Augustine’s struggles with evil in this first part of Confessions provide definite issues 
for further consideration, issues that are not limited to his time period or setting. If the 
earlier analysis of the theft episode in this chapter is correct, then what of Augustine’s 
basic point that not all evil acts fall into the Platonic category? An elaboration of a 
famous experiment with C. Fred Alford’s input will be helpful in addressing the inquiry. 
Alford first reminds us of the famous Milgram experiment (1974) in which the 
experimental subject, “the teacher,” is instructed to give increasingly higher shocks (in 
15-volt increments) to a mild-mannered man, middle-aged, whenever he does not give 
the correct answer concerning a word pair.
172
 Actually a confederate of Milgram, the man 
grunts with discomfort when the “shocks” reach around 100 volts and then yells, 
complaining of a heart condition, and even eventually reaching the point of screaming 
before later falling silent as the voltage gradually “increases” further.  
Noting how a panel of psychiatrists originally predicted that only one-tenth of one 
percent, the “sickest” members of the population, would eventually deliver the full range 
of shocks, Alford submits that Milgram struggled to explain why 65% of the 
experimental subjects, working- and middle-class men and women that lived in New 
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Haven, did deliver the full shock.
173
 Of course, the “teachers” did not ignore the cries of 
the “learner”: some were hesitant to continue, others demurred, but most ultimately 
continued the shocks. Milgram carefully argued that the subjects are not sadistic, but 
rather they could not help themselves because they are “born and bred for obedience” as 
Alford summarizes the account.  
Alford later briefly summarized the Milgram experiment to ordinary citizens under 
the title “If Hitler Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Probably.”174 After 
spending two hours with them each, Alford observed that the citizens’ explanation of the 
results was similar to Milgram’s: people are “naturally weak, conformist, and cowardly,” 
but “not naturally sadistic.”  Alford then spent three hours per week for more than a year 
with a group of prisoners incarcerated for murder and rape. The prisoners’ answers were 
markedly different from those of the group of free citizens. First, Mr. Acorn, whose input 
was strongly supported by the other prisoners as accurately voicing their thoughts 
throughout Alford’s interaction with them, quickly changed the summary name to the 
following: “If the State Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Hell, Yes.” A 
biker that is covered with tattoo designs (some rather vulgar) and that wants to open a 
tattoo shop after his release, Acorn might be dismissed by many as unqualified for even 
understanding the Milgram experiment, but Alford asks us to consider the possibility that 
his background does qualify him. Acorn submitted that all people have the potential for 
violence, adding that the prisoners with him all sense that “half of the citizens of the state 
would love to see us fry; hell, they’d be lining up for the job.” Acorn essentially argues 
that the state’s executioner adheres to public procedure to carry out his own sadism, 
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 Alford, “Evil Be Thou My Good,” 14. Alford here also references the related article by Phillip Meyer, 
“If Hitler Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Probably,” Esquire, 73 (1970): 72-73.  
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whereas a man that, say, kidnaps people and electrocutes them in his basement handles 
his sadism “freelance.”175 Alford suggests that it is the difference between the Milgram 
subjects and the criminal, the difference between civilization and barbarism, instead of a 
difference between sadism and obedience. He adds that the inmates were not more 
sadistic and aggressive in his experience than the free participants. Rather, the inmates’ 
sadism is simply more visible, “more likely to go freelance, less bound to institutional 
forms,” virtually the basic definition of criminal-type behavior. If this is true, then Alford 
concludes how evil, pleasure in hurting, is “more widespread and institutionalized than 
we know,” but we have a tendency to confuse “organization, rationalization, and 
legitimation with goodness…”  
As a result, regarding Augustine’s analysis of Catiline’s acts in Book 2 of 
Confessions (2.5.11), Alford poses the question: “Is not Augustine working a little too 
hard to make Catiline’s savagery a rational act, perverse, but nonetheless based on 
reason?” He believes Augustine stops too early when he should have continued exploring 
other possibilities of pure evil.
176
 Alford closes by asserting  that Enlightenment 
optimism finds it “literally unthinkable that people, or at least more than the psychopathic 
few…find pleasure in hurt, harm, and destruction” but instead he suggests that we should 
listen more closely to those “idiot savants of evil,” the prisoners that he interviewed.  
On the issue of evil for evil’s sake, in response to Alford Scarre would conceivably 
suggest that the willingness of free citizens to “fry” anyone could easily be understood as 
anger or revenge or even as expressing their own superiority over that person, all definite 
reasons that he raises in his own essay regarding the more general question of whether 
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one person hurts another only for the sake of it.
177
 Scarre adds that people that enjoy 
others’ suffering are often not indifferent to who the others are; it is precisely their 
enemies, those against whom they hold some kind of grudge, that they want to be on the 
receiving end.
178
 Therefore, concerning the prisoner Acorn’s example Scarre could 
conceivably go further and mention the tendency of people to see their enemies as any 
enemy of society, extrapolated to include any criminal in society since criminal activity 
poses a threat to the peaceful, orderly society that the free citizen has come to love and 
value and thus, not a case of sadism simply for the sake of sadism. Whether the death 
penalty itself is ethical is a separate issue, but I concur with Scarre’s conceivable line of 
reasoning here against Alford.  
However, both Scarre’s and Alford’s accounts agree that the Platonic understanding 
of wrong acts is not an adequate explanation of the real human condition. Alford’s 
submission that people’s potential for violence is conceivably much greater than we may 
realize or want to admit or even consider is a sobering thought. This is not to suggest that 
people never do acts because of a perceived good or that people do not have such 
motivations much of the time. Yet it is conceivably difficult, especially as one surveys 
various events of today across the globe, to assert strongly that people do wrong acts that 
they do out of ignorance more often than not. In contrast, I propose that Scarre’s account 
of deliberate acts of wrongness, performed for attractive reasons beyond the act’s 
wrongness itself, constitutes the ultimate motivation behind many acts that we see and 
hear about. Alford’s submissions, including Acorn’s more basic account of people’s 
enormous potential to do wrong, are points well-taken even though Alford’s belief in 
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pure evil suffers from the problems that Scarre raises in his own essay. Augustine would 
presumably be astonished at how the simple youthful theft of a pear tree among other 
factors has contributed to some of the larger debates about good and evil today.   
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CHAPTER THREE: CICERO’S HORTENSIUS  
AND THE MANICHEAN PERIOD 
 
 
This chapter focuses primarily on events in Books 3 and 4 of Confessions and also 
through much of Book 5. At the age of sixteen Augustine moves to Carthage to continue 
his education in rhetoric and immediately describes how “a cauldron of illicit loves leapt 
and boiled about me” (3.1.1).179 He was “in love with love [amare amabam]” but since 
his ultimate hunger was not for the “spiritual food,” God Himself, his “soul was sick.” 
Therefore, his struggles with lust continued and his new interest in stage plays stemmed 
from his efforts to cope with his own miseries that he saw mirrored on the stage (3.2.2). 
 
CICERO’S HORTENSIUS 
 
 
In 3.4.8 Augustine’s excited reading of Hortensius by Cicero at the age of nineteen 
launches him on a quest to find true wisdom. The part in the Hortensius that makes an 
impact on Augustine is the large focus on Wisdom, but Peter Brown reminds us how 
“Wisdom” for Augustine does not hold the same meaning that it held for Cicero.180 The 
name of Christ was held with a certain regard by Augustine, not only as a result of his 
boyhood in a Christian household, but also from the tendency of his culture to view the 
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name of Christ as a safeguard, “like a vaccination,” against the common, very active 
presence of demons in the physical world. Moreover, the fourth-century presentation of 
Christ as the wise teacher, and not the suffering Savior, affected his interpretation as 
well.
181
 Conversely, so-called pagan “Wisdom” would have meant nothing to 
Augustine.
182
  
Augustine’s experience is not just intellectual but life-transforming—a return to the 
God that he had moved away from in the past. However, first, in the section in which he 
describes his encounter with the Hortensius, he initially remarks how “in eloquence it 
was my ambition to shine, all from a damnable vaingloriousness and for the satisfaction 
of human vanity […fine damnabili et ventoso per gaudia vanitatis humanae],…” (3.4.7). 
Next, by noting the effect that the experience had on Augustine’s desires, Robert 
O’Connell illuminates the religious and moral aspects of the experience:183  
It turned my prayers [preces] to You Yourself, Lord, and redirected my purposes and desires [vota 
ac desideria]. My every vain hope was suddenly cheapened for me [viluit mihi repente omnis vana 
spes], and with incredible ardor of heart [aestu cordis incredibili] I yearned for the immortality of 
Wisdom. I began to rise up, in order to return to You [surgere coeperam ut ad Te redirem]... 
 
O’Connell interprets vana spes as “vain hopes,” viewing this as Augustine’s term 
meaning “‘empty’ aspirations after ‘secular’ or ‘this-worldly’ distinction” and 
corresponding to the worldly, lucrative career of the last of the triad of sins (the pride of 
life) from James J. O’Donnell’s interpretation of Confessions. Thus, in contrast to 
Augustine’s obsession with ambition in the earlier quotation, Cicero’s inspiring work 
here greatly tempered his desire for glory at this point.  
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However, although O’Connell observes that the phrase aestu cordis incredibili does 
hint at the erotic quality of the experience, he submits that this erotic element is 
intensified in the next part of Augustine’s experience: “How I burned, O my God 
[ardebam…], how I burned with desire to fly back to You from earthly things [a 
terrenis]…for Wisdom is with You [apud Te est enim Sapientia]” (3.4.8). O’Connell 
notes the continuing sexual imagery in the next passage: “What delighted me in 
[Cicero’s] exhortation was only this: I was stirred up, and enkindled, and enflamed to 
love, to seek after, to attain and strongly embrace, not this or that sect, but Wisdom Itself, 
whatsoever Wisdom might be” (3.4.8).184  
Nevertheless, Cicero’s work had its limitations in Augustine’s view because of his 
disappointment in 3.4.8 at the lack of any mention of Christ in it: 
In so great a blaze, only one thing held me back: that the name of Christ was not in it…Whatever 
lacked that name, no matter how well-written, polished, and truthful it might be, could not  wholly bear 
me away [non me totum rapiebat].
185  
 
The intellectual aspect of the experience led to his immediate next step of looking at the 
Christian Scriptures for this “Wisdom.” The resulting disappointment of this step 
stemmed from how his “conceit was repelled by their [the Scriptures’] simplicity.”186 In 
3.7.12 several other questions that challenged the Catholic faith, including a question on 
the origin of evil, strengthen Augustine’s belief that the Catholic faith of his mother does 
not have the “Wisdom” he is seeking after reading Cicero. Instead, he finds himself 
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gravitating toward the Manichees with their promise of showing the truth of their 
teachings through the use of reason.
187
                                                                        
 
 
THE MANICHEAN PERIOD 
 
 
In 3.6.10 Augustine, now nineteen, falls in with the Manichees, for whom the 
problem of evil is a primary issue. In various works Augustine states that this period 
lasted nine years.
188
  L. Ferrari offers the observation that a prolonged period without 
baptism encouraged sin in Augustine’s day189 along with other observations of how and 
why Augustine would have experimented with Manichaeism but without actually leaving 
the Church:
190
  
It is small wonder then, that still unbaptized at the insecure age of nineteen he indulged himself yet 
again when confronted by the mysterious Manichees with their constant talk of the Holy Trinity 
(3.6.10), and of his beloved Christ. Consequently, the previously mentioned secretive character of the 
Manichees and their love of the “suffering Jesus” who was “crucified throughout the visible 
universe”… were irresistible to a bright and curious nineteen-year-old with his passionate love of the 
name of Christ on the one hand (3.4.8; 5.14.25) and with a licence to sin and his fascination for secrecy 
on the other. 
 
Augustine’s curiosity, stemming from one of the sins in the triad of weaknesses in 
O’Donnell’s interpretation of Confessions, arguably helped to lead to his time with the 
Manichees, and this consideration leads us to consider their system of beliefs next. 
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Manichean Beliefs 
 
 
In order to better understand Augustine’s attraction to this sect as well as its effect on 
the two problems of evil and his eventual disillusionment with the group, specific 
background on the group’s dogma and morals will be helpful here. Seven writings from 
the group’s founder Mani make up the Manichean canon such as The Living Gospel and 
The Book of Mysteries.
191
 According to Manichean cosmogony, before heaven and earth 
were created there existed two principles, good and evil, with the first principle called the 
“Father of Greatness” in his “Kingdom of Light,” a kingdom composed of five elements 
(air, wind, light, water, fire).
192
 However, the divine substance itself was light, different 
from either matter or intellect but still apprehensible and possessing a quality of 
manifestation.
193
 The realm of the principle of evil is the reverse image of the realm of 
Light, and the “Prince of Darkness” is the head of that realm.194  
As for the nature of the soul itself, Jason BeDuhn makes clear that in Manichean 
teaching the soul is that “divine substance” that is now “enmeshed” with darkness, evil, 
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and this mixed condition has produced what we see in the cosmos around us.
195
 Thus, 
Man is a microcosm of the cosmic battle: his body of matter is from the demon but his 
soul is from God.
196
  
Only a number of adherents could observe the strict rules of the church, leading to the 
ecclesiastical organization of Mani’s church.197 One class was made up of “the chosen 
few,” and thus called “the Elect,” also labeled variously as the “just, perfect, or holy,”198  
and forming the community of monks in the religion. The Elect play a crucial role in 
Manichean beliefs on salvation since their strict observance of the commandments, 
including those of purity, enables them to be the “earthly agents for the release of the 
captive Light.”199 This is accomplished through their digestive systems, which refine the 
various Light Particles in the food that they eat and release these Particles through their 
belches.
200
 The other major class was composed of the Hearers, that is, Catechumens.
201
 
Hearers or Auditors were precisely that because they were unwilling, at least at this point, 
to follow the required life of the Elect perfectly—hence their label, taken from Romans 
2:13.
202
  However, the Hearers’ role in the salvation process was important too as they 
gave “Soul-Service,” committed to caring for the Elect with almsgiving as well as with 
food preparation for these “redemptive meals.”203   
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Monks were required to hold to five major commandments, and the laity were bound 
to observe three of them, at least in part.
204
 The third commandment, especially relevant 
for us to understand Augustine’s early perception of the Elect, required the monk to 
practice strict chastity, not only sexually by pursuing a life of celibacy but also even to 
the point of avoiding any pleasurable contact by touching dew, snow, fine fabric, etc.
205
 
Hearers did not have to observe all the same commandments as the Elect but could marry 
(or have mistresses), and yet were instructed to avoid procreation.
206
 A Hearer sins less 
with a concubine than with a wife—intending to propagate men is a larger evil than 
simply seeking one’s own pleasure. Nevertheless, the ideal in this area would be total 
abstinence.
207
 As for almsgiving, the Hearer must give a tenth (or seventh) of his 
possessions with the result that he received purification from his worldly works as his 
giving allowed the Elect to fulfill their own duties.
208
  
A brief, closer look at evil in Manichean thought will be helpful for understanding 
Manichaeism’s promises of deliverance. This in turn is helpful for understanding 
Augustine’s strong preoccupation with the problem of evil. Although the term “myth” is 
often used to describe the cosmic drama described earlier, Mani’s claim to have received 
special revelation precludes the use of the term since his entire teaching on origins is 
meant to be understood literally and be scientifically accurate as well.
209
 As Lieu 
summarizes it, the “total acceptance of the Manichaean gnosis is essential for the 
believer’s redemption as it demands his participation in a special lifestyle which has a 
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salvific function and which is only meaningful within a literal understanding of the 
cosmogonic drama.” As a result, Mani held literal views on the goodness or badness of 
celestial entities. He regarded the sun and the moon as good beings but saw the planets 
and the signs of the Zodiac as evil and pernicious.
210
 In his Kephalaia Mani even laid out 
a schema in which two zodiacal animals were connected to each of the Five Worlds of 
Darkness.
211
 In another passage in the same work, Mani divided the world into four parts, 
with each part split into four triangles. In this way three specific zodiacal signs were 
distributed to each triangle.
212
 Astrological ideas enter Manichean thinking at this point, 
and the zodiacal signs that one is “connected” to affect both the physiology and 
psychology of humans.
213
 Moreover, this science of melothesia, which outlined the 
impact that astrological signs have on different parts of the body, allowed specifically for 
the influence of Zodiac signs such as Aries influencing the head, Taurus affecting the 
neck and shoulders, the belly influenced by Virgo, the genitals by Scorpio, and so forth in 
one of the systems of influence.
214
   
However, besides astrology, food is a second crucial factor in one’s physiology and 
psychology. In Manichaeism “you are what you eat,” and so eating a food with many 
dark (negative) substances instead of light particles can disturb one’s physical health and 
also harm one’s psychological well-being as such food strengthens the presence of evil 
within the individual.
215
 A third factor involves the senses. Each sense organ has a 
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“memory storehouse,” a depository of good and evil from the world.216 Experiences 
gained through the five senses enter the appropriate sensory repository and have an effect 
on one’s behaviors and attitudes. Which “regime” controls the body at a given time 
determines the memories, good or evil, that will be consulted and utilized.
217
 For 
example, whenever the body is controlled by “the regime of evil,” the senses have a 
tendency to take in and concentrate on experiences that cultivate unhealthy dispositions. 
Thus, the Manichean strategy to free elements in Nature and especially in food is 
frustrated whenever the individual is controlled by evil.
218
  
A closer look at the Manichean preoccupation with evil in the context of North Africa 
is useful at this point. In particular, the Manichees in that area centered on the problem of 
evil as did their Gnostic forerunners in Africa two hundred years before—and essentially 
gave the same answers as well, as W. H. C. Frend points out.
219
 The evil that both groups 
struggled with was demoniac forces of evil, and the Berbers in Augustine’s Africa held to 
a belief in those forces from “remote prehistory” all the way to the present.220 This evil 
was manifested in two ways. First, there was the virtually universal belief in Africa that 
the life of an individual was under the tight governance of the stars and planets beginning 
at birth, and death could result from the eventual decree of those demons that controlled 
the planets that originally corresponded to the birth of that person. Religion aimed to 
provide people with the formulas needed to deal with certain demons that they would 
encounter on their journey to Paradise. Thus, astrology was not only a crucial part of 
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Gnostic and Manichean belief systems but was very attractive to African Christians as 
well.  
The second evil was even more dreadful as it involved the “evil eye” and the “evil 
mouth” as immediate causes of suffering.221 Various buildings, churches among them, 
had inscriptions against “Invidus” or “evil eye,” and decorations on personal possessions 
existed for the same purpose.
222
 The Berbers already viewed Saturn, the supreme God in 
the North African region, as “savage and morose,” demanding blood sacrifice for 
appeasement and totally sovereign over creation. In this vein Frend suggests that perhaps 
an African’s acceptance of this jealous deity as God versus a rejection of him (by viewing 
him as an evil Archon) well determined whether that person became committed either to 
the Donatists
223
 or to Gnostic and Manichean beliefs.
224
 In other words, to be for or 
against the Old Testament was to be for or against Jehovah.
225
 Thus, Frend adds that if 
many North Africans desired freedom from the domination of a “savage Creator-God” as 
well as deliverance from “tangible powers of evil,” then the strong attraction of 
movements such as Gnosticism becomes clear: their promise to redeem the believer from 
these elements and provide a logical explanation of happenings and of phenomena 
through a strong use of astrology. Frend sees a parallel between developments in 
Gnosticism and in Manichaeism: in both the second century and the fourth, a speculative 
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focus on evil along with a distaste for Old Testament writings led directly to a dualistic, 
heretical variety of Christianity. 
  
Augustine’s Early View of God 
 
A relevant issue for exposition involves Augustine’s view of God at this point, 
especially since the Manichees’ challenge concerning the concept of God and evil drew 
Augustine’s attention. J. Kermit Scott and various other commentators concur on the 
conclusion of Augustine’s general belief in his early life in the God of his mother, 
including the view of God as a very dominant, sovereign deity.
226
 This concept was 
coupled with the notion of God as a powerful father whose “protection might be less than 
fully reliable” for his followers on earth.227  However, this earthly life was followed by a 
blissful, pain-free existence in a “heavenly home,” and all of these key elements pointed 
to a heavily anthropomorphic concept of deity. Scott concludes that it “seems certain that 
Augustine at this point conceived his god as a corporeal being with a body very like a 
human.” Scott adds that although this anthropomorphism is not stated by Augustine 
explicitly, his later difficulties in conceiving God without a body (in his Manichean 
period) reinforce the point above. In addition, his attraction to the Manichean concept of 
God as superior to the Catholic view, which he understood to be a God “bounded by the 
form of the human body” (5.10), also supports that conclusion in Scott’s view.228 
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Although Scott doesn’t utilize the passage in Confessions 7.1.1 in support of his 
position, Augustine’s comments there concerning his beliefs on the nature of God are 
relevant: 
Now my evil sinful youth was over, and I had come on into young manhood; but the older in 
years, the baser was my vanity, in that I could not conceive any other kind of substance than what 
these eyes are accustomed to see. I did not indeed, O God, think of You under the figure of a human 
body [non te cogitabam, deus, in figura corporis humani]. From the moment I began to know anything 
of philosophy, I had rejected that idea; and I rejoiced to find the same rejection in the faith of our 
spiritual mother, Your Catholic Church. But what else to think of You I did not know.  
 
Carl W. Griffin and David L. Paulsen draw two conclusions from the passage: (1) there 
was a past time before he learned anything of philosophy in which Augustine viewed 
God in anthropomorphic terms, and (2) despite being raised a Christian he did not think 
Christians believed otherwise until a definitely later date, specifically the preaching of 
Ambrose in Milan.
229
 Griffin and Paulsen interpret the period of learning about 
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philosophy in the passage as essentially contemporaneous with his Manichean 
conversion.
230
  
 
Augustine and Manichaeism 
 
 
There is very little doubt that the problem of evil was a key factor in moving 
Augustine toward the Manichees when he joined them at the age of nineteen. In his work 
On Free Choice of the Will (388) he asserts that the question of the source of our 
evildoing was “a question that wore me out, drove me into the company of heretics [the 
Manichees]…and knocked me flat on my face [me…atque deiecit]” (1.2.4).231 
In 3.7.12 Augustine admits his initial bafflement with several issues the Manichees 
brought to his focus, the first question dealing with evil (“Whence comes evil?”—“Unde 
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malum?”).232 Since Catholics believe that God is all-good and omnipotent, this inquiry 
about evil raises a challenge to some of their key beliefs. Augustine’s utter inability to 
address that question and others adequately and the Manichees’ promise of rational 
explanations for the truth on those issues commanded his interest. 
O’Connell’s input is helpful as he sees a narrative relationship between three events 
of Augustine’s life at this point: his sexual struggles, his common-law marriage with a 
concubine, and his encounter with Cicero’s Hortensius all help to lead to his growing 
interest in the Manichees’ religion.233 In particular, O’Connell notes the Manichean 
emphasis on sexual purity, which would have conceivably accorded with Augustine’s 
attraction to Cicero’s call to follow high ideals.234  
One additional development here is how Augustine’s “curiosity” with theater in 3.2.2 
now merges in Book 4 into an effort to compete in various public displays for “the 
applause of spectators,” ultimately coupled with his struggle with worldly ambition 
(4.1.1). However, his ambition is most evident in his teaching career in rhetoric: 
“Overcome…by the desire for money” is how Augustine describes himself as he offers 
lessons in rhetoric for compensation in 4.2.2. Although Cicero’s Hortensius had tempered 
his “vain hopes” somewhat in Book 3, the temptations present in Carthage apparently 
brought his struggles in this area back in full force.  Moreover, Augustine’s statement that 
he pursued glory during the entire nine-year period while trying to cleanse himself 
through Manichean practices suggests even here that Manichean teachings were 
ineffectual in lessening his own struggle in this area (4.1.1): 
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Throughout that nine-year period, from my nineteenth year to my twenty-eighth, I was astray 
myself and led others astray, was deceived and deceived others in various forms of self-assertion, 
publicly by the teaching of what are called the liberal arts, privately under the false name of religion; in 
the one proud, in the other superstitious, in both vain. On the one side of my life I pursued the 
emptiness of popular glory [popularis gloriae…inanitatem] and the applause of spectators, with 
competition for prize poems and strife for garlands of straw and the vanity of stage shows and 
untempered lusts [intemperantiam  libidinum]; on the other side I was striving to be made clean of all 
this  same filth, by bearing food to those who were called elect and holy, that in the factory of their 
own stomachs they should turn it into angels and deities by whom I was to be set free. And I followed 
out this line of conduct; and so did my friends who were deceived by me and with me. 
 
It is rather clear from the overall context here that Augustine was not “set free” by the 
“stomachs” of the Elect during this entire period or at the very least he certainly did not 
perceive him as freed. He is also candid regarding his role in leading “astray” friends of 
his into following the same “line of conduct” that he himself was deceived into.  
In 4.13.20 Augustine explores further imaginings of the nature of Manichean 
substance in the context of the issue of beauty in his The Beautiful and the Fitting. This 
book was a work that he hoped would win him favor with the orator Hierius in his quest 
for acclaim (4.14.23). Although that work is not extant now, Augustine describes briefly 
his difficulties at that time in better understanding the nature of substance and evil. In 
particular, his inability to imagine spiritual entities proved to be a major stumbling block 
to his thought in this area (4.15.24).
235
 However, in section 26 in that chapter Augustine 
also eventually connects his limitations on thoughts regarding substance to his attraction 
to the guiltlessness that Manichean thinking provided him: 
What could be worse pride than the incredible folly in which I asserted that I was by nature what 
You are? Since I was not myself immutable…I choose rather to think You mutable than to think I was 
not as You are…So that I went on imagining corporeal forms: and being flesh I accused the flesh, and 
being a wayfaring spirit I did not return to You [et spiritus ambulans  nondum revertebar ad te] but in 
my drifting was borne on towards imaginings which have no reality either in You or in me or in the 
body, and were not created for me by Your truth but were invented by my own folly  playing upon 
matter [sed a mea vanitate  fingebantur ex corpore]. And I spoke much to the little ones of your 
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flock…I put to them the question: “Why does the soul err if God created it?” But I would not have any 
one ask me: “Why then does God err?” And I preferred to maintain that Your immutable substance had 
been constrained to suffer error [et contendebam magis incommutabilem tuam substantiam coactam 
errare] rather than admit that my own mutable substance had gone astray through its own fault and 
fallen into error for its punishment. 
 
Yet, even after the disappointing meeting with Faustus, after which Augustine still 
associates with the Elect despite his serious doubts about their cosmology, he is still 
attracted to the tendency of Manichean doctrine to portray himself as guiltless (5.10.18):  
For I still held the view that it was not we that sinned, but some other nature sinning in us; and it 
pleased my pride to be beyond fault, and when I did any evil not to confess that I had done it, that You 
might heal my soul because it had sinned against You: I very much preferred to excuse myself and 
accuse some other thing that was in me but was not I. But in truth I was wholly I, it was my impiety 
that had divided me against myself [verum autem totum ego eram et adversus me impietas mea me 
diviserat]. My sin was all the more incurable because I thought I was not a sinner; and my iniquity was 
most execrable in that I would rather have You, God Almighty, vanquished in me to my destruction 
than myself vanquished by You for my salvation […te, deus omnipotens, te in me ad perniciem meam, 
quam me a te ad salutem malle superari].  
  
In view of the quotations from Confessions above, the influence of Manichean beliefs on 
his weaknesses quickly comes into focus. Roy W. Battenhouse is direct in his 
assessment: “They [the two warring principles within him] were fated and he need feel no 
guilt about them; he needed only to observe them.”236 G. R. Evans summarizes it by 
saying that the Manichees had taken the personal struggle between one’s soul and body 
and placed the issue on a cosmic scale.
237
 They took away Augustine’s “private 
responsibility” for the health of his soul and “allowed him to cast his burden into the 
cosmic maelstrom.”  
With lust as perhaps the most pervasive temptation that he struggled with, Manichean 
beliefs especially had an effect on his relationship with his concubine. As Warren 
Thomas Smith notes, Manichean teachings offered Augustine a way out of self-
responsibility: “It was not the real Augustine that was sinning, but the evil within. He 
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might disassociate these carnal, lustful exploits from his soul, which was his authentic 
being.”238 R. McMahon concurs with this idea, adding that “Manichaean doctrine allows 
the young Augustine to blame his fleshy desires on an alien force within him, distinct 
from and opposed to his ‘true nature.’”239 Moreover, “Inclined to ‘fleshliness’ by youth 
and education, he can continue to enjoy his mistress…without acknowledging his own 
responsibility for his conduct.”240 This is not to say that Augustine’s motivations for 
wrong acts stemmed from a sense of moral license, an excuse to commit the  
wrong action. Rather, whenever he did do something immoral, Manichean teaching 
encouraged him not to bear a sense of responsibility for the mistake in which the “bad 
regime” happened to prevail in that instance.  
Augustine also dabbled in astrology itself from certain mathematicians that claimed 
that the planets and stars were the cause of the evil that one does, not the human agent 
himself (4.3.4-4.3.5). Only a strong counterexample of two infants that were born the 
same day but with differing destinies (7.6.10) finally dispelled his trust in such astrology, 
although he had already largely rejected the specific Manichean understanding of 
astronomy itself after his disappointment with Faustus (5.6.10). Augustine himself notes 
retrospectively how the astrologers’ belief in the planets as the cause of one’s misdeeds 
presents the problem of how one is “guiltless” in such a system (4.3.4). However, he 
never does directly state that this implication is the factor that attracted him to the 
astrologers’ teachings.  
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Of course, Augustine’s disappointment with Faustus’s inability to address his 
questions about the Manichean writings, specifically their failure to explain and predict 
accurately astronomical phenomena, was a major factor in Augustine’s abandonment of 
the sect (5.7.12-13). As Battenhouse makes clear, since Augustine’s doubts on 
Manichean calculations concerning the natural sciences were now substantial, this factor 
naturally raised questions as to whether the Manichees could be trusted in the area of 
deeper matters.
241
 The very observation by Augustine that those celestial bodies 
venerated by the Manichees were subject to the calculations and evaluation of the 
philosophers (5.5.9) probably made him reconsider whether the beings in those bodies 
really had a kind of divine nature in accordance with Manichean teaching.
242
 
Furthermore, I would submit that the problems with Mani’s astronomical writings might 
have been especially troubling for Augustine since those difficulties raise questions on 
whether Mani’s literal understanding of the entire cosmological process of purification, 
including the role of the sun and moon in delivering redeemed Light, is actually correct.  
However, additional problems abound in other aspects of the Manichean process, 
other aspects that were reviewed earlier. Eating the right foods was within Augustine’s 
control, but which “regime” controlled him at a given moment was essentially beyond his 
reach, and Manichean teachings did not necessarily rule out the possibility of astrological 
influence on the type of regime in control. As a result, in light of Mani’s melothesia 
understanding of astrological influence on an individual, even a person with an otherwise 
predominantly good “regime” could conceivably have his or her destiny trumped by a 
fate that was determined by the alleged demonic forces in the sky.   
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Moreover, Augustine’s statements on the lack of any sense of guilt were derived from 
Manichean thinking as several commentators noted earlier. However, these same 
Manichean beliefs did not allow the individual to take any active role, including any role 
in regime choice, to win the personal battle against evil. As Brown makes clear, the self-
contradictory aspects of the Manichean tradition puts the Manichee in a dilemma: the 
promise of taking control of one’s identity and being able to “secure” a release from the 
rest of evil that was present in him was contradicted by the myths which portrayed the 
helplessness of Good and the definite limit to the power of the good God.
243
  
However, the reputation of Mani himself and the prayers of the Elect on Augustine’s 
behalf are factors in the efficacy of the salvific process in Manichaeism that must be 
considered as well. First, what about the roles of Mani himself and the Elect with regard 
to Augustine’s eventual loss of trust in Manichean teachings? The very need to resolve 
the experiential evil that he felt consumed with arguably affected his perception of which 
authority to trust in addressing both problems of evil. Despite Augustine’s attraction to 
the Manichean sect because of its emphasis on reason, he experienced a personal dialectic 
of sorts between authority and reason during his nine years with the Manichees according 
to Frederick van Fleteren.
244
 For example, when Augustine favored the teachings of the 
astrologers against the advice of Vindicianus and Nebridius to abandon those teachings, 
authority, specifically the perceived greater authority of the astrologers, carried more 
weight here than reason (4.3.6). Regarding reason, the Manichees did promise “rational 
explanations” of solar/lunar phenomena but actually demanded an “irrational belief in 
fantastic accounts.” When Augustine eventually reached a level of uncertainty as to  
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whether the Manichean accounts can explain such phenomena (5.3.3, 5.3.6), he remained 
committed to the Manichees because of Mani’s reputation for “sanctity of life [… 
creditam sanctitatem]” (5.5.9).245  
Nevertheless, regardless of how well Mani himself might have conquered experiential 
evil in his own life, Augustine’s gradual disillusionment with the lack of moral purity of 
the Elect, which he gives various examples of in his work On the Morals of the 
Manichees (388),
246
 was another issue. In that work Augustine specifically states that 
during the entire nine years of his time with the Manichees, he had never heard of a 
member of the Elect that either had not violated rules of morality or wasn’t suspected of 
having done so (19.68).
247
 For example, his observation of several of the Elect making 
“indecent sounds and gestures” toward various women near a square in Carthage so 
disturbed him that he and his friends “lodged a complaint” on the incident. He was 
disgusted to learn that no punishment was forthcoming from Manichean leaders since the 
men in question might have provided the civil authorities with information on the sect in 
retaliation,
248
 a line of reasoning that would allow all kinds of moral laxity to go without 
punishment. He outlines other disturbing events by members of the Elect although some 
are based on hearsay: sexual advances toward a woman at the end of a meeting after the 
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light in the lamp at the meeting had been put out, false charges of sexual assault (against 
a follower’s wife) by one of the Elect against another, prompted by jealousy between the 
two men (19.71), and an elderly member of the Elect beaten up by a woman’s brother and 
friends after the woman was in the course of time visibly pregnant. This last case was 
unavoidable in a sense since any timely marriage to her by this member of the Elect (to 
prevent any discovery of the illegitimate pregnancy) was prohibited by the Manichean 
rules against marriage by the Elect (19.72). In his comments on this particular incident 
(19.73), surely Augustine also had in mind the effect of Manichean doctrine on his own 
struggle with lust and his concubine during that period despite the differences between 
his own situation and this one:  
I blame the man for the atrocity, and not you. Still there is this in you all that cannot, as far as I 
can see, be admitted or tolerated, that while you hold the soul to be part of God, you still maintain that 
the mixture of a little evil prevailed over the superior force and quantity of good [asseritis tamen etiam 
exiguo admixto malo maiorem eius copiam ubertatemque superari]. Who that believes this, when 
incited by passion, will not find here an excuse, instead of checking and controlling his passion [Quis 
enim cum hoc crediderit et eum libido pulsaverit, non ad talem defensionem potius quam eius libidinis 
refrenationem compressionemque confugiat]?
249
 
 
Augustine clearly could draw from his own past concerning how Manichean teachings 
could lead to an abdication of moral responsibility. However, the thrust of his argument 
here is an intellectual one, not personal experience, as he seeks to use the problems in 
Manichean teaching on good and evil to illustrate how their beliefs can easily lead to 
immoral behavior. 
This section on the Elect, taken as a whole, leads to troubling conclusions: If the Elect 
themselves were not meeting the standards they were committed to reach, then either the 
members were fraudulent, and thus hypocritical in their commitment to these standards, 
or even worse, the light separation process was not the effectual cosmic resolution that 
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Augustine had been told to accept. Moreover, the prayers that the Elect were committed 
to say on his behalf would presumably be of no avail if the Elect’s own dedication to 
personal purity lagged in any significant way. In any case, the result was ultimately the 
same: the group supposedly with the real solution to the intellectual problem of evil still 
struggled with experiential evil in their very own lives. Despite Augustine’s earlier trust 
in Mani because of Mani’s alleged “sanctity of life,” the failure of any of the Elect that he 
encountered to emulate this standard successfully surely weakened his trust in Manichean 
thinking even further.  
However, the largest experiential factor by far was the failure of the Manichean 
system to help him deal with experiential evil in his life since that failure in turn raised 
considerable questions about their solution to the intellectual problem. More specifically, 
although they were basically correct about a real, experiential struggle between a “New 
Man” and “Old Man” (within the individual) from Pauline theology, their view of the 
actual cosmology involved was seriously uncertain in Augustine’s opinion. In addition, 
the nine years he had devoted to Manichaeism, including serving meals to the Elect, 
taking part in their rituals, and presumably almsgiving as well to help secure his own 
purification, had actually only increased the evil he experienced in life—his commitment 
had been to a rather questionable system of thought all this time. It should be stressed at 
this point that Augustine cannot prove or show that Manichaeism is definitely wrong. 
Rather, he has encountered enough serious questions and doubts about the Manichean 
religion that he is now seriously open to another alternative.  
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Therefore, in The Advantage of Believing (391), which he wrote only five to six years 
after his Christian conversion, Augustine notes the difference between the Manichean 
interpretation of his leaving the sect and his own understanding of events:  
Therefore, let them [the Manichees] cease to utter that saying , which they have on their lips as if 
of necessity, whenever they are deserted by anyone who has been a Hearer over a rather long period of 
time, ‘The light hath made its way through him [lumen per illum transitum fecit].’ For you see—you 
[Honoratus], who are my greatest care…how empty this can be and how very easy for anyone to 
censure… And so I leave this for your prudence to investigate. For I am not afraid that you may think 
that I was possessed by light [me arbitreris inhabitatum lumine] at the time that I was entangled in the 
life of this world, having a darksome hope from the beauty of my wife, from the pomp of riches, from 
the emptiness of honors and other harmful and destructive pleasures [de inanitate honorum ceterisque 
noxiis et perniciosis voluptatibu]. And all these…I did not cease to desire and hope for, as long as I 
remained their attentive Hearer. Nor do I attribute this to their teaching, for I admit that they 
assiduously advise that such things be shunned. But to say that I have been deserted by light now that I 
have turned away from all these shadows of things [cum ab his omnibus umbris rerum me averterim] 
and determined to be content with only the necessary sustenance for bodily health, but that I was 
enlightened and resplendent when I loved these things and was held enmeshed in them [his involutus 
tenerer], is characteristic of a man who, to put it very gently, gives superficial consideration to matters 
on which he loves to talk much. (1.3)
250
 
 
So although Augustine readily concedes that Manichean teachings supported an ideal of 
not pursuing marriage, riches, or honors as goals, he points out how he harbored these 
desires during his entire time as an “attentive Hearer.” Thus, the Manichean view that the 
“light” has left him, specifically that his remaining body of Matter is pure evil, makes 
little sense in light of the enormous changes with his personal struggles. According to the 
“truth” of the Manichean system, this pattern of evidence should be reversed.   
Finally, in 5.10.19 during Augustine’s temporary foray into Academic skepticism, he 
continued to reject the anthropomorphic understanding of God that he believed the 
Catholic Church held to, but he still held a corporealist view of God as well as the view  
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of evil as a substance, based on Manichean influence (5.10.20). This factor also explains 
his continual rejection of the basic Catholic teaching on the Incarnation in the same 
section.  
            
The Concubine 
 
 
This section serves to provide a closer examination of the nature of the relationship 
between Augustine and his concubine in order to supplement the discussion in the 
previous section and also to bring to light other retrospective considerations of 
Augustine’s. These components of the discussion will provide a more complete 
understanding of the problem of evil for him during this time. 
 
Preliminary Considerations 
In the second chapter of this work in the analysis of Augustine’s adolescent sexual 
struggles, the idea has already been raised that his escapades were not the huge, sinful 
frolic that his evocative descriptions might suggest. J. Ramirez essentially makes the case 
that the image of Augustine as a great sinner as exemplified by the period of concubinage 
also falters upon close examination.
251
 For example, according to Augustine he and the 
concubine were faithful to each other during their relationship (4.2.2). Thus, instead of 
“years of promiscuity and sexual license,” from a practical standpoint they were the 
equivalent of years of marriage—Augustine could not act upon an uncontrolled sexual 
appetite with the “confines” of a faithful partner, not to mention his family life of caring 
for both mistress and son, which itself imposed “sexual moderation” on the participants. 
                                                          
251
  J. Roland E. Ramirez, “Demythologizing Augustine as Great Sinner,” Augustinian Studies 12 (1981): 
68. 
109 
 
In actuality, there was no significant difference between their relationship and a common-
law marriage as practiced over the centuries in many countries.
252
 When compared to 
contemporary Western vogues of cohabitation and easy divorce, Augustine’s life of 
fidelity with her was relatively commendable. The church did not frown upon such 
relationships, and even if it did, Augustine was not a baptized Christian at that time. In 
addition, with infidelity common among Roman marriages including the case of 
Augustine’s father,253 Augustine’s long-term faithfulness to his concubine showed his 
superior character in this regard.
254
 Moreover, Monnica’s lack of protest at Augustine’s 
relationship is worth noting
255—what she actually protested against, even to the point of 
breaking with Augustine, was his connection with the Manichean religion.   
Not all scholars agree on whether Augustine actually loved her. James A. Brundage 
holds that he did not,
256
 but the majority of scholars, including Kim Power and Danuta 
Shanzer, hold that he did. The arguments of both rely heavily on key passages such as the 
“torn” passage in 6.15.25 in which the concubine is dismissed as preparation for an 
upcoming marriage that Monnica had arranged for Augustine for his social mobility.
257
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That Augustine never names the first concubine is interpreted either as a step taken out of 
respect for her or to spare them both embarrassment or out of Augustine’s pain from her 
memory.
258
  
However, it is clear that Augustine regarded the relationship as sinful as it 
exemplified his sexual struggles, a conflict that received no fuller resolution until his 
conversion in Book 8.
259
 He describes the lust that dominated the relationship as a 
situation in which he was “bound by this need of the flesh [deligatus morbo carnis],” and 
I “dragged with me the chain of its poisonous delight, fearing to be set free…” (6.12.21). 
When he takes a second concubine (after the first is dismissed) instead of waiting for the 
upcoming marriage that had been arranged by Monnica, his description is direct: “In fact 
it was not really marriage that I wanted. I was simply a slave to lust [sed libidinis servus 
eram]. So I took another woman…and thus my soul’s disease was nourished and kept 
alive as vigorously as ever, indeed worse than ever...” (6.15.25).  
 
The Manichean Effect on His Concubinage  
In view of Augustine’s struggle with lust, another relevant question involves how his 
relationship with the concubine was perceived by the Manichees that he associated 
himself with in this period. Brown submits that under the Manichees, Augustine’s 
“punctilious relationship” with the concubine was not any better or worse than marriage 
itself—it was simply the best they could expect him to do. Thus, as the Manichees at their 
service sang hymns praising virginity, Brown can imagine Augustine believing that such 
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“stirring sentiments” did not yet apply to himself as he famously prayed, “Lord, give me 
chastity and continence…but not now [sed noli modo]” (8.7.17).260 We have already seen 
his retrospective candor on how Manichean doctrine allowed him to avoid taking 
responsibility or even a sense of ownership for “his” weakness whenever he did fail in 
that area. 
On the moral implications of the Manichean faith at a personal level, Brown notes 
that “Augustine as a Manichee could enjoy the very real consolation, that for all his 
intense ambition, his disquieting involvement with his concubine, the pervasive sense of 
guilt that came so often to cloud his relations with his mother, at least the good part of 
him remained throughout,  unsoiled…”261 However, O’Connell suggests that Augustine, 
never content with “second class,” was “determined to advance in that sect” with definite 
steps to do so (5.7.13), and thus, surely the practice of strict sexual purity of the Elect 
would have worked on Augustine’s thinking and attitude here deeply.262 O’Connell 
acknowledges that this teaching that allowed one to evade any sense of culpability 
continued to attract Augustine (5.10.18) but asserts that the ambiguity of the statement in 
that section precludes the idea that Augustine necessarily felt guiltless. This observation, 
along with the name of Augustine’s son, Adeodatus (Gift of God) and O’Connell’s 
reminder that Augustine is ever aware of the meanings and implications of words, all 
suggest a “subconscious defiance” of Manichean teaching in this area. O’Connell’s point 
on Augustine’s ambitions within the sect is well taken, but the last points are problematic. 
The birth of Adeodatus most likely took place before Augustine’s first association with 
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the Manichees, and the point on the lack of a sense of guilt is perplexing. Why would 
Augustine continue to be attracted to the avoidance of responsibility (that resulted from 
Manichean thought) for so long if this “benefit” was not also experienced by him 
emotionally at least part of the time?  
Contra O’Connell, Ramirez posits that Augustine was a better Hearer than most 
because although he did have a concubine, he never had offspring during his time among 
the Manichees—his only son was actually born before his association with the Manichees 
ever began.
263
 Furthermore, he never did marry nor even seriously consider marriage 
during his time with them.
264
 Ramirez does concede that Augustine, in the same section 
in which he admits his joyful belief that he is guiltless over the sin he seemingly 
committed (5.10.18), states how “that sin was the more incurable whereby I judged 
myself to be no sinner…” This factor gives him limited culpability here because 
Augustine at the time of this statement is speaking with the conscience of a Manichee, an 
observation that mitigates any condemnation we might normally give someone in his 
situation as he “acts in accordance with that conscience.”265  
Most of Ramirez’s points are well taken, but concerning conscience it is difficult to 
be certain as to which one prevailed in Augustine in this period. On the one hand, the 
influence of a residual Catholic conscience that he was grounded in since birth and 
possibly had not totally cast off yet should be considered. On the other hand, a 
Manichean conscience could be the larger factor here even though his other writings 
indicate a hesitation to fully embrace Manichean teaching. Battenhouse explores the latter 
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option without extensive elaboration, specifically that the Manichean religion simply 
“drugged his conscience” in his moral struggles266 with conscience here presumably as a 
permanent, basic blueprint of right and wrong that includes the fundamental idea of self-
responsibility for one’s actions. In addition, one should not discount the possibility of a 
“hybrid” conscience, one that draws from both Manichean and Catholic values as a 
slightly bewildered Augustine continues living a kind of “religious double-life.”267 
Although I am inclined to believe that the Manichean conscience dominated his thinking 
during this period, the conclusion is not easily reached in this case.  
 
Considerations from the Post-Manichean and Post-Conversion Periods  
Augustine’s relationship with his concubine began in his eighteenth year in 
approximately 372. Although that fifteen-year relationship extended well past the nine 
years of Augustine’s Manichean period, a further look at that part of the narrative is 
helpful in better understanding the nature of the relationship. After fifteen years or so of 
living with Augustine, including approximately fourteen years of raising their son 
Adeodatus, the first concubine is dismissed to make room for Augustine’s upcoming 
marriage (6.15.25). The dismissal is in the passive voice: “She with whom I had lived so 
long was torn from my side [et avulsa a latere meo] as a hindrance to my forthcoming 
marriage. My heart which had held her very dear was broken and wounded and shed 
blood.” Although many scholars see Monnica as the one behind the dismissal, other 
explanations are considered in the following chapter. However, even if the “Monnica” 
                                                          
266
  Battenhouse, 25. 
267
  Leo Ferrari has argued cogently that during his entire time with the Manichees Augustine was still a 
Catholic Catechumen, albeit in a vacillating way. See Leo Ferrari, “Young Augustine: Both Catholic and 
Manichee,” Augustinian Studies 25, no. 1 (1995): 109-128.  
  
114 
 
theory is true, Augustine certainly succumbed to pressure at the very least and allowed 
the concubine to be sent away. Nevertheless, despite the future marriage, as we saw 
earlier, he had stated candidly in 6.15.25 how he was “a slave to lust,” and thus, he took a 
second concubine.  
Kim Power essentially agrees that Augustine’s relationship with the first concubine 
was close, but she submits that textual hints such as Augustine’s comments to Alypius 
about his relationship with the concubine (6.12.22) point to the possibility that Augustine 
actually viewed the relationship as a de facto marriage, thus making the “lustful bargain” 
phrasing (4.2.2) a rhetorical device to make a definite boundary between a de facto 
marriage and marriage de jure.
268
 Then, with the status of concubinage as a “second-class 
marriage,” dismissing his concubine would be morally, even if not legally, tantamount to 
dismissal of a wife, therefore making his marriage to another woman a case of adultery.  
The “torn” passage in 6.15.25 reinforces this interpretation according to Power.269 
Terms such as integer, morbus, desperatius are nuanced in the text with meanings of 
grief and injury. Therefore, his shame at taking a second woman in her place is no 
surprise if “in his lacerated heart” sex with someone else felt like adultery. In The Good 
of Marriage 5.5, this view is reinforced through Augustine’s denunciation of men’s 
dismissal of their concubines to marry women of more suitable fortune and rank.
270
  
Moreover, in the passage the charge of adultery (not fornication) affirms how blurred the 
boundaries are between concubinage and marriage.
271
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Friendship and Grief 
 
 
The failure of the third temptation to satisfy, especially due to its transient nature, 
becomes amplified by Augustine’s period of misery and grief at the death of a friend in 
Book 4. Gerald Schlabach notes how ambitio saecul was the most troublesome of the 
triad for Augustine, and then he links this third struggle to the friendship passages in 
Book 4.
272
 Ambition was a “subtle temptation” for Augustine, Schlabach informs us, 
because it did not require aspiration to public positions in saeculo as long as a few friends 
were to offer their praise of him. In his description of the friendship Augustine points out 
how it grew from a “community of shared interests,” not out of a genuine concern for one 
another, much less a friendship based on enjoyment ultimately focused on God.
273
 
Augustine’s grief at losing the friend was immense: “Sorrow entirely clouded over my 
heart; death appeared wherever I looked” (4.4.9).274 Every action he had shared with the 
friend was “cruel torture” with his friend constituting “half of his soul” (4.6.11).  
However, even before the death Augustine noticed how he had loved the experience 
of the friendship itself more than the friend:
275
 “So wretched was I that I held that life of 
wretchedness to be more dear to me than my friend himself. For although I wished to 
change it, yet I was more unwilling to lose it than I was to lose my friend” (4.6.11). 
Schlabach’s conclusion is hard-hitting: in their friendship they had used one another in a 
“pact of reciprocal instrumentality” in order to create experiences that they valued above 
how much each valued the other. While conceding that Augustine did not state such a 
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pact in so many words, Schlabach notes other events in book 4 that suggest this kind of 
pattern: Augustine’s description of the relationship with his concubine as a pactum 
libidinosi amoris (bargain struck for lust) (4.2.2),
276
  his portrayal of new friends in 
Carthage as an “adulterous reciprocity” as they bolstered each other’s illusions (4.8.13), 
and Augustine’s greater concern (after his now-baptized friend seemed to be recovering 
from sickness) for restoring the previous “joviality” of the friendship than for the ultimate 
good of his friend (4.4.8).
277
 Similarly, Marie McNamara submits how Augustine’s 
attachment was “emotional and superficial” so that loving the friend as if death would 
never come made his despair at the death inevitable, a total despair that was manifesting a 
certain “idolatry of friendship.”278 So both her observations and the last part of 
Schlabach’s analysis expose the fuller extent of experiential evil here, not only 
Augustine’s struggle with the temptation of ambition among his friends but also his use 
of those people in Book 4 for meeting primarily that need of his to feel important and 
influential instead of focusing on their needs.  
Elements of the narrative are intertwined with Augustine’s Manichean thinking as 
well. The unnamed friend in Book 4, whom Augustine had converted to Manichaeism in 
the past, expressed openness later to his Catholic baptism after learning of that sacrament 
being administered to him while he was not conscious (4.4.8). Augustine made light of 
the baptism after his comrade regained consciousness, but his friend’s sharp disapproval 
at Augustine’s jest surprised him. Then, a certain irony is evident as Augustine discovers 
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experientially Manichaeism’s inability to provide him comfort after the very friend that 
he had converted to Manichean teachings eventually passes away. In particular, Mallard 
adeptly brings to light how Augustine’s miserable grieving process contains Manichean 
elements that actually perpetuate the misery itself. In connection with this, he quotes 
from Confessions (4.7.12) Augustine’s efforts to depend on God at this time and find 
resolution to his grief:
279
  
Towards you, Lord, my soul needed to be lifted up for cure, I knew that! but [sic] I did not will to 
do it, nor could I, all the more because I saw you as nothing substantial and sure [non…aliquid solidum 
et firmum], as I conceived you. You were only an empty phantom. My error was my God. If I tried to 
lay my soul there [si conabar eam ibi ponere…], it fell through the emptiness and came down again on 
me. I remained an unhappy place, where I could not stay, and I could not go. 
 
Mallard carefully elaborates on how Augustine’s efforts to depend on God were limited 
by his Manichean understanding of deity: “Assuredly, if he tried to lay his soul on God, 
‘it fell through the emptiness and came down again on me’—since God [in the 
Manichean system] was his soul, plus countless other souls and sparkles.”280 He has us 
also consider Augustine’s other anguished observation, “I…an unhappy place, where I 
could not stay, and I could not go.” Mallard notes here how Augustine “hung, suspended, 
a paradigm of the cosmos…the world of Mani, suspended forever in irresolution with no 
conqueror” as he directly links to Manichaeism Augustine’s record of his feelings at that 
time. Mallard’s final summary of the lack of resolution in a Manichean universe makes 
Augustine’s ongoing agony another example of experiential evil brought on by 
Manichaeism while Mallard simultaneously reinforces his previous criticism: “Mani 
could only reflect the world; he could not change it. To permit oneself to love was to 
follow Mani into the heart of his morass, where the stalemate of good and evil was itself 
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the true evil, the darkest evil of all.”281 In the dualistic Manichean system the principles 
of good and evil were essentially equal in strength, leading to no guarantee that good 
would ever triumph over the other side—a cosmic battle with no apparent end in sight.282  
Although the pattern of using friends to meet his ambitions constitutes a type of evil, 
in relating some final relevant aspects of the narrative for this particular chapter a case of 
experiential evil surfaces again in the narrative, this time in Augustine’s treatment of his 
mother Monnica. He is rather candid about his gross deception of Monnica in his efforts 
to sail away unopposed to teach in Rome despite her strong disagreement and tears about 
his overall plans (5.8.15). In spite of her intense opposition here, he credits her many 
prayers on his behalf, not only with sustaining him through his serious illness in Rome 
(5.9.16-5.10.18) but also with regard to divine providence in subsequent events that will 
be included in the following chapter. Augustine’s brief excursion into Academic 
Skepticism, which serves as a transition of sorts for the next step in his journey, will be 
included as well.    
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Confessions but then ultimately uses that observation to argue that Augustine’s motive for not naming his 
friend here in Book 4 must be understood as part of a higher goal of using key characters throughout 
Confessions to align himself with esteemed figures of the Latin Church. As part of his case, Condon also 
submits that not referring to a character by that person’s name, is, in a sense, obliterating that individual’s 
existence. However, Condon’s thesis is problematic. There is a strong likelihood that the experience in 
Book 4, another case of experiential evil, was so miserable for Augustine that he certainly had no desire to 
recall the friend’s name. Stated another way, he deliberately “chose” to forget the name. In addition, his 
failure to name his own parents much sooner in the narrative and his naming of Nebridius at all do not fit 
well with Condon’s line of reasoning. For Condon’s overall argument, see Matthew G. Condon, “The 
Unnamed and the Defaced: The Limits of Rhetoric in Augustine’s Confessiones,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 69, no. 1 (March, 2001): 43-63. 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIL IN THE MANICHEAN PERIOD 
 
 
In this chapter Augustine’s three temptations, stemming from the triad of sins that 
O’Donnell raised to the fore in his interpretation of Confessions, constitute much of the 
experiential evil that Augustine encounters in this period of life. His initial struggles with 
lust in Book 2 have been joined now in Book 3 by his weakness for “curiosity” in new 
ideas and new experiences, which ultimately took him into exploring other beliefs, 
including his association with the Manichees after beginning his search for Wisdom from 
Cicero’s Hortensius. His struggle with worldly ambitions grows in Book 4, leading to his 
competition for praise and glory in stage competitions and his writing of a book at that 
time, The Beautiful and the Fitting (4.13.20-14.23), for consideration by Hierius, an 
orator.
283
 However, the Manichees’ promise of release from these evils is never kept, and 
other books that Augustine examines during this time simply exemplify  
his continuing descent into a triad of experiential evils.
284
  
  The deceptive Manichean promise to solve both the intellectual and experiential 
problems of evil only leads ironically to more experiential evil in Augustine’s life as he 
reaches a serious level of doubt that Manichean teaching could resolve either issue. 
                                                          
283
  I note here the irony of how Augustine’s sinful desire for acclaim by writing The Beautiful and the 
Fitting dovetails with his efforts to comprehend the nature of substance and evil in the work itself, 
stemming from the intellectual problem of evil already on his mind. 
284
  Frederick Crosson comments on Augustine’s tendency near the end of each book of Confessions to 
discuss specific books that he encountered and read. See Frederick J. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning in 
St. Augustine’s Confessions,” in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth P. Matthews (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1999), 30-31. I note here how each book reinforces a theme of Augustine’s specific 
weakness for that particular book of Confessions: Book 2 (focusing on lust) is the exception, but the 
Manichean writings (and his earlier exploration of Hortensius) help to showcase his curiosity that is 
prevalent in Book 3, and mastering Aristotle’s Categories (4.16.28) and numerous books in the liberal arts 
(4.16.30) exemplify Book 4’s focus on his worldly ambitions. Augustine’s overall confusion of the truth in 
Book 5, especially after the encounter with Faustus, results in his focus on the writings from the Academic 
skeptics. Crosson refers to the importance of the Epicurean writings in Book 6, but the other connections 
made here are my combination of an extrapolation of Crosson’s “book pattern” observations and 
O’Donnell’s insights on the triad of sins discussed in the first chapter. 
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Moreover, as we have seen, Manichean beliefs arguably helped to perpetuate the evil of 
Augustine’s three weaknesses, not in the sense of cultivating an attitude of moral license 
toward those areas of struggle but in absolving him of any serious sense of personal 
responsibility whenever failed in any of those struggles. So although the Manichean 
system didn’t necessarily encourage his misdeeds, it certainly didn’t discourage them 
either. Moreover, in Manichean teaching there was no permanent, active, good “he” that 
could even take ownership of his struggles to begin with—Augustine was doomed to be a 
passive observer of evil under their system without even enough individuality in the 
system to call it “his” good or “his” evil. However, the link between experiential evil and 
one’s credibility as an authority is also very crucial here. Although Mani’s supposed 
holiness was a factor in Augustine’s decision-making regarding his authority, even after 
the discrepancies that he noticed in Mani’s writings on astronomical matters, the 
hypocrisy that he perceived in the Elect with their own experiential evil conceivably 
increased his doubts that their solution to the intellectual problem of evil was really the 
correct one.  
The grief at the loss of the unnamed friend in Book 4 stems from how friendship for 
Augustine is largely an extension of a method for reaching his personal goal of worldly 
ambition. Thus, the experiential evil that one commonly associates with the loss of a 
comrade takes a twisted turn in Augustine’s case: the main experiential “evil” he 
perceives here is the loss of someone through whom he was able to have his need for 
self-glory met. As an additional example of experiential evil, the Manichean system 
actually can offer him no solace in this episode. Both the Manichean concept of God and 
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the self, along with the stark cosmic dualism inherent in the system, only prolong his 
agony in the grieving process.  
Augustine’s struggles with lust through his relationship with the concubine are the 
most visible signs of his spiritual waywardness. Nevertheless, Ramirez’s qualifications of 
Augustine’s situation help to illuminate the good aspects of Augustine’s choices—his 
fidelity to the concubine as well as the confinement of his lustful behavior to one partner 
in contrast to the alleged immoralities in Book 2. The level of experiential evil during this 
period, when viewed as willful acts of evil, is not so easy to assess since Augustine’s 
general conscience regarding right and wrong and the residual presence of a Catholic 
conscience instilled early on by his mother are factors that must be considered along with 
his “Manichean conscience” of that time. In short, in the narrative Augustine is no closer 
at this point to a resolution to the intellectual problem of evil, and as a result, the 
experiential problem of evil with his three weaknesses has advanced far beyond the level 
of difficulty it posed for him by the end of Book 2.  
                
 
CRITIQUE OF AUGUSTINE’S CONTRIBUTIONS REGARDING EVIL 
 
  
Several interesting observations come to mind on Augustine’s insights and 
interpretations in this part of Confessions.  First, Augustine’s candid admission that he 
avoided taking responsibility for his choices is a prevalent theme in his Manichean 
period. Despite the fact that Manichaeism is no longer a prevalent religion as it was in 
Augustine’s time, the mindset that it can potentially lead to is alive and well today in 
some quarters. It is interesting for some counselors to report the tendency of certain 
counselees to summarize difficult periods of life as cases in which “I simply had some 
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bad luck” instead of recognizing that the choice of a particular partner for marriage, a 
particular job, or a particular habit with damaging effects was quite directly an unwise 
(wrong) choice on his or her part to begin with. Such a pattern quickly suggests a parallel 
to the avoidance of responsibility that Augustine confesses from his time with the 
Manichees. To his credit Augustine eventually owns up to his flawed reasoning, albeit 
retrospectively, and clearly sees the implications of Manichean thinking on the issue of 
moral accountability. 
The issue of conscience in this section of Confessions, which Augustine brought to 
the fore, perhaps unwittingly, also raises interesting questions: to what extent if any, does 
a basic blueprint of right and wrong exist in a human being, how detailed is that 
blueprint, and how do later factors such as the Manichean influence on Augustine’s 
perception of right and wrong play a role in informing one’s conscience? As an example, 
Augustine’s relatively sudden adherence to the Manichean ban on procreation, especially 
not long after his concubine bore a child, is rather unusual. One need not be a strong 
advocate of Natural Law ethics to wonder what was running through Augustine’s mind as 
the sect that he associated himself with taught him how evil marriage and childbirth 
inherently were. One criticism of Augustine here would be the need for a fuller 
clarification from him on what his thought process was concerning the more controversial 
aspects of Manichean doctrine, in particular since he states in various works that he never 
fully assented to Manichean teaching and was waiting for fuller truths to emerge from 
their initial presentations of doctrine. However, despite that lingering drawback the  
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considerations in this critique are recognition of some of the interesting questions that 
this part of Confessions has stimulated and can bring to the forefront to the observant 
reader. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE POST-MANICHEAN,  
NEO-PLATONIC, AND CHRISTIAN PERIODS 
 
  
The coverage of events in this chapter begins with Augustine’s post-Manichean 
period (from 5.10.19 through 7.8.12), followed by a Neo-Platonic Period (from 7.9.13 
through 7.18.24), and then a Christian period (from 7.19.25 through all of Book 8, with 
relevant passages in Books 9 and 10 also included for consideration). In this chapter 
Augustine finally reaches a resolution for each aspect of the problem of evil, and his 
Christian conversion is the high point of the overall narrative.  
     
THE POST-MANICHEAN PERIOD 
 
 
Although Augustine still associated with the Manichees at this point in the narrative, 
his doubts about their teachings were substantial enough that it is reasonable to term this 
next period as “post-Manichean” with respect to his ongoing search for truth and a 
resolution to both problems of evil. This part of the chapter essentially covers the period 
in which Augustine eventually experiences a new breakthrough in Milan concerning his 
perception of Catholic teaching and raises new questions on evil and free will as he 
reflects on the problem of evil from that standpoint.  
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New Breakthrough in Milan 
 
 
Augustine had eventually come to the point of largely rejecting Manichean teachings 
during his time in Rome, but only after his later move to Milan (5.13.23) does he begin to 
make substantial progress in his quest. However, first, as we noted near the end of 
chapter 3, during Augustine’s temporary foray into Academic skepticism while in Rome 
(5.10.19), he continued to reject the anthropomorphic understanding of God that he 
believed the Catholic Church held to, but he still held a corporealist view of God as well 
as the view of evil as a substance, based on his previous exposure to Manichean thinking 
(5.10.20). This situation also explains his continual rejection of the basic Catholic 
teaching of the Incarnation in the same section since he reasoned that any nature born of 
the Virgin Mary meant that this nature was mingled with Mary’s flesh and thus, that the 
nature would be inescapably defiled as well. In his own words, “I feared to believe the 
Word made flesh lest I be forced to believe the Word defiled by flesh” (5.10.20). 
Therefore, with strong doubts about Manichean teachings but formidable difficulties at 
this point in accepting key Catholic doctrine, Augustine accepts the skeptical outlook of 
the Academics for a brief period: holding to any belief with a considerable measure of 
doubt and thus, not taking a firm side on any position to the point of calling it 
“knowledge.” Yet even though he recounts the Manichees’ weak arguments against the 
Christian Scriptures in 5.11.21, his tendency to think only in corporeal terms continued to 
stifle any progress in resolving his intellectual struggles.  
A breakthrough begins when Augustine applies for and receives a professorship in 
Milan after discovering the drawbacks of teaching rhetoric in Rome (5.12.22). In Milan 
he meets the famous Bishop Ambrose whose sermons begin to make an impression on 
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him, especially as Ambrose’s more figurative approach toward understanding the 
Scriptures begins to address Augustine’s difficulties with various biblical stories 
(5.14.24). Even though he did not perceive the Catholic side as “clearly victorious” at this 
point, due to the influence of Academic skepticism on his intellectual journey he decides 
that he can no longer hold to Manichean teaching or associate with the group to any 
degree, and so he decisively breaks with the sect. Although he considers the views of the 
philosophers to be “more probable,” he declines to go in their direction either since they 
were “without the saving name of Christ.” Augustine then “determined…to go on as a 
catechumen in the Catholic Church” (5.14.25) but not as someone that fully accepted 
church teaching at that time in light of his unresolved questions. Rather, his intention was 
“to remain in that state [as a catechumen] until some certain light should appear by which 
I might steer my course [quo cursum dirigerem].”  
Next, in Milan Augustine reached the realization that the idea of God having a human 
figure was not standard Catholic belief as he had previously thought (6.4.5), and 
Ambrose’s preaching and spiritual interpretation of various biblical passages continued to 
make an impression on him (6.4.6).   As a result, although he still wrestled with how to 
think of God in non-corporeal terms, this period significantly influenced his thinking on 
two of the three dilemmas that the Manichees had originally brought to his attention 
(3.7.12). The apparent resolution to his questions about Scripture, in turn, brought him to 
the point of preferring Catholic doctrine (while still working through the question of its 
truth) as well as holding a newfound level of respect for those that accepted the Bible as 
divine revelation (6.5.7). 
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Even so, despite breaking new ground at the intellectual level, Augustine’s struggles 
at the experiential level continued unabated: in his own words he was “all hot for 
honours, money, marriage…[inhiabam honoribus, lucris, coniugio…]” (6.6.9).  Only an 
encounter with a drunken beggar helped to shed a little light on his misery and the futility 
of his pursuits: “Certainly his joy [the beggar’s enjoyment of wine] was no true joy; but 
the joy I sought in my ambition was emptier still.” In addition, “he [the beggar] by 
wishing luck to all comers had at least got wine, while I by lying was aiming only to get 
empty praise” (6.6.10). Moreover, as we saw earlier in the third chapter, despite the 
future marriage arranged by Monnica he had stated candidly in 6.15.25 how he was “a 
slave to lust,” and thus, he took a second concubine during this period. 
 
Reflections on Moral Evil and Free Will 
 
 
Augustine’s recent rejection of Manichean teaching and new breakthrough in Milan 
with Catholic teaching leads to his new openness to solutions concerning evil, and this 
development, in turn, lead to his reflections on moral evil and free will in the first part of 
Book 7. At the beginning of that book, Augustine restates his rejection of the idea of God 
in the image of a human body, and he also rejoices upon learning that the Catholic 
Church also rejected such a view. Even though he still perceives God generally as “some 
corporeal substance” extended into space in every direction, he firmly holds to God as 
being “incorruptible and inviolable and immutable [incorruptibilem et inviolabilem et 
incommutabilem]” (7.1.1). He was also now certain that the Manichees’ beliefs were 
false (7.3.4), but he was still perplexed as to the cause of evil.  
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In 7.3.5 Augustine discusses part of the solution to the problem of evil in connection 
with his growing understanding of the will. Two seminal ideas in the passage are 
especially crucial: the first involves the concept of free choice of the will, a notion that 
includes the corollary of individual responsibility for what one wills, and the second 
centers on the thought that this free choice made by the will is where sin comes from. 
The breakdown of the relevant passage by Simon Harrison into numbered clauses is 
helpful for part of our analysis:  
 (1) I directed my mind to understand [cernerem] what I was being told [quod audiebam], namely 
that (2) the free choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong (3) and suffer your just judgement; 
(4) but I could not get a clear grasp of it. (5) I made an effort to lift my mind’s eye out of the abyss, but 
again plunged back. I tried several times, but again and again sank back. (6) I was brought up into your 
light by the fact that (7) I knew myself to have a will in the same way and as much as I knew myself to 
be alive [tam sciebam me habere voluntatem quam me vivere]. (8) Therefore [itaque] when I willed or 
did not will something, I was utterly certain that none other than myself was willing or not willing. (9) 
That there lay the cause of my sin I was now gradually beginning [iam iamque] to recognize. (10) I 
saw that when I acted against my wishes [invitus facerem], I was passive rather than active [pati me 
potius quam facere videbam]; (11) and this condition I judged to be not guilt but a punishment [non 
culpam sed poenam]. (12) It was an effortless step to grant that, (13) since I conceived you to be just, 
(14) it was not unjust that I was chastised.
285
  
 
First of all, in clause 1 who was the source that was exposing Augustine to the idea of 
free will as a cause of evil? Based on the use of audio six times in Book 6 with 
Augustine’s listening to Ambrose, J. O’Donnell is correct in raising the implication that 
Augustine’s hearing of the free will idea here is also from Ambrose in this passage in 
Book 7.
286
 Harrison goes further and helpfully elaborates on how the two uses of facere 
in clause 10 are the key to the next part of Augustine’s discovery. By mentally combining 
facio with invitus (against my will), Harrison redefines the first facio as patior, something 
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  Simon Harrison, “Do We Have A Will?: Augustine’s Way in to the Will” in The Augustinian 
Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 195, Harrison’s use of 
Henry Chadwick’s translation with Harrison’s Latin insertions and also some English alterations in italics. 
Harrison overtranslates the “tam…quam” in clause 7 deliberately in order to bolster his point concerning 
the pivotal connection between cogito-type arguments for one’s existence and Augustine’s current 
reasoning about the will in this passage. 
286
  James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 2, Commentary on Books 1-7 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 406. O’Donnell states this conclusion more directly on 453 of the same work as he notes 
Augustine’s stronger acceptance of the idea of free will in 7.16.22. 
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that is being done to me.
287
 So certain actions that appear on the surface to be my actions 
are now seen as things “’done to’” me. In other words, if I do not like the action that I am 
doing, one could say that I am, in a sense, not actually doing it: not wishing to be a party 
to the action that is happening shows that I am not the author of the action. In clause 11 
then, this “condition” of experiencing things that I do not want does not lead to blame—I 
am not guilty for an action that I really do not do (in connection with the meaning of this 
in clause 10).
288
 Combining this with clause 13, that God is just, with the unwritten 
premise that God is providentially in control of what happens to me, then those 
happenings must be a just punishment for some action I already did. At this point 
Harrison recognizes the implication of this reasoning as leading toward some theory 
concerning “original sin,” but he views any further discussion of that possibility as 
tangential to his purpose here.  
The input above enables the reader to see the interesting relationship between the key 
clauses. The understanding from clauses 10-14, namely that just punishment (for things 
already done) is taking place as he experiences “doing” actions that go against his will, 
reinforces the earlier conception in clauses 8 and 9 that his own free choices are the cause 
of sin, choices that he is ultimately responsible for.   
However, the lynchpin of the passage centers on the existence of the will to begin 
with, and it is noteworthy in clause 7 how Augustine equates the certainty of this with the 
certainty of his own existence. But what allows Augustine to view the argument with 
such strong certainty? Harrison correctly sees the argument about will as a self-evident 
realization, a “cogitolike” line of reasoning similar to Augustine’s reasoning in other 
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  Harrison, 199. 
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  Ibid., 200. 
130 
 
works that he really exists.
289
 As examples of the “cogitolike” reasoning for one’s 
existence, Harrison examines 11.26 in City of God as well as 2.3.7 in On Free Choice of 
the Will, examples in which the denial of one’s own existence would constitute a self-
refuting line of reasoning. Harrison bolsters the case more fully by providing an example 
of a “cogitolike” argument for the will from On Free Choice of the Will (1.12.25). In that 
passage Augustine seeks to convince his interlocutor Evodius of the existence of the will:  
A: Do you want to know [Visne hoc scire]?  
E: I do not know this either. 
A: Then ask me nothing more. 
E: Why not? 
A: Because I oughtn’t to give you an answer to your question unless you want to know the answer [nisi 
volenti scire quod rogas]. And secondly because, if you don’t want to attain to wisdom [Deinde nisi 
velis ad sapientiam  pervenire…], I ought not to discuss such things with you. And finally because 
we cannot be friends unless you want things to go well for me [nisi velis ut bene sit mihi]. But look 
to yourself and see whether you, as regards yourself, do not want to be happy [utrum tibi voluntas 
nulla sit beatae vitae tuae].  
.  
E: I admit that it cannot be denied that we have a will. Go on, let us now see what follows from  
     this.
290
 
 
Augustine’s examples of key “wants” in the context of his dialogue with Evodius 
effectively outline the importance (and unavoidability) of Evodius’s “wanting” definite 
things as part of everyday life. In particular, the last example on the desire for one’s own 
happiness and well-being is helpful as it should resonate with any reader.   
After becoming convinced in 7.3.5 that his free will is the locus of evil acts, 
Augustine presses the question of evil further, seeking the “root” of it all:  
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  Ibid., 201. 
290
  Ibid., 201-202, Harrison’s translation. Harrison points out the difficulty in ensuring the coherence of 
the vocabulary as he renders the Latin noun “voluntas” and verb “ volo” as “will” and to “want” and to 
“wish” respectively in the context of the exchange here. He also refers to 1.7.17 and 2.3.7 in On Free 
Choice as containing “cogitolike” arguments that focus on existence but with a pattern of elements similar 
to this exchange in the overall line of reasoning. 
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But I asked further: “Who made me? Was it not my God, who is not only Good but Goodness 
itself? What root reason is there for my willing evil and failing to will good, which would make it just 
for me to be punished? Who was it that set and ingrafted in me this root of bitterness [quis in me hoc 
posuit et insevit mihi plantarium amaritudinis], since I was wholly made by my most loving God? If 
the devil is the author, where does the devil come from? And if by his own perverse will he was turned 
from a good angel into a devil, what was the origin in him of the perverse will by which he became a 
devil, since by the all-good Creator he was made wholly angel?”  
 
Instead of stopping at the level of the will, Augustine raises the same question that 
conceivably arises in many typical discussions on the problem of evil: How could his will 
do evil acts if the will itself was made by a good God? Or if the devil is ultimately 
responsible for this evil, how did he become evil if he was made by the same loving God? 
After modifying his view of God to a refined conception of a measureless sea with 
creation as a huge but still finite sponge enveloped by this sea, Augustine questions how 
evil could have ever entered such a system: 
“Where then is evil, and what is its source, and how has it crept into the Creation? What is its root, 
what is its seed? Can it be that it is wholly without being [An omnino non est]? But why should we fear 
and be on guard against what is not? Or if our fear of it is groundless, then our very fear is itself an evil 
thing. For by it the heart is driven and tormented for no cause; and that evil is all the worse, if there is 
nothing to fear yet we do fear. Thus either there is evil which we fear, or the fact that we fear is evil. 
“Whence then is evil, since God who is good made all things good? It was the greater and supreme 
Good who made these lesser goods, but Creator and Creation are alike good. Whence then comes evil? 
Was there perhaps some evil matter of which He made this creation, matter which He formed and 
ordered, while yet leaving in it some element which he did not convert into good? But why? Could He 
who was omnipotent be unable to change matter wholly so that no evil might remain in it [an impotens 
erat totam vertere et commutare, ut nihil mali remaneret, cum sit omnipotens]?...Could it possibly 
have existed against his will?...could He not have taken away and reduced to nothing that matter which 
was evil, and provided good matter of which to create all things? For He would not be omnipotent if 
He could not create something good without the aid of matter which He had not created.” (7.5.7) 
 
Augustine raises the possibility early in the passage that evil itself has no being, but he 
quickly raises further questions that cast doubt on that position. Of course, he will return 
to that very option later in Book 7 (7.12.18). Concerning another position that he 
examines later in the passage, perhaps evil does not come from an all-powerful Maker  
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but instead from the matter He used in creating the world.
291
 However, in the process of 
his questioning Augustine concludes that this possibility is not compatible with the notion 
that God is omnipotent. G. Matthews correctly elaborates that this solution was never 
attractive to Augustine since his belief that God created everything from nothing renders 
this solution implausible: if God used formless matter to create the heavens and the earth, 
the initial step of God creating formless matter from nothing, matter to be used next in 
making creatures, raises questions on how God would have been unable to avoid making 
creatures not tainted by evil because of any evil of matter itself.
292
 He agrees that 
Augustine does find the first solution, the privation solution, appealing later in 7.12.18.
293
 
Nevertheless, this is not his primary response to the problem of evil; rather, Augustine’s 
Free Will Defense, as Matthews terms it,
294
 rises to the fore later as Augustine’s fuller 
response.  
Despite the large number of questions about evil, in this same section Augustine 
states how in this period “the faith of Your Christ…taught by the Catholic Church, stood 
firm” in his heart, even though he was still uncertain on a number of points of Catholic 
doctrine. In addition, besides his recent rejection of Manichean teachings, he repudiates  
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  Augustine does submit later in Book 7 that the “stuff” of creation is ontologically inferior to God, the 
supreme substance, and therefore, understandably subject to corruption, but this state of affairs is not the 
same as working with matter already tainted with evil, which is the scenario that he raises at this point in 
Confessions. 
292
  Gareth B. Matthews, Augustine (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 107-108. 
293
  Ibid., 108.  
294
  Matthews follows Alvin Plantinga’s famous use of the term “Free Will Defense” in discussing this 
line of reasoning. In this regard Matthews refers to chapter 6 of Plantinga’s work, God and Other Minds 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967). 
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any further belief in astrology as well (7.6.8-10),
295
 followed by a strong statement of 
basic belief in Christ as the way of salvation and in the authority of the Christian 
Scriptures (7.7.11). All the same, he states, “I was still on fire with the question whence 
comes evil [quaerebam aestuans unde sit malum],” and limitations to still thinking of 
God in corporeal terms continue to complicate for him any hope of a resolution. 
  
     
THE NEO-PLATONIC PERIOD 
                                                
In the Neo-Platonic period of the narrative, Augustine is greatly influenced by the 
writings of Neo-Platonism, a pivotal event that provides a breakthrough for his questions 
concerning the nature of God and related matters. This period commences with his 
encounter with some “books of the Platonists” (7.9.13-15). After a brief overview of 
Neo-Platonism itself and some consideration of which “books of the Platonists” 
Augustine read, we take a closer look at Plotinus’ views on matter and metaphysical evil, 
followed by Augustine’s appropriation of Neo-Platonic thought, his first attempted ascent  
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  Although the chapter on astrology may seem out of place with the rest of the sequence of Book 7, 
O’Donnell reminds us how curiosity, one of Augustine’s three weaknesses, especially on certain 
intellectual questions, is resolved throughout Book 7. At the beginning of the fourth book, the astrology 
discussion serves to mark how far Augustine’s fall into Manichaeism was (on account of his youthful 
curiosity at that time) and now the resolution (and rejection) of that knowledge “source” in Book 7 help to 
highlight his liberation from curiosity in this book. Although he is now “detached” from the Manichees, his 
“pre-Manichean curiositas hounds him” as he still seeks answers to two of the three questions that 
originally compelled him into the Manichean group. In that regard, see James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: 
Confessions, vol. 2, Commentary on Books 1-7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 405-406. In the previous 
chapter we briefly mentioned Frederick Crosson’s outline of Augustine’s succumbing to 3 weaknesses: the 
lust of the flesh in Book 2, the lust of the eyes (curiosity) in Book 3 with the Manichees, and the pride of 
life (secular ambition) in Book 4. After his overall confusion in Book 5, now his current ascent to God has 
involved addressing each weakness in subsequent books but in reverse order from how he first yielded to 
them: confronting his ambition (in particular through the encounter with the beggar) in Book 6, dealing 
with the intellectual problem of evil in Book 7, and overcoming the struggle with lust in Book 8. See 
Frederick J. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” in The Augustinian 
Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 31. 
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of the mind, and his final conclusions on metaphysical evil, the harmony of creation, 
moral evil, and free will. A brief consideration of his second attempt at an ascent of the 
mind closes this section.  
 
 
Background on Neo-Platonism and the “Books of the Platonists” 
 
 
A short overview of Neo-Platonism is helpful at this point. Plotinus, the original 
source and pioneer of Neo-Platonic thought, viewed reality as a series of emanations all 
flowing from the One, the ultimate source of reality, similar to the way that a light bulb, 
the source of light, has a field of light radiating out from it, with that field becoming 
fainter and fainter as the distance from the bulb increases. The One in Neo-Platonism is 
beyond being and essentially unknowable. Three levels of reality flow or emanate from 
the One, with each new level becoming more complex. After the first two emanations, 
Intellect (Nous) and Soul, the final level, Matter, is the most complex, but since it is the 
farthest removed from the One, beings at this level are capable of the greatest evil. 
The negative view toward Matter explains the ultimate goal in Neo-Platonism. People 
are viewed as consisting of a soul housed in a physical body. As a result, the desire of 
every person should be for the soul to ascend each level of reality (through contemplation 
and meditation) ultimately to attain union with the One. Only then could perfection be 
achieved. Nevertheless, the brief outline above of Neo-Platonism does not do justice to 
the complexity of Neo-Platonic thought nor to the differing interpretations of the main 
writings, therefore making a deeper look at the relevant works necessary. Yet in order to 
accomplish that task one must consider first which writings of Neo-Platonism Augustine 
encountered. 
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There is no universal agreement on which “books of the Platonists” Augustine read, 
including whether the writings of Plotinus or Porphyry were a larger influence on him at 
this point. In spite of this, some of Augustine’s works and the research of certain scholars 
point at least to Plotinus’ likely influence as a reasonable conclusion. In City of God 8.12 
Augustine lists Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry in that order as the most eminent 
Platonists, and he then calls Plotinus “that great Platonist” later in 10.2. Only months 
after he converted to Christianity, in his Against the Academics (3.18.41) Augustine 
clearly praised Plotinus as the most prominent philosopher in the spirit of Plato’s 
thinking.  
Based on Paul Henry’s focused methodology (demonstrating Augustine’s literary  
dependence on certain passages in the Enneads), Eugene TeSelle concurs with Henry that 
1.6 and 5.1 of Plotinus’ Enneads and probably 3.2 and 4.3 as well, influenced Augustine 
early.
296
 Using a similar methodology, Olivier du Roy’s insights (that 5.5 surely 
influenced Augustine early) and Robert O’Connell’s conclusions (the influence of 6.4 
and 6.5 on Augustine) have expanded the list.
297
 With the same line of reasoning TeSelle 
has included 1.8 (“On the Origin of Evil”) and other tractates to the list of probabilities. 
Furthermore, Stephen Menn pinpoints phrasing in 7.10.16 of Confessions that is arguably 
taken from Enneads 1.8.13.
298
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Arguments for a strong Porphyrian influence in the time period of Confessions are 
less conclusive at best: Porphyry’s On the Return of the Soul does not appear to have 
been read by Augustine until very near 400 at the earliest,
299
 and James J. O’Donnell 
maintains that Porphyry was only named by Augustine in any of his writings when 
Augustine becomes aware of Porphyry’s polemic against Christianity.300 Porphyry’s 
Mixed Questions (on the union of body and soul) does not explain Augustine’s eventual 
familiarity with key Porphyrian themes not present in that work,
301
 and arguments that 
the influences of 6.4 and 6.5 on him are from Plotinian, not Porphyrian versions of the 
Enneads, lessen the possibility that Porphyry’s Sentences made a substantial impact on 
Augustine. In summary, the libri platonicorum were conceivably either a group of key 
treatises by Plotinus or perhaps a “package” of works by both Plotinus and Porphyry so 
that in 7.9 of Confessions Augustine was exposed to the key Neo-Platonic teachings that 
enabled him now to perceive God as a non-corporeal, eternal being. Likewise, he also 
gained new understandings of the soul, matter, and evil that would soon be helpful to him 
in addressing the intellectual problem of evil. Even though those writings did not contain 
the teaching of the Incarnation as Augustine himself states in that same section (7.9.14), 
the books are a key instrument in his eventual willingness to reconsider the possibility of 
the veracity of the Christian Scriptures in his search for truth.  
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Plotinus’ Views on Matter 
 
  
 Plotinus’ views on matter are the best starting point for understanding his views on 
evil more fully since matter is often understood to be the locus of evil for Plotinus. His 
key comments on the nature of matter in 3.6.7 of his Enneads are relevant for this part of 
the discussion: “Matter has no reality and is not capable of being affected…Matter is no 
Soul; it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal–Principle; no Reason-Principle; it is no 
limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it 
produce?”302 Moreover, in the same section Plotinus even excludes it from the regular 
categories of Being: “[Matter]…has no title to the name of Being. It will be more 
plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement [away from Being] or 
station (in Not-being) but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and 
phantasm of Mass; a bare aspiration towards substantial existence…” Therefore, Matter 
seems to be quite different from contemporary definitions of Matter. It appears to be 
something with a radically different type of existence in comparison to the One or the 
other emanations from the One.  
However, despite the summary above a deeper look at the origins of matter reveals a 
lack of widespread agreement among scholars on the best understanding of this element 
in Plotinian thought. For example, W. J. Carroll notes three positions that seem prevalent 
regarding the origins of matter and the One: (1) matter exists independently of the One 
and in opposition to the One (P. Pistorius), either passively or actively; (2) matter is the 
last product resulting from the procession of the One (E. R. Dodds, Paul Henry, A. H. 
Armstrong, Dean Inge); and (3) the issue is meaningless because matter is really nothing 
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in Plotinus’ system (John Murray, Joseph Katz, Cletus Carbonara).303 Interestingly 
enough, J. M. Rist conceivably holds to a combination of the first two views, that “matter 
is good when it is viewed as a product of a higher reality and evil only when considered 
in itself apart from the emanative process.”304 
After examining key passages pertaining to matter, Carroll proposes the following six 
results about matter that he gleaned from those sections, results that show the gradual 
development and changes in Plotinus’ thought concerning matter:305 
 
 (1) In 2.4 there are two kinds of matter: Intelligible matter (matter with form) had 
origins in the One, but this claim is not made about corporeal matter--it is simply 
void of any qualities, seen as a container for bodies, and identical to privation, but 
it does have existence. 
(2) In 2.4.1 a link is made between corporeal matter, seen in the guise of total 
indetermination, and the chain of various types of reality, which ultimately have 
the One as their source. 
(3) In 3.6.14 matter is no longer seen as produced but rather is viewed as that which 
halts production from the One. 
(4) In 5.8.7 Intellect (Nous) shapes matter in the same way that a potter has an effect 
on clay, but Intellect has no causal (creator) effect on matter.   
(5) In 3.2.2 the One is seen as the First, prior to all things, and matter is viewed as the 
Last, but Plotinus avoids discussing the origins of matter. 
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(6) In 1.8 the major section on matter and evil, great ambiguities are present regarding 
the status and origin of corporeal matter. Instead of linking matter to the higher 
realities, it is the “ancient nature,” the cause of all evil.306 
Carroll concludes by positing a potential way to understand the flow of development 
of Plotinus’ thought over time:307 position (2) represents his fully developed monistic 
position (corporeal matter originates from the One), and (6), the final position, is 
representative of Plotinus’ move toward a more dualistic position (matter seemingly 
without any origin in the One). Thus, (1) then is a transitional view (Plotinus’ uncertainty 
about matter’s origin) culminating eventually in the monism of (2); whereas (3), (4), and 
(5) would be transitional periods of uncertainty leading eventually to a more dualistic 
position in (6). Even so, Carroll is quick to note that although Plotinus’ monism seems to 
change into a dualism of sorts, it is one “of implication rather than intent.”308 
Kevin Corrigan’s analysis agrees with key elements of Carroll’s theory of two types 
of matter. Moreover, he clarifies how lower (corporeal) matter is simply the image of 
intelligible matter.
309
 Regarding the difference between both kinds of matter, in 
intelligible matter “activity expresses what the matter is, whereas in…[lower matter], 
matter does not become a ‘whole illuminated substance’ (2.4.5) together with form, but 
remains something ‘covered’ or masked by form.”310 
In addition, commenting on a passage from 1.8.4, Corrigan elaborates on the three 
ways that ”secondary evil” as he terms it, has an effect on compound beings: in the first 
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option, such evils have privation, which is part of their composite nature (that is, “they 
‘belong to matter’, are ‘of matter’, in a privative way”);311 in the second option, they 
make a privative kind of unity with it by perceiving it” (seen here as a ‘single activity’ 
according to Aristotle); or in the third option, they “produce” evil in such a way that evil 
needs “positive form” to have any power. Corrigan notes that these three types of 
participation are further developed in other chapters by Plotinus. 
According to R.T. Wallis the Middle Platonists had wrestled with whether Matter was 
simply inert, without form, and therefore, a morally neutral entity or evil in the sense of 
an active principle.
312
 Plotinus combines both ideas and sees the lack of Form in Matter 
as precisely what makes Matter part of Absolute Evil. Along those lines, Plotinus does 
not see Matter as a principle that exists independently but simply as the limit at which the 
flow of reality out of the One fades into darkness.
313
 Therefore, instead of a positive force 
he views it more as a “poverty” that taints with its deficiencies every single body that is 
based on it. 
 
  Plotinus’ View on Metaphysical Evil 
 
Although some key aspects of Plotinian views on evil were included in the previous 
section, a fuller look at this subject is needed. Plotinus discusses the nature of evil in 
various places in his Enneads, but the most developed discussion can be found in the 
First Ennead in the Eighth Tractate. Plotinus opens by elaborating on the Good so that its  
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contrary, evil, will be more easily understood. Then, in 1.8.2 he submits the idea of evil 
as being present in Non-Being because of the radical difference between it and Being and 
Beyond-Being (the Good). 
Yet even though Plotinus situates evil in the realm of Non-Being, he is careful to 
explain that Non-Being is not non-existence; rather, it is a type of existence that is a 
marked contrast to “Authentic Being,” and it is at most “an image of Being” (1.8.3). 
Likewise, “some conception of it would be reached by thinking of measurelessness as 
opposed to measure, of the unbounded against bound, the unshaped against a principle of 
shape, the ever-needy against the self-sufficing…whatsoever fragment of it be taken, that 
part is all lawless void….” We must also not think of evil as simply an accidental quality 
but recognize the existence of Absolute Evil: 
For if Evil can enter into other things, it must have in a certain sense a prior existence, even 
though it may not be an essence. As there is Good, the Absolute, as well as Good, the quality, so, 
together with the derived evil entering into something not itself, there must be the Absolute Evil… 
That Kind whose place is below all the patterns, forms, shapes, measurements and limits, that which 
has no trace of good by any title of its own, but [at best] takes order and grace from some Principle 
outside itself, a mere image as regards Absolute Being but the Authentic Essence of Evil…The bodily 
Kind, in that it partakes of Matter[,] is an evil thing… in their [bodies’] ceaseless flux they are always 
slipping away from Being… Soul, on the contrary, since not every Soul is evil, is not an evil Kind. 
(1.8.3)  
 
Therefore, for Plotinus absolute evil exists in connection with a specific Principle, a 
“mere image.” The “bodily kind” participates in evil because of its connection with 
Matter, where evil is found; therefore, souls are not naturally evil. The nature of evil as 
“found” in Matter is also described as “absolute Lack” and “where there is utter dearth, 
there we have Essential Evil, void of all share in Good; this is the case with Matter” 
(1.8.5). Thus, “we are not to think of Evil as some particular bad thing--injustice, for 
example, or any other ugly trait--but as a principle,” apparently a privation of sorts, found 
with Matter in connection with the Principle of Evil. 
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Yet although evil is not a “thing” per se, Plotinus does reinforce its connection with 
Matter (or at least a certain type of Matter) as well as how it “infects” types of Being: 
“For, wholly, without part in Good, the negation of Good, unmingled Lack, this Matter-
Kind makes over to its own likeness whatsoever comes in touch with it” (1.8.4). 
Consequently, the “Soul’s seeing” can be “baulked by the passions and by the darkening 
that Matter brings to it,” but the ideal Soul is one that is “wrought to perfection, 
addressed towards the Intellectual-Principle, is steadfastly pure: it has turned away from 
Matter…” 
In 1.7 Plotinus argues for the existence of metaphysical aspects of evil by seeing it as 
one of necessity. First, the universe must by its very nature be composed of opposed 
principles: “…for necessarily this All is made up of contraries: it could not exist if Matter 
did not…[Thus] what comes into it [the Nature of this cosmos] from God is good; evil is 
from the Ancient Kind which, we read, is the underlying Matter not yet brought to order 
by the Ideal-Form” (1.8.7). In the second argument from necessity, Plotinus maintains 
that in the emanative process of the Good, it is natural, of course, in the sequence of 
productions from the One to have eventually a “Last” in the sequence and this “Last” is 
evil: “As necessarily as there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last: 
this Last of Matter, the thing which has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of 
Evil.” After reinforcing the notion that Matter is the cause of Evil, he explains how vices 
and virtues fit into his teaching on evil as well as how vices are caused by Primal Evil. 
The importance of metaphysical evil in the context of Plotinus’ overall views on evil 
cannot be overestimated. Dominic O’Meara argues that 1.8 of Plotinus’ Enneads can be 
understood as presenting two theses: (1) moral evil cannot be understood  without 
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presupposing metaphysical evil, and (2) the constitution of this material world includes 
the presupposition of metaphysical evil.
314
 The first thesis can be more easily understood 
if one considers the earlier quote above from Plotinus regarding the effect of matter on 
the soul. As P. Pistorius explains, “…both [moral and metaphysical evil] are caused by 
the same factor, namely matter, the absolute lack. Moral and general [metaphysical] evil 
are in their nature identical; the moral aspect appears when the human soul yields to 
matter and ceases to exercise its self-determination.”315 Stated another way, vices are 
exhibited after Primal Evil has first had an effect on the soul. As Plotinus himself 
explains: “The evil of matter precedes the weakness, the vice; it is Primal Evil. Even 
though the Soul itself submits to Matter and engenders it; if it becomes evil within itself 
by its commerce with Matter, the cause is still the presence of Matter” (1.8.1). As a 
result, not only does the soul seem to bear no moral responsibility for its wrong choices, 
but also Plotinus adds that “the Soul would never have approached Matter but that the 
presence of Matter is the occasion of its earth-life.” 
                                                      
Augustine’s Appropriation of Neo-Platonic Thought 
 
  
It is difficult to be conclusive on Augustine’s precise interpretation of Plotinus’ 
thought in some respects or whether he was aware of the shift on the nature of matter that 
Plotinus’ writings appear to make over time. However, some general observations in this 
area can be advanced as we seek to understand what he appropriated from Plotinian 
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thought. First, on the nature of matter elements of positions 4 and 5 (from Carroll’s 
analysis) coincide or at least are compatible with Augustine’s metaphysical breakdown in 
Book 7 of Confessions: just as position 4 presents the Intellect (Nous) as shaping matter 
into an intelligible entity, Augustine views all matter as being under God’s creative 
direction and purpose (7.12.18). Similarly, with position 5 the One is “prior to all things,” 
and like the One, God is also the ultimate reference point for describing what manner of 
existence all other things have (7.11.17). In general, the more dualistic positions in 
Plotinus’ thought above tend to dovetail to a fair extent with Augustine’s Christian 
metaphysics.   
With regard to evil, whether Augustine also discerned the three types of participation 
that Corrigan noted is unclear, but he apparently drew heavily from the privation 
understanding (the first of Corrigan’s three categories on how “secondary evil” affects 
beings) in view of his words in 7.12.18. However, although Plotinus appears to 
categorize evil as a “mere image” in the realm of Non-Being but not in the category of 
non-existence, Augustine does not include an “image” category in his account. 
Furthermore, instead of discussing Non-Being and non-existence as two distinct 
categories, he simply states directly that evil is not a substance (7.12.18).  He also avoids 
ever taking Plotinus’ position that matter itself is inherently evil. Concerning Plotinus’ 
two arguments of necessity (that evil must exist), Augustine clearly does not accept or 
use the first, in particular that certain metaphysical opposites must exist. The second 
argument, that there must inevitably be a final element, which should be called evil, in 
the procession of emanations after identifying the first element, is too pantheistic for 
Augustine to appropriate directly. Nevertheless, did that flow of argumentation influence 
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his thinking at all that the inferior nature of material “stuff” (material ontologically 
inferior to God Himself) would make privations “natural” in a sense and thus 
unavoidable?
316
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore that question more fully, 
but the consideration is an interesting one.  
All the same, what is the overall effect of this Neo-Platonic system of thought on 
Augustine’s basic views on the nature of God and evil? Instead of the passive and 
relatively powerless good God in Manichaeism which had troubled Augustine, Peter 
Brown points out the improvement in Plotinus’ system: 
…the power of the Good always maintained the initiative: the One flowed out, touching 
everything, moulding and giving meaning to passive matter, without itself being in any way violated or 
diminished…Evil, therefore, was only a turning away into separateness: its very existence assumed the 
existence of an order, which was flouted while remaining no less real and meaningful. It was the self-
willed part that was diminished, by losing contact with something bigger and more vital than itself. 
 
Brown’s understanding here takes the position that Augustine understood Matter as 
flowing out of the One. The “self-willed” element reminds one of Augustine’s own 
ruminations on free will, but it is difficult to know how much that factor influenced his 
thought. Presumably Ambrose’s direct coverage of free will in a Scriptural context was 
still the greater factor. However, the larger ramifications of Neo-Platonism are not lost on 
Augustine as Brown eloquently outlines his changing position regarding the nature of 
God Himself:  
It is this revolution which is, perhaps, the most lasting and profound result of Augustine’s 
absorption of Neo-Platonism. It did nothing less than shift the center of gravity of Augustine’s spiritual 
life. He was no longer identified with his God [as in Manichaeism, with its view of good and bad 
substance in an individual from those respective kingdoms]: this God was utterly transcendent—His 
separateness had to be accepted. And, in realizing this, Augustine had to accept, that he, also, was 
separate and different from God.
317
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W. Mallard adds that since Augustine’s original conception of God was physical, he 
thought directly of divinity as electricity or light,
318
 but the Neo-Platonists, in contrast to 
that, immediately taught him how to understand the idea that God is more like a 
principle.
319
 Consequently, O’Meara argues that Neo-Platonism served as a bridge for 
Augustine in his search for the truth, in particular regarding evil: “…it was Neo-
Platonism that finally delivered him from the two persisting difficulties which had been 
so deeply ingrained in him by the Manichean teaching of a material God and a principle 
of Evil…The Neo-Platonist teaching bridged a gap between a material [physical] 
Manicheism and a spiritual Christianity.”320    
Stated another way, Plotinus’ focus on the spirituality of the Word, in some ways 
similar thematically to the Gospel of John (but without saying the Word was made flesh), 
pervaded Augustine’s mind (7.9.13-15). This led him to realize that extension is not 
needed for one’s being (7.10.16), and at that point he began to understand how physical 
things are part of creation and how everything that God has made is good even if 
corruptible. Moreover, as stated earlier, Neo-Platonism influenced Augustine’s final 
conclusion that metaphysical evil is literally nothing, simply a lack or absence of 
goodness (in the same way that darkness is simply the lack or absence of light), which 
addressed his perplexity on the nature and origin of evil.  
The influence of Neo-Platonism on Augustine’s concept of God can also be seen by 
considering a broader canvas of his writings. John Rist acknowledges the Neo-Platonic 
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roots of Augustine’s concept of God, even of seeing something of the Trinity in Neo-
Platonic thinking.
321
 Yet, he also notes the distinctions that Augustine makes in various 
writings. For example, in Question 46 of 83 Questions, with the old tradition of the 
unchanging Platonic Forms in God’s  mind in view here, Augustine speaks of the Forms 
being in the Son as the Word (=Logos) just as the Neo-Platonic Forms are in the Nous.
322
 
Nonetheless, Rist points out how careful Augustine must be in avoiding an exact parallel: 
although the Forms are contained in the Word, the Word is not subordinate (unlike the 
Nous in Plotinian thought). In addition, Rist observes in Augustine’s writings how he 
avoids the Plotinian expression of God as “above being”323 or “beyond being”324 or as 
“the One” but instead describes Him as either “being itself [ipsum esse],”325 which is 
closer to Porphyry’s phrase “being alone [to einai monon],”326 or as “true being 
[idipsum].”327 Augustine’s thinking of God as the Good by identifying being as the Good 
parallels Neo-Platonic thinking more closely here.
328
  
 
 
The First Ascent 
 
 
It is not uncommon for commentators to view the experience in 7.10.16 as an effort 
by Augustine to take what he learned in Plotinus’ writings and attempt an ecstatic “ascent 
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of the mind” on Plotinian terms in order to “see” this new understanding of God at the 
level of certainty. Vernon J. Bourke observes a three-stage ascension in Augustine’s 
move toward God in that passage: “thus admonished [by the writings of the Platonists] to 
turn back to my very self [redire ad memet ipsum], I entered into my innermost parts 
[intravi in intima mea] under your guidance… and I saw…above my mind the immutable 
Light [lucem incommutabilem].”329 Noteworthy here in Bourke’s view is the clear pattern 
of moving from outside one’s mind to the inside of the mind and eventually to above 
one’s mind.330  
Contra various interpreters including Bourke, Robert O’Connell is correct in rejecting 
the notion that the experience in 7.10.16 constitutes a Plotinian-type ascent of the mind. 
Terms in the passage such as vidi (I saw), cognovi (“I came to  know”), manifestatum est 
mihi (“it was made manifest to me”) are actually Augustine’s way of stressing that he 
now held to the truths in that section at the level of knowledge (thus with certainty) 
instead of the level of belief on the authority of, say, Ambrose.
331
 The thrust of the 
passage in 7.10.16 centers on what he saw, the world-view he came to know with 
certainty, not secondary considerations such as when he came to see it,
332
 but even here 
Augustine seems more concerned with giving the reader assurance that he reached a 
breakthrough to a spiritual type of understanding, not in describing that spiritual reality in 
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  Vernon J. Bourke, Wisdom from St. Augustine (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1984), 68, 
bracketed portion mine. 
330
  O’Donnell views the experience in 7.10.16 as Augustine’s effort to achieve an ascent (through the 
mind) to a kind of union with highest being based on what Plotinus had taught, an effort that fails. 
Subsequent paragraphs (7.11.17-16.22) recount further developments in his thinking, thus paving the way 
for a successful ascent (successful on Plotinian terms as Augustine had understood them) in 7.17.23. 
However, that success leaves Augustine dissatisfied, setting the stage for the fuller resolution in Book 8. 
See James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 2, 435.  
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  Robert J. O’Connell, Images of Conversion in St. Augustine’s Confessions (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1996), 107. The translation “I came to know” (instead of “I knew”) for cognovi is 
O’Connell’s choice. 
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any great detail.
333
 In contrast, according to many commentators such phrases are used to 
narrate the temporal sequence of the experience (or experiences),
334
 and those 
interpreting the text this way hold to the “narrative-mystical” interpretation in 
O’Connell’s thinking since they commonly see a mystical element in the experience(s) as 
well.
335
 However, Augustine’s use of Romans 1:20 four times in such passages, a verse in 
which God is “viewed” only mediately, indirectly through His creation instead of a direct 
vision of Him, is crucial here.
336
 Furthermore, Augustine’s own summary statement in 
8.1.1 that he reached those certainties only “enigmatically, as though in a mirror,” 
drawing from the Apostle Paul’s contrast with direct, immediate vision (1 Cor. 13:12), 
reinforces this conclusion.
337
 Therefore, the term lux, for example, is better translated in 
7.10.16 as “light-field” or “luminous atmosphere” (with the intelligible truths bathed in 
that Light) instead of as “light” or even “light-source,” which would imply that Augustine 
directly glimpsed that Light, God Himself, as part of a direct, immediate mystical-type 
vision.
338
 Yet perhaps most compelling is how it is astounding to think that anyone, even 
with Augustine’s talent, would have put together such a “sophisticated tapestry of 
supporting insights” after only such a slender acquaintance with Platonic thinking in 
philosophy (a month or a year at most), a definite problem for those in the “narrative” 
camp to explain.
339
  
 
                                                          
333
  Ibid., 194.   
334
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  Ibid., 192. O’Connell points out the use of Romans 1:20 in 7.10.16, twice in 7.17.23 and once again 
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Final Conclusions on Metaphysical Evil and the Harmony of Creation 
 
 
Regardless of how one might characterize the nature of it, the experience in 7.10.16 
leads to new developments in Augustine’s thinking, starting first with the concept that 
true being is that which “abides unchangeably” (7.11.17).340 In addition, “corruptible 
things are good: if they were supremely good [si summa bona essent] [like God] they 
could not be corrupted, but also if they were not good at all they could not be corrupted” 
(7.12.18), and these latter insights are based on a tight connection between being and 
goodness: starting with God as true being, everything else is good to the point that it 
exists, a key insight that serves to bolster his new understanding of evil: “Thus 
whatsoever things are, are good; and that evil whose origin I sought is not a substance 
[malumque illud, quod quaerebam unde esset, non est substantia], because if it were a  
substance it would be good.” Not surprisingly, Augustine elaborates on this account of 
evil as corruption of a good nature in anti-Manichean writings such as The Nature of the 
Good (399): 
When accordingly it is inquired, whence is evil, it must first be inquired, what is evil, which is 
nothing else than corruption, either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to nature 
[corruptio vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis naturalis].  Nature therefore which has been corrupted, is 
called evil, for assuredly when incorrupt it is good; but even when corrupt, so far as it is nature it is 
good, so far as it is corrupted it is evil. (4.1)   
  
Therefore, corruption of any of the three perfections (measure, form, order) that God 
originally formulated in the good nature of the subject is called evil, and so the extent of 
the evil depends, of course, on the extent of the corruption of that nature. Augustine’s  
                                                          
340
  O’Donnell submits that just as the books of the Platonists in 7.9 provided Augustine with a correct 
understanding of Scripture and a corrected conception of God, therefore making the ascent in 7.10 possible, 
now a corrected understanding of the goodness of creation in this entire section of the book will address the 
remaining Manichean objection of “Whence evil?” from 3.7.12. See James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: 
Confessions, vol. 2, 446. 
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correction of the question “Whence is evil?” by stating that one must first address the 
question “What is evil?”, brings to mind his quest in Book 7 of Confessions on the first 
question as his initial starting point. 
In his concluding remarks in that section (7.12.18) Augustine affirms not only the 
goodness of all individual substances that God has made, an observation that helps to 
address his earlier question of whether God was the origin of evil in some way, but he 
also maintains the goodness of creation as a whole:   
Thus I saw and clearly realized that You have made all things good, and that there are no 
substances not made by You. And because all the things You have made are not equal, they have a 
goodness [over and above] as a totality [ideo sunt omnia]: because they are good individually, and they 
are very good all together, for our God has made all things very good.
341
  
 
In the next section Augustine reaffirms key ideas on evil from the previous section and 
also includes wording as to how this new understanding resolves at least part of his 
inquiry on the presence of evil in creation. He also uses those insights to elaborate more 
on the harmony of creation as a whole despite the evil that exists in the “lower part of 
creation” (7.13.19): 
To You [God], then, evil utterly is not—and not only to You, but to Your whole creation likewise, 
evil is not: because there is nothing over and above Your Creation that could break in or derange the 
order that You imposed upon it. But in certain of its parts there are some things which we call evil 
because they do not harmonize with other things [quia non conveniunt]; yet these same things do 
harmonize with still others and thus are good; and in themselves they are good. All these things which 
do not harmonize with one another, do suit well with that lower part of creation which we call the earth 
[et omnia haec, quae sibimet invicem non conveniunt, conveniunt inferiori parti rerum, quam terram 
dicimus]…God forbid that I should say: “I wish that these things were not”; because even if I saw only 
them,…yet even for them alone I should praise You:…fire, hail, snow, ice, and stormy winds, which 
fulfill Thy word…beasts and all cattle,...kings of the earth and all people…And since from the 
heavens,…all Thy angels praise Thee…I no longer desired better, because I had thought upon them all 
and with clearer judgment I realized that while certain higher things are better than lower things, yet all 
things together are better than the higher alone.
342
 
 
                                                          
341
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Other works by Augustine that also treat the theme of evil and the harmony of 
creation are helpful for understanding this section of Confessions more fully. The 
following passage is from On Free Choice of the Will (388-95) and in this example 
Augustine moves from examining the variety of physical objects to the variety of souls 
that one finds in creation: 
When you observe the differences among material objects and see that some are brighter than 
others, it would be wrong to want to get rid of the darker ones, or to make them just like the brighter 
ones. Instead, if you refer all of them to the perfection of the whole [sed ad perfectionem universitatis 
referens omnia], you will see that these differences in brightness contribute to the more perfect being 
of the universe. The universe would not be perfect unless the greater things were present in such a way 
that lesser things are not excluded. In the same way, when you consider the differences among souls, 
you will find that the unhappiness that grieves you also contributes to the perfection of the whole by 
ensuring that it includes even those souls who deserved to be made unhappy because they willed to be 
sinners. God was perfectly justified in making such souls [Tantumque abest ut Deus tales facere non 
debuerit…], just as he deserves praise for making other creatures that are far inferior even to unhappy 
souls. (3.9)
343
    
 
Earlier in this section of On Free Choice, Augustine had discussed the brightness of the 
sun and the moon, but “material objects” in the quotation above takes the broader 
meaning of physical objects in general. After examining the comparative brightness and 
darkness of those objects and how they contribute to the universe, he makes a transition 
to the comparative “brightness” and “darkness” of souls—their happiness or unhappiness 
based on just deserts.  
A similar theme is explored in Augustine’s The Nature of the Good, and in this 
passage he focuses on how privations fit into the orderliness of the universe: 
Yet even these privations of things [silence, the absence of voice, and darkness, the absence of 
light] are so ordered in the universe of nature, that to those wisely considering[,] they not unfittingly 
have their vicissitudes.  For by not illuminating certain places and times, God has also made the 
darkness as fittingly as the day. For if we by restraining the voice fittingly interpose silence in 
speaking, how much more does He, as the perfect framer of all things, fittingly make privations of 
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things [rerum privationes decenter facit]?  Whence also in the hymn of the three children, light and 
darkness alike praise God, that is, bring forth praise in the hearts of those who well consider (16.1).
344
 
 
Augustine’s examples of silence and darkness are interesting, but the statement that God 
“fittingly” made privations may strike many as unusual, almost as if God created 
privations as the result of a direct intention to design and introduce them as a part of 
creation. However, the statement can be best understood by taking into account 
Augustine’s thoughts in 7.12.18 of Confessions on the corruptibility of created natures, 
which provides a more nuanced understanding of the passage above: God, fully aware of 
the corruptible nature of the creative material, wisely made all things so that the resulting 
privations, an inevitable part of the newly created order by its very nature, would be a 
harmonious, useful component in the finished universe.    
In his City of God Augustine reinforces certain elements of the theme of evil and the 
design and beauty of creation in Books 11 and 12. In the first book he uses a picture 
analogy to reinforce the idea of the overall beauty of the world despite the evil it 
contains: “A picture may be beautiful when it has touches of black in appropriate places; 
in the same way the whole universe is beautiful, if one could see it as a whole, even with 
its sinners, though their ugliness is disgusting when they are viewed in themselves” 
(11.23).
345
  In Book 12 he includes the notion that although it is difficult to appreciate the 
complete harmony and beauty of the natural world from our limited human standpoint, it 
is still wrong to question the divine Designer of it all:  
But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and mutable 
things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their 
corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator’s will, an existence fitting them, by 
passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty [peragant  infimam 
pulchritudinem], the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a requisite part of this world. For 
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things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be 
quite omitted from the universe…Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal 
frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments 
that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty [cui particulae, quae nos 
offendunt, satis apte decenterque conveniunt]. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive 
the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe it, lest in the vanity of human 
rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great an Artificer [ne tanti artificis opus in 
aliquo reprehendere vanitate humanae temeritatis audeamus]. (12.4) 
 
After discussing further the goodness of such natural things themselves, he concludes in 
the very next chapter that “All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a 
rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good.” 
Continuing with the theme of creation in Confessions, Augustine brings the concept 
of justice into the equation, enabling him to make a transition to the nature of moral evil 
and punishment:  
Your justice displeases the wicked: but so do the viper and the smaller worms: yet these You have 
created good, and suited to the lower parts of Your creation—to which lower parts indeed the wicked 
themselves are well suited [quibus et ipsi iniqui apti sunt], insofar as they are unlike You, though they 
become suited to the higher parts as they grow more like You. So that when I now asked what is 
iniquity, I realized that it was not a substance but a swerving of the will [voluntatis perversitatem] 
which is turned towards lower things and away from You, O God, who are the supreme substance: so 
that it casts away what is most inward to it and swells greedily for outward things. (7.16.22) 
 
In this unusual but pivotal passage Augustine remarks first on how the wicked are 
unhappy with a variety of creatures that are part of the lower world, with examples of 
creatures that afflict and bother those that are confined to that lower part of the world. 
Again, in his On Free Choice of the Will, a slight elaboration on a similar theme is 
helpful for contrasting the just from the passage below with the reaction of the unjust to 
the creatures that they are confined with in the previous passage: 
For the best souls lend dignity to the humblest creatures among whom they dwell, not by their 
unhappiness (for they are not unhappy), but by making good use of those creatures [sed usu earum 
bono]. But it would be unjust if sinful souls were permitted to dwell in the highest places, where they 
do not belong, since they cannot use superior creatures well or adorn them in any way. (3.9)  
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Although Augustine opens here with discussing the “best souls,” he then moves to the 
topic of “sinful souls” and how their proper place in the universe is not with the superior 
creatures, therefore making the lower places the proper abode for such sinners. 
 
Final Conclusions on Moral Evil and Free Will 
 
 
Augustine then unexpectedly uses that same account (7.16.22) to pronounce deeper 
insights on the nature of moral evil. He focuses on what exactly iniquity is: not a 
substance but a “swerving of the will…towards lower things…and away 
from…God…the supreme substance…” Even though he briefly brought up the concept 
of free will earlier in Book 7, the statement on “swerving” constitutes his most important 
statement on the nature of moral evil. His discussion of it in On Free Choice of the Will 
sheds additional light on the nature of this “swerving.” First of all, his understanding of 
the will and of one’s punishment for the misuse of that will are clear in 2.19-20: 
Hence, the goods that are pursued by sinners are in no way evil things, and neither is free will 
itself,…What is evil is the turning of the will away from the unchangeable good and toward 
changeable goods. And since this turning is not coerced, but voluntary [quae tamen aversio atque 
conversio, quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria…], it is justly and deservedly punished with 
misery. 
But perhaps you are going to ask what is the source of this movement by which the will turns 
away [quoniam movetur voluntas cum se avertit…unde iste motus existat] from the unchangeable good 
toward a changeable good. This movement is certainly evil…that movement is not from God. But then 
where does it come from? If I told you that I don’t know, you might be disappointed; but that would be 
the truth. For one cannot know that which is nothing [Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est].  
 
The will’s turn away from the “unchangeable good,” God, toward a changeable good, the 
wrong focus of one’s love, is “justly…punished” according to Augustine. With regard to 
the source or cause of this movement, Augustine reiterates the idea of evil as literally 
“nothing,” no substance that can be pinpointed as the cause. Later in the same section 
Augustine adds that “…every defect comes from nothing [omnis autem defectus ex nihilo 
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est], and that movement of turning away, which we admit is sin, is a defective movement. 
So you see where that movement comes from; you may be sure that it does not come 
from God.”  
In 3.17 of the same work, after stating that “…a perverse will is the cause of all evils 
[Ergo improba voluntas, malorum omnium causa est],” Augustine elaborates more on 
this issue: 
But if you are asking for the cause of this root [a perverse will], how can it be the root of all evils? 
Its cause would then turn out to be the root of all evils. And as I said, once you have found that, you 
will have to search for its cause, and there will be no limit to your searching.  
And besides, what could be the cause of the will before the will itself? Either it is the will itself, in 
which case the root of all evils is still the will, or else it is not the will, in which case there is no sin. So 
either the will is the first cause of sin, or no sin is the first cause of sin [nullum peccatum est prima 
causa peccandi]. And you cannot rightly assign responsibility for a sin to anyone but the sinner; 
therefore, you cannot rightly assign responsibility except to someone who wills it [Non est ergo cui 
recte imputetur nisi volenti]—but I don’t know why you would want to look any further.
346
 
 
Although his conclusion may not satisfy modern readers, Augustine is adamant that the 
will itself is the best stopping point in one’s search for the cause of moral evil despite the 
questions that might still emerge. Even after considering the effects of original sin in the 
next part of Book 3, Augustine retains his basic conclusion that “souls pay the penalty for 
their sins, for which their own wills are alone responsible. We should look no further for 
the cause of sin” (3.22). 
It is true that later in life, while writing Book of 12 of City of God, Augustine does 
elaborate slightly on the nature of the will and how to understand it, but he does so 
without deviating at all from his basic premise that an evil will has no underlying cause 
(12.7): 
Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient 
[non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens], as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect 
[quia nec illa effectio sed defectio]. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less 
of being,--this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections,-
-causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient,--is as if some one sought to see darkness, or hear 
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silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter only by 
the ear; but not by their positive actuality…, but by their want of it [non sane in specie, sed in speciei 
privatione]…For those things which are known not by their actuality, but by their want of it, are 
known, if our expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing them, that by knowing them 
they may be not known. For when the eyesight surveys objects that strike the sense, it nowhere sees 
darkness but where it begins not to see. And so no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, and yet 
it is only perceived by not hearing. Thus, too, our mind perceives intelligible forms by understanding 
them; but when they are deficient, it knows them by not knowing them; for “who can understand 
defects?”
347
  
 
In his careful wording here Augustine strives to use the examples of darkness and 
silence again, both privations of a sort, to explain how the deficient cause of the will can 
only be known by not being known as a “positive actuality.” In 12.9 of the same work 
Augustine emphasizes the defection away from God:  “There is, then, no natural efficient 
cause, or, if I may be allowed the expression, no essential cause of the evil will [malae 
voluntatis…essentialis nulla sit causa]…the will is made evil by nothing else than 
defection from God,--a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient [cuius 
defectionis etiam causa utique deficit].”  
Will any of this make sense to the modern reader or at least can Augustine’s view 
here be more understandable in some way to modern ears? However, the inability to 
explain such causes is precisely the point according to C. T. Mathewes as he expounds 
further on the nature of metaphysical evil for Augustine and how it connects to the notion 
of literally no cause for moral evil:  
 First, the introduction of evil into a wholly good creation is fundamentally a negative act—
ontologically privational and hence intellectually incomprehensible. That such an act is, strictly 
speaking, inexplicable need not, however, render it incredible; rather, it tells us something about the 
nature of wicked acts themselves. They are, at heart, purely negative, a nay-saying to the world, and 
they are, thereby, ultimately unthinkable. Such acts are done not simply out of bad reasons, but rather 
out of no reasons at all…Sin is the perverse manifestation of our godlike faculty of freedom, the ex 
nihilo that stays nihilum.
348
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Mathewes here seeks to use Augustine’s privation understanding of ontological evil 
as the starting point for comprehending why evil acts are ultimately incomprehensible. 
Then, in the next section he focuses more on the sinful act itself: 
To seek a “cause” for sin is to try to render it intelligible, and to render it intelligible is to render it 
explicable; that would tie it back into the explanatory fabric of the cosmos, the violation of which is 
what sin quite literally is…But its [the sinful act’s] consequences are disastrous; the act alienates us 
from ourselves and destroys the integrity of desire and will with which we were created.
349
 
 
So the development of Augustine’s free will understanding of moral evil takes place 
particularly in On Free Choice of the Will, not as much in Confessions itself. In 
Confessions one sees Augustine’s brief acknowledgment in 7.3.5 of his consideration of 
the role of free will with the problem of evil, followed by his argument that he has a will 
and the famous “swerving” statement in 7.16.22, but not much further development of 
those ideas in the remainder of Book 7. Book 8 contains more considerations but about 
the nature of the will in the context of Augustine’s struggle to exercise the power of it to 
turn his back on his temptations. However, there is not further development in that book 
of a free will explanation in relation to the original intellectual problem of evil.  
 It is easy to lose sight of the overall flow of thought and experience that Augustine 
goes through from the beginning of Book 7 up to now or even to miss the full 
implications of his conclusions along the way. Rowan Williams links the key ideas on 
evil from Book 7 together in a helpful manner to clarify Augustine’s system of 
developing thought here. He notes how at the beginning of Book 7, Augustine is still “in 
thrall to a kind of sophisticated materialism,” with only one being, God, as invulnerable 
to any invasion or erosion that hurts others.
350
 In such a universe in which one’s 
“territory” is invaded or some kind of force takes up the “space” that was lost by the 
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original entity, the question Unde malum? (Whence is evil?) is a reasonable question.
351
 
Yet Augustine’s breakthrough, which includes a new frame of reference, involves his 
focus on thinking itself. The mind certainly does not use or take up space, and asking the 
question of how the mind orders and evaluates its own environment then raises the 
question of the source from which the mind is deriving its standards, “its sense of real 
and mutually relative (ordered) structures.” The answer in the Platonist literature that he 
was studying points to a freer, more active presence that activates the mind, a truth not 
passive or static.  
Thus, by 7.12.18 he finds that the original difficulty has “dissolved” or at least been 
redefined so that the first question must be discarded.
352
 In addition, this source of all is 
from the divine, but in all that is not divine a plurality exists regarding agencies, with 
variety in their self-determination, all part of “an interlocking system of action and 
passion.” Consequently, what may appear to the casual observer as disagreeable, 
aesthetically speaking, or “contingently annoying” is simply a specific arrangement of 
both constraint and action. Perhaps it is a case concerning action more vulnerable or even 
more liable to variation due to circumstances than human actions and especially more 
than distinctive actions such as mental functioning.
353
 More precisely, at the level of 
one’s actual experience in the world evil can be understood as a failure of the balance that 
is appropriate between action and constraint that should be operative in a particular 
interaction in the world. In general, even though Williams is definitely familiar with 
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Augustine’s understanding of metaphysical evil as a privation, in light of Augustine’s use 
of interactions in the history of the world in his writings for understanding the origins of 
evil, the charge against him of teaching a solution to the problem of evil in terms of 
“essences” instead of “personal relationships” is in Williams’s view a “caricature.”354  
Despite his belief that the privation response is not Augustine’s primary emphasis in 
addressing the problem of evil, Williams is definitely willing to defend that 
understanding of evil from critics, and in doing so the reader gains a better grasp of the 
response itself. A key disagreement from John Hick that Williams counters involves 
Hick’s belief that there should be a crucial distinction between a “metaphysical” account 
of evil and an “empirical” account: regardless of one’s understanding of evil as a 
privation, one cannot accurately speak of evil as being experienced in such terms.
355
 Evil 
activity seems to have a power of its own as one considers agents of evil such as Milton’s 
Satan, Shakespeare’s Iago, and the Nazi Joseph Goebbels, for example.356 Furthermore, if 
evil is described as an absence of good, describing pain as an absence of pleasure, for 
instance, is surely an inadequate description of something that clearly impresses itself on 
the subject. Williams responds that the “power” of evil is derived from those elements 
that are most active and alive in the context of the reality one is speaking of. For 
example, the will that is corrupted in Augustinian terms is definitely not a will that is 
powerless or weak as long as it shows the identifiable excellences of the will: energy, 
liberty, persistence, etc. What is specifically evil in the evil will simply cannot be 
understood or spoken of in terms of energy, liberty, and so forth. Although the fervent 
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desire for something false eventually takes the “subject to destruction,” it would be 
wrong to conclude that the search for falsehood is necessarily vague or half-hearted. 
Moreover, since evil itself is not a substance, the only way it can be sought after or even 
desired is “by the exercise of the goods of mental and affective life swung around by 
error to a vast misapprehension, a mistaking of the unreal and groundless for the real.”357 
Therefore, what we call evil and what we experience is not simply a type of void, a lack, 
but rather the effect of that lack, “the displacement of true by untrue perception…”358 To 
use a physical analogy, although a vacuum is an absence, a “lack,” its effects in a larger 
system of forces can be powerful.   
                                                       
A Second Ascent 
 
Augustine describes a second ascent of the mind in 7.17.23. In this section Augustine 
marvels “to find that at last I loved You and not some phantom instead of You…yet [I] 
soon was torn away from You again by my own weight [diripiebar abs te pondere meo], 
and fell again with torment to lower things” and “carnal habit” [consuetudo carnalis] was 
that weight. His wording is not explicit here concerning the “lower things” that pulled 
him down, but with “carnal habit” as the weight, his struggles with his weaknesses 
immediately come to mind as the factors that were holding him back from being able to 
“cleave” [cohaerere] to God. Later in the same chapter, Augustine’s mental “glance” 
takes place toward “That Which Is [id quod est],” God Himself, and he remarks how “my 
weakness was beaten back again so that I returned to my old habits [et repercussa 
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infirmitate redditus solitis...].” Again, despite the general wording one thinks of his 
carnal struggles here as inhibiting the ability to “cleave,” and Augustine admits in 7.18.24 
that he could not find the strength to enjoy God until he “embraced” the Mediator, Christ 
Himself. 
Even though this second ascent appears to use the same pattern as the first (7.10.16),  
Bourke also outlines seven different stages this time in his basic analysis of the text, and 
he includes parenthetical numbering in his quotation to make the stages more evident:  
And so, step by step (gradatim) from (1) bodies, to (2) the soul which senses through the body, 
and thence to its (3) interior power to which the sense organs report about external things…further to 
(4) the reasoning power…which lifted itself to (5) its understanding …whence it discovered (6) the 
Immutable itself [ipsum incommutabile] …and in the flash of a trembling glance [in ictu trepidantis 
aspectus] (7) reached up to That Which Is [pervenit ad id quod est].
359
  
 
O’Connell agrees that an ascent is happening but as he notes that the account of the 
experience begins and ends with Romans 1:20, he rightly views the ascent like the one in 
7.10.16, as one only of understanding, not a mystical type of “vision.”360 He 
acknowledges how the last line’s language would suggest an “ecstatic ‘vision’” if taken 
out of context.
361
 However, the very next lines of the passage are reminiscent of the 
wording in 7.10.16: Augustine had only been allowed a “’glimpse’” of divine radiance by 
way of the “eye of ‘understanding’” which once again had to “peer ‘through’ created 
realities.” Therefore, even though Bourke’s seven-stage breakdown is correct, again 
O’Connell’s rejection of the “mystical” interpretation of the ascent is the more satisfying 
understanding of this passage. One remaining concern involves O’Connell’s failure to 
discuss the ascent at Ostia (9.10.23), experienced by Augustine and Monnica after his 
conversion and seen by various commentators as a successful mystical ascent in Christian 
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terms. Nevertheless, presumably O’Connell would point to the differences in language 
between that account and the other two ascents as well as the conspicuous absence of 
Romans 1:20 in the Ostia passage, clues that would suggest or at least allow the 
possibility of a mystical ascent in this case and therefore, without negating his 
interpretation of the other two experiences in Book 7. 
          
 THE CHRISTIAN PERIOD 
 
 
Neo-Platonism, or at least Augustine’s understanding of it, had exercised a powerful 
influence on his thinking through Plotinus’ writings and the Neo-Platonic elements in 
Ambrose’s sermons. These sermons were helpful in addressing key objections that 
Augustine had previously held concerning the Christian Scriptures, and in short, 
Augustine finds himself moving ever more toward Christianity. Although he comes to 
accept the teaching of the Incarnation in 7.21.27, it is also crucial here to discuss how 
other conversion stories prove necessary to bring Augustine closer to the point of 
submission followed by his own conversion in the garden. Some post-conversion 
considerations on the aftermath of his struggles with the experiential problem will be 
included in this section as well.   
Despite his high esteem for Christ at this point, Augustine admits his lingering 
confusion and ongoing disbelief in the Incarnation (7.19.25). He reaffirms how his belief 
in the incorporeality of God resulted from the books of the Platonists (7.20.26), books 
that also opened the way for him to reconsider the Christian Scriptures now, especially 
Paul’s writings, which resolved his objections concerning the nature of Christ (7.21.27). 
However, perhaps Paul’s discussion of the personal struggle with evil in Romans 7, a 
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passage that Augustine also draws from in 7.21.27, was a catalyst in his realization  that 
something more was needed. In 8.1.1 he reflects on how an intellectual conversion itself 
is not sufficient: “But in my temporal life all was uncertain; my heart had to be purged of 
the old leaven. The way, our Saviour himself, delighted me, but I still shrank from 
actually walking a way so strait.” Augustine also admits that even though his old desires 
of secular ambition were lessening, that was not the case with his struggle with lust—the 
very struggle that now held him back from embarking firmly on the new path (8.1.2):  
But I was unhappy at the life I led in the world, and it was indeed a heavy burden, for the hope of 
honour and profit no longer inflamed my desire, as formerly, to help me bear so exacting a servitude. 
These things delighted me no longer in comparison with Your sweetness and the beauty of Your house 
which I loved. But what still held me tight bound was my need of woman [sed adhuc tenaciter 
conligabar ex femina]: nor indeed did the apostle [Paul] forbid me to marry, though he exhorted to a 
better state, wishing all men to be as he was himself. But I in my weakness was for choosing the softer 
place, and this one thing kept me from taking a sure line upon others [sed ego infirmior eligebam 
molliorem locum et propter hoc unum volvebar,…].      
 
The “weakness” that Augustine speaks of called for a conversion of the will; his intellect 
had already embraced the truth. It is at this point that Augustine seeks help in dealing 
with this final barrier. 
                                                        
Other Conversion Stories 
 
                                                            
Other accounts of conversion prove to be important now in moving Augustine closer 
to his own conversion. Since his weakness with lust was affecting his decision-making 
for Christ, Augustine decided to see Simplicianus, a trusted friend of Ambrose, whose 
recounting of the conversion of Victorinus (8.2) then inspired Augustine, who was “on 
fire to imitate him [exarsi ad imitandum]” (8.5.10). In addition, another factor that 
influenced his desires was Victorinus’ decision to abandon teaching Rhetoric when 
Julian’s law against Christians’ teaching that subject forced Victorinus to choose between 
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that career and his faith. He tells of his agony in desiring to follow the example of 
Victorinus but not being able to yield his will to the new direction:  
I longed for the same chance [to follow the example of Victorinus], but I was bound not with the 
iron of another’s chains, but by my own iron will. The enemy held my will; and of it he made a chain 
and bound me. Because my will was perverse it changed to lust, and lust yielded to become habit, and 
habit not resisted became necessity [et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas]. These 
were like links hanging one on another—which is why I have called it a chain—and their hard bondage 
held me bound hand and foot. The new will which I now began to have, by which I willed to worship 
You freely and to enjoy You, O God, the only certain Joy, was not yet strong enough to overcome that 
earlier will rooted deep through the years [nondum erat idonea ad superandam priorem vetustate 
roboratam]. My two wills, one old, one new, one carnal, one spiritual, were in conflict and in their 
conflict wasted my soul. (8.5.10)
362
  
 
His sexual struggles are the focal point for the “battle of wills” that Augustine describes 
here, just as we saw in the earlier quotation from 8.1.2. Of course, the implication of two 
wills in the passage should be understood rhetorically as Augustine describes the 
immense struggle that he undergoes during this time. 
Yet another conversion story—really consisting of four conversions—had a strong 
effect on Augustine. During a brief visit Ponticianus, a colleague of Augustine’s, told him 
of the inspiring life of Antony, an Egyptian monk, and how a book on his life had 
motivated a state official, right at the moment of having read part of that work, to commit 
to such a life of devotion (8.6.15). This official’s colleague, another official in a similar 
position, also spontaneously devoted himself to the same kind of life after witnessing the 
commitment of his friend, and even the two women they were betrothed to “dedicated 
their virginity to You,” thus making a similar pledge after eventually learning what the 
two men had done. However, this latest conversion narrative had a different effect on him 
(8.7.17):  
But this time, the more ardently I approved those two as I heard of their determination to win 
health for their souls […audiebam salubres affectus] by giving themselves up wholly to Your healing, 
the more detestable did I find myself in comparison with them.  
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Augustine in this comparison laments his double-minded state, which was even evident 
earlier in the past in his famous request to God, “Grant me chastity and continence, but 
not yet” (8.7.17). Acting as a stimulus, these accounts of conversion pave the way for the 
beginning of Augustine’s own turn to Christ in the following chapter. 
     
The Garden Scene 
 
The events and inner struggle surrounding Augustine’s own conversion dominate the 
rest of Book 8. After outlining the basic narrative that takes place and reflecting on the 
struggle of his will, we will examine a more in-depth interpretation of key events and 
imagery in order to reach a fuller understanding of the impact of the conversion on his 
experiential problem of evil.  
After Ponticianus had left, Augustine’s reflections in 8.8.19 on the story told by him 
triggered an intensification of the struggle of Augustine’s will, sparking his famous cry to 
his friend Alypius, “What is wrong with us?” This exclamation is followed by the 
departure of both men to the garden by the house as Augustine’s frantic conversion 
experience commences, prompting him (retrospectively) to reflect on the relation 
between a disobedient mind and the will, a product perhaps of “the mysterious 
punishment that has come upon men and some deeply hidden damage in the sons of 
Adam” (8.9.21). The resulting considerations on the experiential aspect of the problem of 
evil lead Augustine to conclude that “there are two wills in us, because neither of them is 
entire…” Augustine is learning that despite his newfound understanding of the nature of 
evil at an intellectual level, the experiential struggle with evil is still a stark conflict not  
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easily resolved. All the same, despite intense struggles at the level of the will and his 
earlier suggestion of the existence of two wills, he rejects the Manichean position that 
two natures exist in people (8.10.22-24).  
Returning to the conversion scene, Augustine describes the “twisting and turning in 
my chain in the hope that it might be utterly broken…But it still held me” (8.11.25). The 
personal battle intensifies in the next section (8.11.26) as his “one-time mistresses”363 
were now figuratively “plucking at my garment of flesh and murmuring softly: ‘Are you 
sending us away?’” and “…the strong force of habit said to me: ‘Do you think you can 
live without them’ [cum diceret mihi consuetudo violenta, `putasne sine istis poteris’]?” 
This experience is countered by his imaginings of a multitude of people that had joyfully 
lived out a life of continence, and Continence, appearing as a lady, beckons to Augustine: 
“Can you not do what these men have done, what these women have done?...Cast 
yourself upon Him [proice te in eum] and be not afraid… Cast yourself…He will receive 
you and heal you.” After weeping heavily, Augustine famously hears a child’s voice from 
a nearby home, chanting, “Take and read [tolle lege], take and read.” Viewing this as a 
divine command, Augustine takes to heart the first passage that his eyes now notice as he 
picks up Paul’s writings again: Romans 13:13-14. According to Augustine the 
admonishment in the passage to leave his life of lust finally brings the submission of his 
will to the new life that he feels called to and results in his complete conversion to the 
Christian faith. 
Carol Harrison’s tracing of the flow of Augustine’s exposition of his struggling will is 
helpful to include here. After noting his marked dependence on the Romans 7 passage by 
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Paul with its focus on the inner struggle not to sin, Harrison observes the “fallen will” as 
“imprisoned, weighed down by the iron chain of sin which had assumed all the strength 
and necessity or habit” and definitely “at war with the new will,” one that was “emerging 
towards God” in 8.5.10.364 He was “twisted and turning with his half-wounded will” 
(8.8.19), rather divided in himself, “passive and unwilling” to yield to God in the face of 
strong habit (8.5.11), similar to one’s unwillingness to leave a warm, comfortable bed, 
and thus continually delaying the time when he must ultimately leave the bed despite 
knowing such a moment is inevitable (8.5.12).
365
 Even though his body readily followed 
his will’s orders to move his limbs, his will was “at war with itself,”366 incapable of 
obeying its very own orders because of its disassociation from itself through sin (8.8.20-
10.23).
367
 
However, what exactly was Augustine struggling against and why? The need for a 
complete break with his sexual struggles and with his worldly ambitions is in view here, 
stemming from a combination of factors. Yet in order to understand this interpretation 
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more fully, it is necessary to tie together certain threads of data in Book 8. We noted 
earlier from 8.1.2 Augustine’s statement that “the hope of honour and profit no longer 
inflamed my desire, as formerly…” and “what still held me tight bound was my need of 
woman…” Although such reflection suggests that worldly desires were essentially gone 
and that lust was the only vice left to address, other passages in Book 8 call for a more 
nuanced position. In 8.5.11 after reflecting on his desire to imitate Victorinus, Augustine 
makes the following comments about the state of his struggle:  
I no longer had the excuse which I used to think I had for not yet forsaking the world and serving 
You, the excuse namely that I had no certain knowledge of the truth. By now I was quite certain; but I 
was still bound to earth [terra obligatus] and refused to take service in your army [militare tibi]; I 
feared to be freed of all the things that impeded me [impedimentis omnibus], as strongly as I ought to 
have feared the being impeded by them. I was held down as agreeably by this world’s baggage 
[sarcina saeculi] as one often is by sleep… 
 
Phrases such as “forsaking the world” and being “held down by this world’s baggage” 
raise the notion that the enticement of secular honors has not totally disappeared. In 
addition, his need to be free of “all the things” impeding him reinforces the suggestion 
that his battle with lust is not necessarily his only current struggle. The imagery of 
military service, suggesting an austere, single-minded life of commitment to God, might 
also be taken as revealing his need to abandon worldly aspirations since the immediate 
context with the phrases above fortifies this understanding. It is true that shortly after that 
Augustine remarks how “it would be better to give myself to Your love rather than go on 
yielding to my own lust…” but the thoughtful wordplay here, juxtaposing a surrender to 
divine love with succumbing to his own desire, does not rule out the presence of struggle 
in areas beyond the sexual. Nonetheless, the prominence of sexual temptation in his life 
in that quotation illuminates again his earlier observation of how “tight bound” he was for 
the need of a woman. 
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Likewise, that struggle is listed first in his opening sentence about the visit of 
Ponticianus and the subsequent conversion scene in the garden, but the statement also 
includes his personal battle with achievement in the secular arena: “Now, O Lord,…I 
shall tell…how You delivered me from the chain of that desire of the flesh [de 
vinculo…desiderii concubitus] which held me so bound, and the servitude of worldly 
things [saecularium negotiorum servitute]” (8.6.13). The reference to the “chain” clearly 
hearkens back to the chain of lust that he discusses in 8.5.10, but the “servitude of 
worldly things” is his clearest statement yet in Book 8 that the weakness for secular 
achievement was addressed by his conversion and apparently needed to be. This imagery 
of servitude is bolstered a few lines later by Augustine’s brief remark about his 
“…business, under the weight of which I groaned […negotiis sub quorum pondere 
gemebam].” Even though our primary interest at this point would still be relevant 
passages in Book 8, in observing Augustine’s motif of the burdensome, dreary toil that 
his original desire for secular advancement had become, his other remark in 9.2.4 (after 
his conversion) is noteworthy: “Desire for money, which formerly had helped me to bear 
the heavy labor of teaching, was quite gone; so that I should have [had nothing to help me 
bear it and so] found it altogether crushing if patience had not taken the place of 
covetousness [recesserat cupiditas, quae mecum solebat ferre grave negotium, et ego 
premendus remanseram nisi patientia succederet].”368  
Back in Book 8, the story that Ponticianus told strengthens the theme of leaving a 
worldly life of achievement and embracing a single-minded military-type life of duty for 
God: the first Imperial agent was moved by what he read about Antony the monk, held 
the desire to take up a similar kind of life, and “the world dropped away from his mind 
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[exuebatur mundo mens eius]” (8.6.15). The second agent added that he would also join 
his companion “in so great a service [tantaeque militiae]” and likewise, their two fiancées 
“dedicated their virginity to You” after hearing about the commitment of the two men. In 
the next chapter Augustine’s remark about his previous prayer “Grant me chastity and 
continence, but not yet” (8.7.17) and his subsequent comments in this same section serve 
to highlight the prominence of his lust problem. However, Augustine’s use of continence 
in Confessions including his apparent distinction here between chastity and continence in 
his famous prayer is significant in pointing to his other struggles besides lust.
369
 For 
example, concerning the focus on continence that begins in 10.29.40, God’s command in 
the very next chapter that a person “contain” (continere) himself regarding all three of 
the triadic sins, pride, carnal lust, and curiosity (10.30.41) and also Augustine’s 
reiteration of the Apostle John’s warning to “contain ourselves” (continere se) against 
those same three in 13.21.29 are notable, thus indicating that Continence in 8.11.27, the 
conversion scene in the garden, does not necessarily refer to chastity only.
370
  
Moreover, in the next section after his famous prayer for continence (8.7.18), 
Augustine’s further comments keep his battle with his secular aspirations in the forefront: 
“I had thought that my reason for putting off from day to day the following of You alone 
to the contempt of earthly hopes [contempta spe saeculi] was that I did not see any 
certain goal towards which to direct my course.” In keeping with the imagery of the 
burden that his worldly goals had become, he chastises himself for telling himself 
previously that “you could not cast off vanity’s baggage [sarcinam vanitatis]” earlier 
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because of the need for certainty on what is true. Even though certainty has been reached, 
“yet you are still carrying the load [et illa te adhuc premit]. Here are men who have been 
given wings to free their shoulders from the load [umerisque liberioribus pinnas 
recipiunt], though they did not wear themselves out in searching nor spend ten years or 
more thinking about it.” So the image of the “load” and the example of the two men 
freeing themselves from it by leaving their public careers—despite an apparently much 
simpler search for truth—weigh heavily on Augustine’s mind as he compares their story 
to his own situation. 
The observations above concerning Augustine’s secular goals for achievement cause 
us to reexamine the images in 8.11.26, supposedly images of Augustine’s “past 
mistresses” that are still pulling at him: “Those trifles of all trifles, and vanities of 
vanities, my one-time mistresses […nugae nugarum et vanitates vanitantium, antiquae 
amicae meae]” were now figuratively “plucking at my garment of flesh and murmuring 
softly: ‘Are you sending us away?’” and “…the strong force of habit said to me: ‘Do you 
think you can live without them’ [cum diceret mihi consuetudo violenta, `putasne sine 
istis poteris’]?” Despite the mention of sordes and dedecora (“filth and shamefulness”) 
later in the passage, it seems improbable that the short interval between the arrival of 
Augustine in Carthage and the commencement of his common-law marriage would have 
allowed Augustine to have many amicae with a sexual meaning.
371
 Moreover, the efforts 
of these tempters to have him “look back [respicere]” can be compared to how Victorinus 
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“did not look back on vanities [non respiciebat in vanitates]” in his unflinching 
movement away from his secular career and toward baptism.
372
  
A consideration of verses 13 and 14 from Romans 13, the verses that Augustine 
quotes from in Book 8 as pivotal to his conversion, also provides clues concerning the 
experiential evil that is addressed by his conversion.
373
 However, since Augustine does 
not quote both in their entirety, the verses are fully given below with the use of 
O’Connell’s amplified translation for the sake of analysis:   
13: Let us walk honorably, as though in daylight; not in rioting and drunkenness, not in 
chambering and [acts of] shamelessness, not in contention and emulation--[or…perhaps more exact, 
“not in a spirit of contentiousness and mutual rivalry”: non in contentione et aemulatione], 14: but garb 
yourselves…in the Lord Jesus Christ,…exercise no carnal (or human) providence amid [or: in view of, 
on behalf of] your concupiscences [et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis].
374
 
 
Regarding the relevance of the last line, O’Connell observes that Augustine’s realization 
of his desire for “womanly embraces,” even in the context of Christian matrimony, 
necessitated that he “provide” (through working for a living) so that he could support 
such a wife and any child their union might produce.
375
 His concupiscences imposed the 
need for him to exercise this carnal kind of “providence” by engaging in a life of 
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business, negotium. In addition, O’Connell correctly notes how the line on 
“contentiousness and rivalry,” often ignored in commentaries on Book 8, definitely raises 
reminders about the competition in Augustine’s profession as rhetor and the burden that 
he felt his career had become. Therefore, although the words in Romans speak to 
Augustine’s struggles with lust, words addressing his life of secular ambitions were also 
present. Furthermore, after the garden scene Augustine speaks of losing worldly hopes 
[spem saeculi] in 8.12.30 as a result of the conversion, and Monnica indicates the same 
about him in 9.10.26. 
Yet O’Connell’s submission that the Romans passage did cut to the heart of 
Augustine’s dilemma—engaging in business (negotium) in effect to “support” his other 
concupiscences--should also be compared to a larger direction of dependence: 
Augustine’s initial acquiescence to the arrangement of a legal marriage because of his 
lust problem, but also a marriage that enables him to advance with his secular aspirations, 
a career which, consequently, would make the continuing marriage financially 
sustainable to begin with. In short, disregarding for a moment Augustine’s possible 
perception of adultery if he married,
376
 the symbiotic relationship that would exist 
between a legal marriage if it took place, and his various weaknesses called for a final, 
decisive break with those temptations at conversion in order to “contain” all of them in 
the future instead of a focus only on his battle with sexual temptation at that crucial time.  
However, if one focuses exclusively for a moment on Augustine’s break with his 
sexual struggles and subsequent commitment to celibacy, what were all the key factors 
that motivated him in this direction? First, it is true that the motif of military service in 
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the conclusion that Augustine essentially viewed the concubinage as a de facto marriage, thus making a 
legal marriage to someone else a case of adultery.  
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Augustine’s mind, noted in Book 8 and exemplified by the two agents, does support to 
some extent such a celibate life of commitment. A second factor, sometimes overlooked, 
involves the earlier influence of Cicero’s Hortensius to embrace the celibate life as part 
of a life devoted to pursuing wisdom.
377
 Nevertheless, the importance of the first 
concubine’s vow of celibacy constitutes a third factor. After his dismissal of the first 
concubine with his subsequent inability to commit to sexual renunciation in imitation of 
her own vow, Augustine has taken another concubine until his impending marriage.
378
 
All the same, he seems to be wearying of the idea of marriage. Although he recognizes 
that he is not obliged to reject the option of marriage, he appears to take the view that for 
him marriage would at best be an “honorable self-indulgence.” In short, Asiedu submits 
that although it is not clear when exactly Augustine began to rethink what possible path 
he might take to become a full-fledged member of the church,
379
 by the time he decides 
to visit Simplicianus (8.1.1), he has come to the point of equating conversion with 
continence.
380
 Nonetheless, Asiedu points to Augustine’s desire for a dream (6.13.23) 
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  Ibid., 251. James J. O’Donnell refers to research that helps to confirm that Hortensius fragments, in 
particular 74M, 80M, and 81M, “essentially” include an invitation to continence, and he suggests that 
Manichaeism, with its “presumed chastity of the elect,” was therefore attractive to Augustine. All the same, 
he allows for the possibility that the idea of continence attracted Augustine even before the Manichean 
period, thus even before his encounter with Cicero’s Hortensius. See James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: 
Confessions, vol. 3, 44. 
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  F. B. A. Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman: Augustine’s Conversion to Christianity in 
386,” Vigiliae Christianae 57, no. 3 (2003): 286. 
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  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 287. 
380  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 288. Asiedu also incorporates The Good of 
Marriage 5.5 into his analysis. He acknowledges how two slightly dissimilar situations are described there, 
how both pertain to Augustine’s situation, and notes how Augustine has exonerated his first concubine, not 
daring to accuse her of adultery. Based on these observations, along with Augustine’s good words in 
6.15.25 of the example that she set, Asiedu concludes that even if an inkling of this kind of thinking from 
both passages formed some part of Augustine’s perspective between the dismissal of the first concubine 
and his conversion in 386, then this interpretation would constitute the most certain explanation of 
Augustine’s situation. Marrying another woman, even one of “’his rank and fortune,’” implied adultery to 
Augustine, a factor that would be sufficient eventually to make continence in his thinking a “necessary 
corollary” to his Christian conversion. See Asiedu, 300. Power’s argument in the third chapter that 
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about his future situation with marriage (just after the Milanese girl had accepted 
Augustine’s proposal) as the initial sign of trouble regarding Augustine’s struggle with 
the marriage option versus a life of continence.
381
 By 8.6.13 Augustine is in the “throes of 
his anxieties, distraught over the prospect of having to consider a life of continence as an 
essential aspect to his possible conversion to Christianity.” In 8.11.27 the large number of 
people that Lady Continence shows him as she beckons for him to embrace the same kind 
of life is perplexing: Augustine’s encounter with figures with such a life was rather 
limited.
382
  Prior to the visit from Ponticianus, he knew quite little about Christian 
asceticism and even Ambrose’s own little community was only recent news to him. So 
Augustine’s only exposure was from the brief examples from Ponticianus and perhaps 
Augustine’s memory of individuals that he might have encountered around Milan. In 
view of this limited exposure and the presentation of Continence as a woman, Asiedu 
posits that the obvious, close example of Augustine’s own concubine and her own sexual 
renunciation after living with him for years would be uppermost in his mind, in particular 
with her example as the very one Augustine claimed previously that he could not follow 
(6.15.25).  
Finally, Asiedu argues that the brief reference to the concubine’s vow to God (to give 
herself to no other man in the future) is one of the conversion stories in Confessions. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Augustine probably perceived the first concubinage as a de facto marriage strengthens Asiedu’s point here, 
but one cannot be totally sure of his perception of the concubinage before his conversion.  
381
  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 294. Asiedu actually places the events above in a 
sequence right after the dismissal of Augustine’s first concubine, a dismissal that Asiedu views as largely 
Monnica’s doing even though the dismissal does not take place until 6.15.25. Nevertheless, the natural 
understanding that the dismissal must take place at some point in view of the upcoming marriage means 
that Asiedu’s point here should still be well taken. 
382
  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 295. 
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Besides noting the use of conversion narratives in Confessions in the broad sense,
383
 he 
posits that a parallel emerges with the two courtiers at Trier that renounce the world 
because of their Christian conversion (8.6.15).
384
 Their respective fiancées were left in a 
state of “marital limbo,” and both women also followed the example of both men, 
committing to chastity before God [dicaverunt etiam ipsae virginitatem tibi], a textual 
section covering the same semantic range as the vovens tibi of the concubine passage. 
Since basic vows of renunciation were leading people into becoming ascetics, many of 
which Augustine and others took to be genuine conversions in the fourth and fifth 
centuries, this observation strengthens the case that the concubine was doing the same.
385
  
Even though Asiedu’s line of reasoning cogently makes the concubine’s vow a 
crucial third reason, such an account is enhanced by the additional observations of 
Augustine’s desire to be a “winner,” including in the spiritual arena, part of a brief point 
raised by Power earlier in this chapter. This desire to be “on top” is compatible with the 
text concerning Augustine’s strong sense of shame at being so slow to commit to service 
for God (8.7.17) and with his powerful desire to imitate Victorinus and the two Imperial 
officials (8.5.10, 8.8.19). Even though the text does not necessarily showcase in explicit 
terms Augustine’s competitive streak as a source of his humiliation here, one can imagine 
that thought process in his mind, an attitude of “Can’t I do better than this?”, especially as 
part of the motivation behind the question of frustration that he poses to Alypius in the 
garden (8.8.19). In connection with all this, Augustine’s apparent disgust at being unable 
to imitate his concubine in her new commitment of celibacy conceivably increased his 
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384
  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 304. Asiedu also observes interesting parallels 
between the conversion of the unnamed friend in Book 4 and that of the concubine, 303-304. 
385
  Asiedu, “Following the Example of A Woman,” 305. 
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dissatisfaction even more: a woman whose limitations and weaknesses he was quite 
familiar with (and presumably from a lower social class) was exhibiting much greater 
spiritual maturity at this point than he himself, an observation that plausibly inspired him 
later to do the same, even beyond what Asiedu envisioned in his thesis. Therefore, 
regardless of his struggle with secular ambition, Augustine’s broader desire for 
achievement, whether in the secular arena or elsewhere, if viewed as a weakness in this 
context, was arguably a factor in addressing another weakness, the lust problem, in the 
narrative leading up to his conversion.  
But was the pull of ambition truly broken in Augustine’s life in Book 8? Love of 
praise (another aspect of this enticement discussed later in Book 10) is a serious concern 
of Augustine’s after his conversion, especially because of the difficulty of testing oneself 
in that area. Such considerations are included in the following section. 
 
                                               Post-Conversion Considerations 
 
A brief look at relevant passages in Books 9 and 10 sheds further light on the 
experiential aspect of evil. In 9.1.1 Augustine is quick to outline the new release from his 
experiential struggles as a result of the conversion experience from Book 8, including 
another use of the “vanities” phrase as part of his statement. Yet in the context of this 
passage such “vanities” refer to all three of his major struggles, not simply secular 
aspirations:  
How lovely I suddenly found it to be free from the loveliness of those vanities […carere 
suavitatibus nugarum], so that now it was a joy to renounce what I had been so afraid to lose. For You 
cast them out of me, O true and Supreme Loveliness…Now my mind was free from the cares that had 
gnawed it, from aspiring and getting and weltering in filth [ambiendi et adquirendi et volutandi] and 
rubbing the scab of lust [scalpendi scabiem libidinum]. 
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The term “lust” refers plainly enough to his sexual struggles, and the “aspiring” and 
“getting” (ambiendi et adquirendi) plausibly refer to his desires concerning ambition and 
money. The term “filth” could conceivably represent any or all of the three temptations 
even though the temptation involving curiosity is not explicitly in view anywhere else in 
the passage. 
With the decision to abandon his professorship (9.2) and his baptism under Ambrose 
(9.6.14), Augustine continues to move in his new Christian direction. But why wait as 
long as he did to be baptized? O’Donnell suggests that the time lapse was providential 
since his philosophical retreat with Monnica and friends at Cassiciacum provided a way 
to test his new resolve to avoid the same besetting sins as well as avoid the specific 
temptations that could be easily encountered in urban life.
386
 
However, in Book 10 Augustine is candid on the lingering nature of those 
experiential struggles while he affirms the great release from them that his conversion 
made possible. In 10.30.41 he is rather frank about the problem of lust after he opens 
with the entire triad of sins in his first statement in the passage:  
Assuredly You command that I contain myself from the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and 
the pride of life…You commanded me also to abstain from fornication, and in the matter of marriage 
You advised me a better course though You allowed me a less good. And since You gave me the 
power, it was so done, even before I became a dispenser of Your Sacrament. Yet there still live in my 
memory the images of those things, of which I have already spoken much, which my long habit had 
fixed there [quas ibi consuetudo mea fixit]. When I am awake they beset me though with no great 
power, but in sleep not only seeming pleasant, but even to the point of consent and the likeness of the 
act itself [sed etiam usque ad consensionem factumque simillimum].
387
  
 
But Augustine is apparently most troubled by the inherent difficulty in testing his 
progress with the third temptation, that of the “pride of life” or in Augustine’s case, his 
                                                          
386
  James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, vol. 3, 70. 
387
  Sheed’s use of italics to mark Augustine’s use of biblical passages shows, in this case, I John 2:16 
with the triad of sins that Augustine includes in his prayer here. 
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ambitions. Here he discusses it as the love of praise from others, a problematic area to 
test oneself in, in contrast to the other two temptations (10.37.60):  
…I am in great fear of my secret sins—sins that Your eyes see, though mine do not. For in those 
other kinds of temptation I have some power of examining myself, but in this [the love of praise] 
almost none. For I can see how far I have advanced in power to control my mind in the matter of the 
pleasures of the flesh and curiosity for vain knowledge: I can see it when I am without these 
things...But how are we to be without praise in order to discover our true attitude to praise?  
 
Noteworthy here is how “love of praise” is not necessarily confined to the secular 
arena—one can encounter that problem in other areas of life, an observation that we 
noted earlier in discussing his overall desire for achievement. Augustine explores the last 
question in the passage more fully throughout the rest of that section before moving to 
other subjects, but it is plain that the answers that he proposes are not as clear-cut as he 
would like. 
 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIL IN THE POST-MANICHEAN, NEO-PLATONIC,  
AND CHRISTIAN PERIODS 
 
 
The thread of the problem of evil that runs through Augustine’s life from the end of 
Book 5 through his Christian conversion in Book 8 and the aftermath of that event shows 
a close connection that exists between the intellectual and experiential aspects of the 
problem. Stated another way, Augustine’s two conversions, the intellectual and the 
moral, can be affirmed from the vantage point of his struggles with the problem of evil. 
This first conversion was a submission of the mind to God, whereas the moral 
conversion, in contrast, dealt with the submission of the will.  
The intellectual conversion included, of course, reading about and believing in a 
corrected view of God, which in turn paved the way for dealing with the intellectual 
aspect of the problem of evil including the nature of metaphysical evil and of moral evil. 
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Therefore, the intellectual aspect of the problem involved first a much needed corrective 
to Augustine’s understanding of God’s nature: his gradual move from a corporealist 
notion of God to the concept of a spiritual, sovereign entity, one that is totally separate 
from Augustine himself in contrast to the Manichean conception of deity that he had 
imbibed earlier. Concerning the experiential, even though Ambrose’s preaching begins to 
make Augustine more receptive again to the Christian Scriptures, which will eventually 
prove key to his conversion scene, in the meantime his struggles at the experiential level 
intensify. The encounter with the beggar illuminates Augustine’s misery in his 
occupation with his ambitions, and as we saw in the third chapter, his taking of a second 
concubine during this period after dismissing the first showcases how he is “a slave to 
lust.” 
It is no accident that the multitude of questions about evil that Augustine raises in the 
first few chapters of Book 7, along with his new openness to the idea of free will and a 
sense of responsibility for his own evil, emerge just after his experiential struggles 
outlined above. The experiential aspect of the problem and his resulting misery from it 
arguably create a fresh receptiveness in him to unconsidered solutions for the intellectual 
problem. Regarding the question of whether evil is ultimately traceable back to the 
Creator (a variation of the question of “whence evil?”), his encounter with writings of 
Neo-Platonism breaks the impasse by allowing him to think of God in non-corporeal 
terms and view metaphysical evil as a privation. The concept of privation, in turn, 
supports his understanding that creation as a whole is in harmony and the notion that a 
perverse will is the (deficient) cause of evil—no further cause should be sought after. 
From this last new insight with the intellectual problem, Augustine must now surely 
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realize how he is personally responsible for his own moral evil. Moreover, the ascents of 
the mind that Augustine achieves before and after his reflections on evil, harmony, and 
free will bring him to the level of certainty on his new understanding of God’s nature—
the conceptual lynchpin that makes all the other insights above possible. 
However, the resolution to the intellectual problem of evil is not enough to resolve his 
experiential struggles—the will must still be subdued. The depth of experiential evil is 
illuminated in Augustine’s quotation on how the “chain” of his own making, a chain from 
lust, held him back from following the soldiery example of Victorinus, whose final 
rejection of “vanities” Augustine needed likewise to imitate. Nevertheless, Augustine’s 
disgust with his own evil only reaches a tipping point after hearing about four other 
conversions, leading to the famous garden scene in which divine intervention through 
Scripture helps to subdue his will and address his experiential problem of evil through 
Christ the Mediator. This conversion event involves a focus on “continence” of all of 
Augustine’s evil, not simply lust. Ironically, the first concubine, who endured the most 
from his experiential struggles with lust was notably the key example that influenced his 
thinking to embrace chastity and address his experiential problem of lust by her very own 
act of commitment. Nonetheless, the initial exhortation from Hortensius to embrace 
celibacy, the Christian motif of military service in God’s army, and Augustine’s own 
ambitious desire to be successful in any endeavor were also significant factors. However, 
despite the seeming progress against the temptation of secular ambition before Book 8, 
the potential symbiosis with his experiential struggles that could have resulted from a 
legal marriage made a fuller break with them at conversion all the more crucial.  
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Augustine’s own post-conversion considerations highlight the lingering residue of 
experiential evil that stays with him as well as his realization that he is totally dependent 
on God’s grace concerning his “secret sins.” All the same, he stands by the decisive step 
taken, with God’s help, against experiential evil by his act of the will in the Milanese 
garden. At long last, the second of the two aspects of the problem of evil came to a final 
resolution in a small garden in Milan after years of struggle.  
    
                          
CRITIQUE OF AUGUSTINE’S CONTRIBUTIONS REGARDING EVIL 
 
 
Augustine’s approach of using free will to explain moral evil and also his privation 
model for explaining the metaphysical nature of evil are among the most well-known 
accounts of evil in the history of philosophy. Concerning the free will explanation itself, 
in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, 
which includes elements of Augustine’s free will account along with some tools of 
argumentation from modal logic, has brought new life to seminal ideas initially found in 
Augustine’s approach. This example is of notable interest since Plantinga’s version has 
justifiably been successful in largely warding off the traditional challenge that the 
existence of evil is logically incompatible with an all-good, all-powerful God. As a result 
of Plantinga’s effective counterargument, current debates over the problem of evil have 
largely shifted into new directions such as evidential considerations (e.g. Is the amount of 
evil that we see in the world really justifiable for the purposes that such evil is allowed 
for?)  
Contemporary philosophers are much more divided over the issue of Augustine’s 
privation understanding of metaphysical evil. Future interaction over the implications of 
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Augustine’s approach itself is necessary and has value as Rowan Williams’s engagement 
with Hick’s objections has made clear. Augustine’s privation model still certainly has its 
defenders,
388
 but some theologians that decry the influence of Greek philosophy on 
Christian theology throughout history do desire theological accounts to be framed in 
demonstrably biblical categories. Aside from the issue of categories, other questions 
arise: are privations in creation really unavoidable because of the ontological inferiority 
of matter in comparison to God? It is not immediately clear why the answer would need 
to be yes. Moreover, some Christian philosophers such as John Frame question whether 
such a model is compatible with the Christian Scriptures: would the statement of the 
goodness of creation in Genesis 1:31 also allow for privations to be present?
389
 Frame is 
doubtful and based on the robust view of God’s sovereignty that he believes the Bible 
teaches, such an understanding of God’s nature would make God just as responsible for 
the bad aspects of creation as for the good under Augustine’s privation solution.390  
A similar problem emerges in connection with God’s omnipotence and the idea that 
evil wills have no cause. Kermit Scott draws from On Free Choice of the Will to point to 
Augustine’s argument in Book 3 that creation is under God’s perfect control.391 Even the 
sin of fallen humans and those sinners themselves add in some way to God’s perfectly 
ordered universe, and yet, in no way does this perfect order depend on the existence of 
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those sins or sinners whatsoever.
392
 Scott holds that Augustine’s claim (in On Free 
Choice) that there is no cause of an evil will since it is “nothing” seems clearly false in 
view of Augustine’s earlier insistence in the same work that God is in total control of 
everything, a  position that includes all beings and events.
393
 Therefore, Augustine cannot 
successfully claim that God possesses both omnipotence and perfect goodness,   and 
when “push comes to shove,” omnipotence is the doctrine that Augustine will maintain at 
all costs.
394
 In short, Augustine’s determination not to bend the belief of God’s absolute 
control over the universe left him in a “radically uncomfortable” position of subsequent 
difficulties with the idea of God’s perfect goodness.395 This was the case despite the 
predominant idea of God’s goodness in the “imperial myth” of a sovereign God in 
Augustine’s culture that he was influenced by at that time.396 However, in Scott’s closing 
remarks in that section he recognizes how the power of that myth went far beyond 
Augustine:  
Augustine could preserve his conception of an imperial deity in absolute control of the universe 
only by sacrificing the justice of that deity, and the most marked incoherence in his thought comes 
from his inability to face that conclusion. That the incoherence went unchallenged by the Pelagians and 
others is due to the fact that no one was willing to assert that one must sacrifice either God’s perfect 
goodness or the absolute efficacy of his will. So powerful was the imperial myth.
397
 
 
Concerning experiential evil, Augustine’s account of the power of God to break 
through his weaknesses and cause significant life change with Christ as the Mediator 
brings to mind the perennial debate on the impact of religion in one’s life. Furthermore, it 
also raises the issue of absolute truth claims made by certain religions in relation to the 
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plurality of existing religions since religious diversity is on display perhaps even more 
today than in Augustine’s time. It is assuredly beyond the scope of this chapter to wade 
into the waters of debate on those topics, but it should at least be noted how Augustine 
was consistent throughout his life in his defense of Catholic Christianity as the true way 
to God: his resistance to splinter groups, heresies, other sects, and other religions was 
easily evident throughout his life as he responded to threats by the Donatists, Pelagians, 
and Manichees, for example, in his numerous writings. His defense of the Christian faith 
against the old Roman system of gods and against other groups in City of God quickly 
comes to mind as a notable example.  
Such are some of the key observations concerning Augustine’s account of the nature 
and origin of evil. Regardless of whether one agrees with Augustine’s account or not, the 
staying power of his efforts on these issues in the history of thought is impressive and 
difficult to deny. So although it may not be problematic to find those that disagree with 
elements of Augustine’s account, it is arguably more difficult to locate detractors that 
have no respect for his contributions to the enormously complex topic of evil in this early 
period of his life.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
     
     
Some final reflections are in order as we consider the two problems of evil in 
Confessions one last time and the lessons that Augustine’s journey can hold for us today. 
After first taking a final look at the role of the two problems throughout the narrative, we 
will then take into account several informative links between some contemporary 
explorations of evil and Augustine’s approach in Confessions. A final consideration of 
Augustine’s views on evil for the current culture closes this chapter.  
Concerning the overall patterns of evil in Confessions, the experiential aspect of the 
problem arguably dominates much of the narrative and serves as the “driving force” of 
Augustine’s journey throughout it. The experiential evil that Augustine engages in 
throughout the first two books of the work culminates in the pear theft in the last part of 
Book 2, a simple, yet revealing act that showcases the depths of his flight from God in 
the story. Augustine’s life-changing reading of Cicero’s Hortensius and his subsequent 
encounter with the Manichees and their questions serve to launch the intellectual aspect 
of his quest. 
However, his experiential weaknesses, a consuming desire for worldly success, an 
unrestrained curiosity about forbidden things, and a lustful love of his concubine, are in 
the forefront during his time with the Manichees. In spite of his hopes of finding an 
answer for the intellectual problem, a resolution that holds implications for his 
weaknesses, the Manichees’ experiential failure to live up to their own standards 
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convinces him of their inability to address satisfactorily the intellectual aspect of his 
problem, much less the experiential one. An additional experiential struggle, the heart-
wrenching experience of grief at his friend’s death, also displays the Manichees’ failure 
to help Augustine at any level. The experiential aspect is predominant in the next part of 
the narrative as well, as the intellectual questions that Augustine raises in Book 7 emerge 
after experiential encounters with his own evil in Book 6 (e.g. reflections on the beggar, 
his emotional turmoil after the first concubinage). The new answers that he finds through 
Neo-Platonism and Christianity not only deal with the intellectual problem effectively but 
also lead to a reinterpretation of the experiential in which he takes personal responsibility 
for his evil. In the end the final resolution of the experiential problem ultimately takes 
place through his Christian conversion.  
In short, despite Augustine’s strong intellectual bent the experiential aspect of the 
problem is in some ways the larger element that ties together the narrative. Yet perhaps 
the reader should not be surprised at this. Out of all of the sources that influence our 
pursuit of knowledge and happiness (reason, authority, tradition, etc.), experience 
conceivably plays the largest role in shaping the content of our beliefs and the direction 
of our decisions. The same is true, in a sense, in our motivation to address the 
experiential aspect of life and make necessary changes. Augustine has deep satisfaction 
with the answers that he has found for the intellectual problem. However, his comparison 
of himself to others (including his first concubine) that have seen changes in their own 
lives is the factor that finally provides him with the needed momentum to take action in 
the area of the experiential himself. 
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Augustine’s journey with both aspects of the problem of evil also offers some 
insightful similarities with contemporary explorations of the problem of evil. One 
example revolves around the obvious christological elements in Augustine’s resolution of 
the experiential problem. T. Work’s discussion of two kinds of theodicy is helpful at this 
juncture. Work outlines how the theistic cluster of theodicies, based on the doctrine of 
creation, tends to stress divine transcendence.
398
 In contrast, the christological cluster, 
based on the doctrine of redemption, has a tendency to place the stress on divine 
immanence.
399
 Stated another way, the theistic cluster, which places an emphasis on 
divine attributes such as immutability, impassibility, aseity, etc., is more metaphysical in 
nature and is expressed in philosophical language.
400
 The christological cluster, by 
contrast, is more of a practical nature, and is “embodied in the semiotics of the 
worshipping church.” Thus, although philosophically-minded theologians and even 
Church Fathers have formulated carefully developed theistic theodicies, such claims have 
no “practical embodiment” in church life401 and even have reached a level of infamy in 
congregational settings.
402
  
 In rejecting a merely theistic approach, Work points to the advantages of the 
christological approach as exemplified in the Christian church’s celebration of Advent.403 
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In contrast to the focus on divine sovereignty and human freedom in theistic-oriented 
solutions, he submits that the christological emphasis lies in God’s justice as made 
manifest in the past at the first Advent of Christ, in the present as Christ is active through 
his spiritual kingdom on earth, and in the future through the coming eschaton, beginning 
with the second Advent of Christ, in which all sin and pain will be wiped away forever.
404
  
In addition, such a liturgical celebration emphasizes an eschatological ethics of both 
mercy and justice that the church is responsible to carry out in the present day until the 
final realization of both in the eschaton.
405
 Why both? The exercise of mercy alone, God 
revoking his sentence of death against wayward humanity, would be compromising His 
justice.
406
 On the other hand, if God were to allow the sin of humanity or His own just 
wrath to annihilate those made in His image, either option would constitute an 
“embarrassing concession to evil.” The history of humanity would be one giant tragedy. 
Therefore, a “‘merciful justice’” contains both elements, punctuated by God’s own 
redemptive comings in human history to reassert His sovereignty and bring humanity 
ultimately to its final destination.  
God’s mercy is currently extended through the church, especially through its 
missionary witness.
407
 However, God’s justice, not only the exercise of it earlier in 
history
408
 but also the initial victory of Christ over natural corruption in the first Advent, 
energizes the church even now in living out the effects of that victory in anticipation of 
                                                          
404
  This summary is a compilation of key points from Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 
104-106.  
405
  Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 106. 
406
  Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 108. Work draws from Athanasius and Anselm 
here in discussing the dilemma of God’s either exercising mercy without justice or justice without mercy. 
407
  Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 106.   
408
  Work gives examples of justice from the Old Testament such as punishment of Egypt’s firstborn, 
Israel’s and Judah’s enemies, Israel and Judah themselves, and also from secular history including the 
punishment of Rome itself.  
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the establishment of final justice at the second Advent.
409
 The present-day exercise of 
civil justice by the state also helps to point to the eventual arrival of final justice under 
the divine.
410
 Thus, Advent views the problem of evil not as an objection brought against 
Christian theology and ethics but rather as forming a constructive part of them. Theodicy 
in this perspective is not primarily an intellectual task or even an existential one, but 
rather a praxis for the community of believers.
411
  
How does the classification of theodicy above relate to Augustine? Of course, as we 
noted before, Augustine’s treatment of the question of evil in Confessions is meant to be 
more one of explanation, not necessarily a robust justification such as the systems 
developed by Leibniz or John Hick. However, both types of theodicy are helpful 
categories in understanding Augustine’s dealings with evil. Concerning his answer to the 
intellectual aspect of the problem, he emphasizes the metaphysics of the transcendent 
God in addressing the nature and origin of evil, God’s immutability, incorruptibility, and 
inviolability, to show God’s separateness from evil and its origins and to acknowledge 
God’s ability ultimately to defeat it. His understanding of free will plays a crucial role as 
well, and so the key elements of his intellectual answer fit plausibly in the theistic-
oriented category of theodicy. 
As for the experiential aspect, Augustine’s focus in that area can naturally be linked 
more readily with some components of the christological approach to evil. Nonetheless, 
this link in Confessions primarily occurs because of Augustine’s position on the 
                                                          
409
  Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 109-110.  
410
  Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 110.  
411
  In his essay Work does address briefly how the christological approach would incorporate God’s use 
of both mercy and justice in a response to David Hume’s well-known challenge concerning God and evil. 
However, he readily acknowledges that such answers will not satisfy everyone, and despite this potential 
intellectual engagement of the christological approach, he still views the orientation as primarily a praxis-
centered one. See Work, “Advent’s Answer to the Problem of Evil,” 110-111. 
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“receiving end” of God’s present-day dealing with evil through the extension of mercy, 
an extension that is done through the church on the basis of Christ’s work on the cross in 
the first Advent. In Augustine’s own case, his evil is addressed through an encounter with 
Christ, but in a sense it is also through the church’s work of mercy that this encounter 
takes place.  
 Of course, Confessions focuses on evil at a personal level, not at a societal level in 
the way that City of God focuses on the issue.
412
 Nevertheless, one sees glimpses of the 
role of the church in Augustine’s personal battle with evil even in Confessions. Bishop 
Ambrose, perhaps unknowingly at first, plays a significant part in dealing with 
Augustine’s objections to Christian revelation in the first place. Augustine’s crucial 
discussion with the Christian Simplicianus is formative as the latter uses the conversion 
story of Victorinus to inspire Augustine. Ponticianus’ account of the impact that the book 
about St. Antony had on the two officials, itself an example of the church’s work in their 
conversion, and the subsequent effect on Augustine’s own turning point especially come 
to mind. However, even earlier factors such as Monnica’s prayers and example on his 
behalf as well as the presumable influence of the Christian believers in his hometown 
should also be noted. Indeed, through this very “defeat of present-day evil” process, 
which is also part of the larger work of mercy, the current spiritual kingdom, which is 
represented by the church, is expanded—one conversion at a time. From the 
christological perspective one could say that God is “retaking” His territory from evil.  
Stated another way, Augustine’s treatment of the intellectual problem reflects the 
orientation of the theistic cluster to a certain extent. The application of his answers to the 
                                                          
412
  Work’s contention of final justice in the coming eschaton brings to mind Books 20-22 in City of God, 
in which Augustine describes the elements of that justice on a large scale.  
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question of “Why evil?” may not satisfy the modern mind, but his stress on the 
experiential aspect arguably centers more on “how” questions. For instance, based on the 
examples of conversion above, the experiential element is helpful in relating how God, 
even now through His church, is eradicating evil, and Augustine himself is the key 
example in Book 8 of Confessions. If Kotze’s analysis of the protreptic features of the 
work is correct,
413
 then one purpose of Augustine’s masterpiece is to encourage the 
reader to deal with his own experiential evil through Christ as well.  
Other contemporary approaches to the problem of evil share some similarities with 
some aspects of Augustine’s treatment of evil. M. Adams views the question of “why?” 
as ultimately unanswerable, at least in the daunting cases of horrendous evil.
414
 As a 
result, she recommends a shift in focus to the “how,” even to the point of utilizing 
religion-specific values of what is “good” in contrast to the general values that have 
characterized answers proposed in the past.
415
 In Adams’s case, the “how” centers on 
how God could be sufficiently good enough to created individuals in a way that would 
defeat the horrendous case of evil that an individual went through and thus provide that 
person with a life as a great good to that individual on the whole.
416
 Thus, Adams’s 
approach concentrates on addressing the intellectual problem of evil, albeit by taking the 
discussion in a new direction.  
                                                          
413
  We initially considered Kotze’s protreptic/paraenetic interpretation of Confessions in the first chapter.  
414
  Marilyn McCord Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” in Philosophy of Religion: 
Selected Readings, 3
rd
 ed., eds. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 367. Regarding her understanding of horrendous evil, Adams 
points to cases such as participation in Nazi concentration camps, the slow experience of death through 
starvation, parental incest, and the detonation of atomic bombs over populated regions. 
415
  Ibid., 370-71. As a general example that the “how” can be satisfying without knowing the “why” of 
the situation, Adams uses the scenario of a two-year-old’s satisfaction from the comfort given by the 
mother as the two-year-old undergoes painful, but life-saving surgery. Even if the “why” of the surgery 
were explained to the two-year-old, the child would not understand it, a situation analogous to an adult’s 
incomprehension of God’s ways, as Adams suggests.  
416
  Ibid., 371. 
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Nonetheless, her emphasis on the “how” brings to mind the experiential problem of 
evil that Augustine grapples with in Confessions. In addition, her stress on defeating 
specific evil in the context of an individual’s life, in contrast to other methods that 
concentrate on generic or global theodicies,
417
 also provides a noteworthy similarity to 
Augustine’s personal need for evil in the context of his life to be defeated, a defeat of 
experiential evil that would provide him with a much better life on the whole. Of course, 
some clear differences also remain. Naturally, Adams’s center of attention is on cases of 
horrendous evil, unlike Augustine’s, since she believes that generic and global theodicies 
are not sufficient justification to an individual that goes through a particularly horrible 
occurrence of evil.
418
 Furthermore, much of the evil that Augustine endures results from 
his own weaknesses, not from the actions of others that Adams’s examples imply.419  
Coming from a different angle, philosopher John Frame views the narrative in the 
Bible as dealing with two problems of evil. The first involves the Old Testament problem 
of evil in which episodes of Israel’s suffering, often brought about by the nation’s 
disobedience, are addressed by God each time, but often after long periods as the people 
wait for deliverance.
420
 Moreover, the pattern of disobedience in Israel’s history brings 
the justice/mercy dilemma to the fore in God’s dealings with the Jewish people.421 Their 
rebellion calls for divine justice, not mercy, and yet the Old Testament prophets include 
both elements in their messages to the people.  
                                                          
417
  Ibid., 368. 
418
  Ibid., 369. 
419
  This is not to suggest, of course, that horrendous evils cannot be self-inflicted in some way. However, 
the case studies that come to mind are plausibly acts of evil caused by one agent against another person.  
420
  John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 
1994), 181-82. 
421
  Ibid., 182. 
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Frame then views the sacrificial death of Christ as a theodicy that resolves the 
justice/mercy impasse—the need for both is met through the Atonement to an astonishing 
degree.
422
 As a result, sufficient confidence has been given for trusting God for a future 
vindication with regard  to the second problem of evil—the issue of suffering and evil in 
the broader context of history.
423
 Even now, a proper theocentric perspective points to 
divine uses of evil for God’s ultimate glory, a “greater-good defense,” in a number of 
contemporary examples of evil,
424
 but God is also totally trustworthy for the evil not yet 
understood.
425
 Since Frame’s christological account concentrates more on the “how” 
instead of the “why,” Augustine’s approach is similar to some aspects of his account in a 
way that is comparable with Adams’s exploration above. Yet other observations  
also emerge. The experiential problem of evil that revolves around Israel’s travails in the 
biblical account, a problem resolved at the cross according to Frame, is reminiscent of 
Augustine’s own experiential problem that was resolved, in a sense, through the cross in 
Book 8. However, in Augustine’s case Christ’s death is the ultimate basis for the solution 
to Augustine’s experiential problem, whereas Frame’s treatment of the cross and the 
justice/mercy issue is more comparable with the direction of Work’s discussion. Yet both 
Frame’s and Augustine’s handling of the experiential is distinctly christological in nature, 
similar to Work’s approach.  
One might also suggest the presence of a large dissimilarity between Israel’s key role 
in Frame’s approach and Augustine’s own experiential struggles with evil. On the one 
hand, it is certainly true that Confessions deals with the experiential problem at a personal 
                                                          
422
  Ibid., 183. In particular, Frame references Romans 3:26 and 5:20-21 in the New Testament for this 
theodicy. 
423
  Ibid., 184. 
424
  Ibid., 184-85.  
425
  Ibid., 187.  
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level, not with the larger context of a nation such as Israel in the Old Testament. 
Nevertheless, the predominance of the experiential over the intellectual in driving both 
narratives, Augustine’s and the biblical account, is noteworthy. The second problem of 
evil that Frame outlines concentrates heavily on the experiential as well, but again at a 
macro-level in contrast to Augustine’s personal account. Yet if Confessions is also meant 
to convert the reader as we suggested earlier, then Augustine’s personal conversion is 
intended to serve as a model of sorts for others to respond to, a model that has 
implications at the macro-level long before Augustine’s fuller treatment of evil at that 
level in City of God.  
A final consideration of Augustine’s privation view and evil at the level of popular 
culture is useful for understanding some additional challenges regarding the problem of 
evil. J. Elshtain, drawing from A. Delbanco’s account, notes that the concept of sin as 
“‘privation’” is “‘almost inaccessible to the modern mind’” because modern thought’s 
tendency toward materialism is such that we “‘confuse a privative conception of evil, 
which should imply no reduction of its hideousness and virulence, with our own 
attenuated versions of evil as a concept that has disappeared into relativism.’”426 She 
correctly suggests that returning to the Augustinian understanding of the nature of evil is 
the way to “give…[evil] its due without giving it its day.” 
Elshtain goes further by pointing out the tendency at the level of popular culture to 
move toward a dualistic way of thinking, thus viewing evil as an active, generative 
power.
427
 Concerning pop culture, much entertainment at that level is “awash in Gothic 
                                                          
426
  Andrew Delbanco, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995), 48. Quoted in Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Why Augustine? Why Now?” 
Theology Today (April 1998): 10.  
427
  Elshtain, “Why Augustine? Why Now?” 10. 
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horror, with hauntings, slashings, and supernatural appearances of all kinds,” a trend in 
which the culture grants “more power to evil than to good.”428 As a result, regaining the 
Augustinian view of evil is critical because in that view “evil cannot generate. It can only 
reproduce itself through acts of debased mimesis.”429  
On the one hand, Elshtain is correct that one’s position on metaphysical evil is the 
starting point for instilling in society a more balanced perspective of evil, and the 
Augustinian model does hold much promise as a corrective to the current tendencies of 
the culture. However, as we saw in the fourth chapter, for Augustine the metaphysical 
view is a starting point that also leads to other important elements in one’s understanding 
of evil, including the unbalanced action/constraint relation between agents that Rowan 
Williams highlights and the responsibility that a free agent should take for wrong actions. 
All of these elements can be used together, not only for keeping evil in its place in the 
culture but also for reinforcing the idea of personal responsibility in the relational 
dynamic that all of us are a part of. 
The final reflections in this chapter help to confirm that Augustine’s journey and 
views in Confessions are not part of some archaic writings that have no bearing for today.  
All of us are on some kind of journey to come to grips with the basic elements of our 
daily experience, including the evil that we see around us, and Augustine’s famous work 
reminds us of the importance of the issues themselves and of interaction with others’ 
                                                          
428
  Although Elshtain originally made her observation on popular culture in 1998, as I write this, recent 
movies such as Fright Night, Paranormal Activity, and even older films like The Blair Witch Project 
illustrate her point here. Thus, it seems that the fascination with the horror genre continues unabated and in 
a way that arguably goes beyond the thrill that some people gain simply because they enjoy being scared. 
429
  Regarding examples of totalitarian evil (Hitler and Stalin), their orders had to work in such a way so 
as to destroy the “living tissue” of civilized society, largely by fostering immoral acts of “thoughtless 
habituation.” In contrast, the courageous villagers of Le Chambon that risked their lives to save refugees 
from Nazi horror acted out of habit and character, and their acts were “generative…opening up new 
possibilities for decency.” See Elshtain, 11. 
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experience and beliefs in grappling with those concerns. In addition, both the intellectual 
problem and the experiential problem throughout his work also serve to keep us balanced 
in our pursuit of truth in these areas: an active inner life of the mind, and yet one that is 
never divorced from the daily struggles of our life experience. Regardless of what readers 
of Confessions may think of his final conclusions, they are all the more enriched by his 
active use of both the intellectual and experiential aspects in the pursuit of questions that 
greatly affect us all.  
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